Adcock v. State
| Decision Date | 10 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A03–1504–PC–147.,20A03–1504–PC–147. |
| Citation | 42 N.E.3d 173 (Table) |
| Parties | Donald S. ADCOCK, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Jay M. Lee, Deputy Public Defender Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
ROBB
, Judge.
[1] On August 20, 2009, Donald Adcock entered a plea of guilty to two counts of child molesting as Class C felonies. The trial court accepted Adcock's plea, entered a judgment of conviction on both counts, and sentenced him to sixteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Thereafter, Adcock filed a petition for post-conviction relief wherein he alleged his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was involuntary. The post-conviction court denied Adcock's petition. Adcock appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, raising two issues for our review, which we restate as: 1) whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding trial counsel was not ineffective, and 2) whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding his guilty plea was not made involuntarily. Concluding counsel was not ineffective and that his guilty plea was not made involuntarily, we affirm.
[2] On January 7, 2009, twelve-year-old C.S. complained to authorities her stepfather, Adcock, had touched her vagina multiple times over a two-year period when she was around the age of nine or ten. When interviewed by a forensic interviewer, C.S. stated Adcock would come into her room and touch her vagina under her clothes and on the skin. When interviewed by police, Adcock admitted to rubbing C.S.'s vagina multiple times.
[3] On April 9, the State charged Adcock with two counts of Class C felony child molesting. On May 19, Susan Snyder, the deputy prosecuting attorney, tendered a plea offer to Adcock's counsel, Fay Schwartz:
My review of Mr. Adcock's criminal history shows that he has two prior class D felonies for possession of marijuana. My initial thought, after reading the sentencing enhancement statutes, is that Mr. Adcock is habitual eligible. In an effort to dispose of this case in a manner other than trial, the State is willing to extend the following plea agreement in exchange for your client's guilty plea: Any sentence authorized by law but no more than 35 years to be executed.
Appellant's Exhibit D. After Schwartz expressed concern as to whether Adcock was, in fact, habitual eligible, Snyder discovered Adcock was indeed not habitual eligible. As negotiations continued, Snyder indicated to Schwartz the State may consider amending the charges to add either, or both, Class A felony child molesting and Class A attempted child molesting, but did not do so originally because Adcock confessed.
[4] On June 11, Snyder tendered a final plea offer. According to Schwartz's notes,1 the State's final offer was for sixteen years, and the offer was to remain open for one week. Per the note, if the parties could not reach an agreement, Snyder would file an “ ‘A’ and felony enhancement.” Appellant's Ex. H. Despite the note's ambiguity, Schwartz acted under the impression that, in exchange for a guilty plea, the State would not charge Adcock with a Class A felony. Schwartz relayed the State's offer to Adcock. Adcock accepted the State's offer.
[5] On June 18, the trial court convened under the premise an agreement had been reached for Adcock to plead guilty and, in exchange, the State would forego the Class A felony charge. When the trial court asked Adcock whether he understood he would be entering a plea of guilty in exchange for the State not filing a Class A felony, Adcock responded affirmatively. Due to confusion as to whether the sentence was to be capped or fixed at sixteen years, however, the trial court found there was no agreement between the parties. The trial court continued the hearing for one week.
[6] On June 25, the trial court reconvened, and the parties proposed the same plea agreement they attempted to enter a week prior. In exchange for the State forgoing the filing of a Class A felony, Adcock entered a plea of guilty on both counts of child molesting as Class C felonies and agreed to a fixed sixteen-year sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction. Per the agreement, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on both counts and sentenced Adcock to eight years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total of sixteen years.
[7] On August 5, 2013 Adcock filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Adcock's petition was later amended by counsel. In his second amended petition, Adcock claimed his trial counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was involuntary. Specifically, he argued his guilty plea had been induced by the State's threats to add an habitual offender enhancement and/or a Class A felony child molesting charge, threats which were illusory because he could not be convicted of either. Therefore, he claimed, counsel was deficient in relaying the illusory threats to him as viable threats.
[8] On January 6, 2015, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, and on April 22, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Adcock's petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal ensued.
[9] Post-conviction procedures create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, and those challenges must be based on the grounds enumerated in post-conviction rules. Parish v. State, 838 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)
. A post-conviction proceeding is a civil proceeding, and the defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
[10] A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief “faces a rigorous standard of review” on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind.2001)
. In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgement. Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind.2006). “On appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses.” Rowe v. State, 915 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. The post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief will be affirmed unless the evidence leads “unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ind.2002). Only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court reached the opposite conclusion, will the court's findings or conclusions be disturbed as being contrary to law. Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 469. Finally, we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions, but do accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind.2002) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830 (2003).
[11] We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 (1998). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show 1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) the lack of reasonable representation prejudiced him. Randolph v. State, 802 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. To satisfy the first prong, the petitioner must show counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and counsel committed errors so serious petitioner did not have the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind.2006). To satisfy the second prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).
[12] The standard for prejudice in a guilty plea setting, however, is stated slightly different. When a defendant contests his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the same two-part test from Strickland discussed above. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985)
. The first part, regarding counsel's performance, is largely the same. Id. The prejudice requirement, however, Id. at 59.
[13] Under this standard, “[c]ounsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and we will accord those decisions deference.” Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind.2001)
, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 839 (2002). When reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we presume counsel rendered adequate legal assistance. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. To overcome this presumption, the defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence. Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.
[14] Adcock contends trial counsel rendered deficient performance when she advised him to enter a guilty plea in response to the State's illusory threats of adding an habitual offender enhancement and filing a Class A felony charge. Thus, in order to determine whether counsel was deficient, we must determine first whether an habitual offender enhancement and the filing of a...
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