Addison Ins. Co. v. 4000 Island Boulevard Condo. Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–21777–CIV–WILLIAMS
• Citation: 263 F.Supp.3d 1266
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: ADDISON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. 4000 ISLAND BOULEVARD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Defendants.

263 F.Supp.3d 1266

ADDISON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.4000 ISLAND BOULEVARD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 15–21777–CIV–WILLIAMS

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

September 22, 2016

Order Clarifying Decision Dec. 23, 2016.

Order Granting Reconsideration in Part March 8, 2017.

Brett Purcell Owens, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Tampa, FL, Bruce Allen Aebel, Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff.

David Brian Haber, Miami, FL, Alexander Brockmeyer, Mark Andrew Boyle, Boyle & Leonard, P.A., Fort Myers, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Addison Insurance Company ("Addison") (DE 46). All three Defendants—4000 Island Boulevard Condominium Association, Inc. ("4000 Island"); Poma Construction Corp. ("Poma"); and Windsor Metal Specialties, Inc. ("Windsor")—filed responses in opposition (DE 53, DE 55, DE 58), and Addison filed a reply (DE 60). In its motion, Addison argues that "it has no duty to defend or to indemnify any party for the allegedly defective balcony railings." (DE 46 at 3). Defendants, for their part, argue that material issues of fact remain regarding Addison's obligations and that a determination on Addison's duty to indemnify is premature in light of the status of the underlying dispute, which is pending in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court for Miami–Dade County. (See, e.g., DE 53 at 5–8; DE 55 at 2–3, 8–15; DE 58 at 4–7).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers the evidence in the record, "including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The Court "must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant." Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the Court's task is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. DISCUSSION

As the Parties all note in their briefs, there is a dearth of information regarding nearly all of the critical facts involved in this litigation. Though the parties disagree as to the reason for this information void,¹ they all state that almost no discovery has been conducted, despite the fact that this case was initiated in May 2015 and the Parties requested and were given extensions to nearly every deadline set by the Court. (See, e.g., DE 9, DE 12, DE 30, DE 36, DE 48, DE 50, DE 51). Addison now seeks to argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This assertion, however, cannot be squared with the record or the controlling case law relating to both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify,

a. Duty to Defend

Under Florida law, an insurer's duty to defend its insured against legal action is quite broad, and "is determined by comparing the allegations contained within the four corners of the underlying complaint with the language of policy." See Jones v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n Inc., 908 So.2d 435, 443 (Fla. 2005) ; Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Yachtman's Inn Condo Ass'n, Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 1319, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Put differently, the duty to defend "is determined solely from the allegations in the complaint against the insured, not by the true facts of the cause of action against the insured, the insured's version of the facts or the insured's defenses." Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co., 657 F.3d 1135, 1141–42 (11th Cir. 2011) ; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tippett, 864 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("The trial court is restricted to the allegations set forth in the complaint, regardless of what the insured or others say actually happened."); Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 470 So.2d 810, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In light of this unequivocal rule, Addison's arguments about the veracity of the allegations contained in the complaint fail, as a matter of law, to warrant summary judgment in its favor.

Addison's arguments about 4000 Island's amendments to the state court complaint and citations to deficiencies in the original state court complaint are similarly unavailing. The case law makes clear that an insurer's duty to defend "is determined from examining the most recent amended pleading, not the original pleading." Trailer Bridge, 657 F.3d at 1142 ; see also Eastpointe Condo. I Ass'n, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 664 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ("Ordinarily, the duty to defend is determined by the most recent amended pleading, not the original pleading."), aff'd, 379 Fed.Appx. 906 (11th Cir. 2010) ; Baron Oil Co., 470 So.2d at 815 ("[W]hen an original complaint has been superseded by an amended complaint, the original complaint can no longer furnish a basis for determining the insurer's duty to defend."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So.2d 992, 995–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)approved sub nom. Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 So.2d 5 (Fla. 2004), 788 So.2d at 995–96 ("When an amended complaint supersedes an earlier one, the allegations of the amended complaint control the duty to defend"). Under this framework, 4000 Island's allegations that "the attendant concrete balcony areas including surfaces have been damaged" and that "the defective railing system, including the defective paint finish, have caused and will continue to cause damage to other property including but not limited to the railing post pockets, the balcony concrete slabs and finishes on the balcony concrete slabs" are the controlling allegations for determining Addison's duty to defend. (DE 46 at 6; DE 47–7 (Second Amended State Court Complaint) ¶¶ 14, 18, 23). Accordingly, the Court finds that Addison has failed to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, "it has no duty to defend ... any party for the allegedly defective balcony railings." (DE 46 at 3).²

III. Duty to Indemnify

"It is axiomatic that 'an insurer's duty to indemnify is not ripe for adjudication in a declaratory judgment action until the insured is in fact held liable in the underlying suit." Evanston Ins. Co. v. Gaddis Corp. , 145 F.Supp.3d 1140, 1153 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (collecting cases); see also Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. M/V SEABOARD VICTORY, No. 08-CIV-21811, 2009 WL 812024, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2009) ("It is well-settled ... that because an insurer's duty to indemnify is dependent on the outcome of a case, any declaration as to the duty to indemnify is premature unless there has been a resolution of the underlying claim."). Considerations of "comity, federalism and judicial economy all favor letting the state court action proceed unaffected by any rulings on indemnity." S. Coatings, Inc. v. Century Sur. Co., No. 07-80558-CIV, 2008 WL 954178, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2008). As such, because the underlying litigation is ongoing and no liability has been established, the Court finds that a determination of Addison's duty to indemnify is premature at this juncture.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing and upon a review of the motion and the record, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Addison's motion for summary judgment (DE 46) is DENIED .

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers in Miami, Florida, this 21 September, 2016.

ORDER ON MOTION TO CLARIFY

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Windsor Metal Specialties, Inc.'s motion for clarification (DE 89), which relates to the Court's prior order (DE 76) denying Plaintiff Addison Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment. Addison filed a response in opposition to the motion for clarification (DE 92), and Windsor filed a reply (DE 98). On November 1, 2016, the Court held a hearing to address the outstanding pretrial motions, including Windsor's motion for clarification. Specifically, the Court shared its concern about proceeding to trial in light of its inability to identify the outstanding issues of fact that would be material to Addison's duty to defend Windsor, and gave both Parties an opportunity to be heard.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is a declaratory judgment action arising out of Windsor's provision of allegedly defective aluminum balcony railings, which were installed on the premises of 4000 Island Boulevard Condominium Association, Inc. by Poma Construction Corporation. (DE 24 ¶ 9). All three entities were initially named as defendants in this case. On August 24, 2015, the Court entered a scheduling order, setting the dispositive motions deadline for June 20, 2016. (DE 21). Addison was the only party to timely move for summary judgment.¹

In its summary judgment motion (DE 46), Addison sought a finding by the Court that "it ha[d] no duty to defend or to indemnify any party for the allegedly defective balcony railings" that are at the center of this dispute. (DE 46 at 3). Each of the three Defendants filed a separate response in opposition (DE 53, DE 55, DE 58). On September 21, 2016, the Court issued an order denying summary judgment based on its finding that (1) a determination on the duty to indemnify was premature in light of the ongoing state court case and (2) Addison had failed to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, it had no duty to defend. (DE 76 at 4, 5). The Court also noted in a footnote that there were a number of genuine...