Addison Tp. v. Gout
| Decision Date | 11 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 83379 |
| Parties | ADDISON TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellant, Board of County Road Commissioners of the County of Oakland, Intervening Plaintiff, v. Peter GOUT, Lakeville Gas Associates, and Department of Natural Resources, State of Michigan, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 435 Mich. 809, 460 N.W.2d 215 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Counsel of Record, Thomas J. Emery, James E. Riley, Roland Hwang, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for Dept. of Natural Resources.
Robert L. Bunting, L. Nicholas Treinen, Oxford, for plaintiff/appellant, Addison Tp.
Roland Whang, for defendant/appellee, State of Mich., Dept. of Natural Resources, Lansing.
John A. DeMarco, Troy, for defendants/appellees, Lakeville Gas.
Nancy T. Slutsky, Birmingham, for intervening plaintiff, Road Com'n.
John H. Bauckham, Carol L.J. Hustoles, Kalamazoo, for amicus curiae.
Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones by Michael C. Haines, John M. De Vries, Grand Rapids, for amicus curiae Michigan Oil & Gas Ass'n.
Addison Township and Michigan Consolidated Gas Company entered into a contract in 1973 which allowed Michigan Consolidated to construct a natural gas processing plant within the township. The plant was intended to be used exclusively for gas produced from Leonard Field. In 1989, Michigan Consolidated sold its interest in the plant to defendant Gout, doing business as Lakeville Gas Associates.
The township subsequently filed this lawsuit as a result of defendant's attempt to construct a pipeline for the purpose of processing gas from outside Leonard Field. Defendant complied with state and federal regulations, obtaining all the permits necessary to construct the pipeline. The complaint asserts, inter alia, that defendant's actions violated its zoning ordinance and special use permit.
Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the Supervisor of Wells had exclusive jurisdiction and that this type of zoning could not be accomplished by contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, but remanded the case on other grounds. 171 Mich.App. 122, 429 N.W.2d 612 (1988). Plaintiff appealed in this Court, and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in an opinion per curiam. 432 Mich. 627, 443 N.W.2d 139 (1989). Defendant filed a motion for rehearing, and we granted leave to appeal. 433 Mich. 1201, 444 N.W.2d 528 (1989).
The issue before us is one of statutory construction, specifically, whether or not processing plants and pipelines fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supervisor of Wells pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 125.271; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(1). 1
After entertaining oral argument, and given further consideration, we are convinced that the rule set forth in our earlier opinion is the correct result.
The Township Rural Zoning Act (TRZA) is an enabling statute which gives authority to a municipality to regulate land use. The statute is a broad grant of authority with one limitation: the Supervisor of Wells has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate and control the drilling, completion, and operation of "oil or gas wells." The statute is clear and unambiguous and accordingly must be applied as written. We hold that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supervisor of Wells applies only to oil and gas wells and does not extend to all aspects of the production process. The legislative intent is clear from the language of the statute, and drawing distinctions on such matters is clearly a legislative and not a judicial function.
We find unconvincing the defendant's arguments that the Legislature intended to vest in the Supervisor of Wells, through the oil, gas and minerals act (OGMA), 2 regulatory control over the entire oil and gas industry. First we note that the brief filed on behalf of the Department of Natural Resources concedes that this legislative scheme does not evidence any intent for the Supervisor of Wells to have absolute regulatory power over all phases of the industry. Second, the Legislature specifically referred to the OGMA and only "jurisdiction relative to wells" when it enacted the TRZA. Finally, defendant's argument is unpersuasive because the regulation of wells is only excluded as to townships. There is no limitation in the city or village zoning act. 3 This enabling act is substantially the same as the TRZA, granting to the individual municipality the authority to regulate land use and structures consistent with the needs of its citizenry regarding energy and other natural resources generally and without limitation. Implicit in the preclusion of township zoning "relative to wells" is that without the language zoning jurisdiction would extend to such activity and in fact does so in the other municipal zoning enabling act.
Defendant relies on the principles enumerated in People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977), to support its claim of intent by the state to occupy the entire regulatory field. 4
A municipality is precluded from enacting an ordinance if 1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme, or 2) if the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of theordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation. [Id. at 322, 257 N.W.2d 902.]
Because there is no express intent to preempt local regulation, except as to the zoning of wells, we must determine if the Legislature has by implication preempted all local regulation of the oil and gas industry. We hold that no such intent is evidenced in the legislative scheme. To ascertain legislative intent we look to the purposes of the statutes. 5 The purposes of the separate regulatory acts do not conflict, nor do they suggest that uniformity is necessary to effectuate these distinct legislative goals. 6 The duty of the Supervisor of Wells to prevent waste as set forth in the OGMA clearly differentiates between the supervisor's role at each phase of the production of natural resources. We find this action by the Legislature to denote an apparent distinction when the term "wells" was used in the TRZA.
The defendant's expansive view of the preemptive language in the TRZA to include all aspects of the production process is also not supported by the claim that uniformity is necessary because of permit requirements before transporting and processing oil and gas. The permits defendant received were not issued by the Supervisor of Wells, but rather were acquired from the DNR and Michigan Public Service Commission pursuant to other regulatory authority. Further, they were issued for only a limited purpose. We find defendant's assertion that merely because it was required to obtain permits that have a limited purpose it should be allowed to bypass municipal regulation lacking in authority and merit. Only in very rare instances will a permit issued for one purpose obviate local zoning laws.
For these reasons and those initially set forth in our opinion, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We again instruct the trial court that on remand it 432 Mich. 637, 443 N.W.2d 139.
I concur, in part, because I agree that the defendants' argument, to the extent based on permit requirements for the transportation and processing of oil and gas, 1 should be rejected, and with the following statement in the opinion of the Court:
2
I also concur because the Director of the DNR, who acts as the Supervisor of Wells, 3 has not sought to exercise authority under the oil, gas and minerals act. 4
The Attorney General has filed a brief on behalf of the people and the DNR asking that this Court:
The opinion of the Court states that the question presented is "whether or not processing plants and pipelines fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supervisor of Wells pursuant to [the Township Rural Zoning Act], MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1)." 8 This Court's order granting leave to appeal did not state a question or limit the grant. 9 Whether or not processing plants and pipelines fall within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Supervisor of Wells, processing plants and pipelines may, nevertheless, if the Supervisor of Wells chooses to exercise authority in particular circumstances, be within his nonexclusive but primary jurisdiction under the oil, gas and minerals act. The Director of the DNR did not, however, seek, in the instant case, to...
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