Addison v. State Of Ind.
| Decision Date | 16 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-1006-CR-354,49A05-1006-CR-354 |
| Parties | JOEY ADDISON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ELLEN M. O'CONNOR
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, Judge
Joey Addison appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, for murder, 1 a felony.
We affirm.
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Addison's Batson2 challenges.
2. Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence.
Addison is African-American. At the time of the incident below, he resided at 202 N. Hendricks Place in Indianapolis. In approximately July of 2008, his neighbors noted his transformation from a courteous neighbor into a reclusive, paranoid, and troubled person. He had shed over one hundred pounds, shaved his characteristically long braided hair, and voluntarily ceased his employment.
On December 19, 2008, Addison emerged from his house, wearing a tuxedo and carrying two handguns. He fired multiple gunshots at Gerrod Scott Scales, who he suspected was a trained assassin intent on killing him. Scales was mortally wounded. Afterwards, Addison surrendered peacefully to responding police. A search of his house, pursuant to a search warrant, yielded two nine-millimeter pistols. Ballistic testing positively linked bullets recovered from Scales' body and casings recovered from the crime scene to one of Addison's guns.
On December 22, 2008, the State charged Addison with Count I, murder, a felony; and Count II, carrying a handgun without a license, as a class A misdemeanor.3 On January 27, 2009, Addison filed a notice of insanity defense pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-36-2-1. The trial court appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate Addison's competency to stand trial.4 On May 21, 2009, the trial court convened a competency hearing. Dr. Ned Masbaum and Dr. George Parker testified that Addison lacked the ability to communicate pertinent facts to his counsel or to otherwise assist in his legal defense; and, further, that Addison was of unsound mind and unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the shooting. The trial court deemed Addison incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction to be confined in an appropriate psychiatric institution.
In September of 2009, after a hearing, Addison was deemed competent to stand trial. The trial court set a jury trial setting of April 19, 2010. On April 7, 2010, he filed a notice of deposition with the trial court, wherein he advised the State of his intention to depose his sister, Lola Hall ("Lola"), an Atlanta, Georgia resident. That day, the State filed a motion in limine to bar Addison from calling Lola to testify regarding his background and mental health history. On April 9, 2010, counsel for Addison conducteda telephonic deposition of Lola. The State had received prior notice, attended the deposition, and took advantage of its opportunity to cross-examine Lola.
On April 19 and 20, 2010, the trial court conducted Addison's jury trial. During round one of voir dire, the State used peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors Henderson, Pettigrew, and Turner--three of the four African-American potential jurors--from the venire. Addison raised a Batson challenge, alleging that the State had used its peremptory challenges for a racially discriminatory purpose, and also moved for mistrial.
After the State offered its race-neutral rationale for striking Henderson, Pettigrew and Turner, Addison conceded5 that the peremptory challenges regarding Henderson and Pettigrew were appropriate; however, as to Turner, he continued his Batson objection. The trial court heard and accepted the State's race-neutral rationale for striking Turner, overruled Addison's Batson challenge, and denied his request for a mistrial. Subsequently, during round two of voir dire, the State used a peremptory challenge to remove Swanigan--the sole remaining African American potential juror--from the venire. Counsel for Addison made another Batson challenge and renewed his motion for mistrial. The trial court accepted the State's race-neutral rationale for striking Swanigan, overruled the Batson challenge, and denied the motion for mistrial.
During the trial, the State renewed its motion in limine, seeking to bar Addison from introducing Lola's deposition testimony. The trial court granted the State's motion, concluding that Addison had neither demonstrated that Lola's testimony was relevant nor that she was legally unavailable. The jury thereafter found Addison guilty, but mentally ill of murder, and on May 14, 2010, the trial court imposed a forty-five year sentence. Addison now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Addison first argues that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge. A trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is racially discriminatory is afforded great deference, and we will set aside the decision only if it is clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 830 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. This deference is not absolute, however; courts need not accept "any facially neutral reason" for striking a juror and should consider "'all relevant circumstances'" in assessing Batson-challenged peremptory strikes. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court determined that the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Ind. 2008). The Batson Court set forth the followingthree-step test for determining whether a peremptory strike has been improperly used to disqualify a potential juror on the basis of race:
First, the party contesting the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of race. Second, after the contesting party makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the party exercising its peremptory challenge to present a race-neutral explanation for using the challenge. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is proffered, the trial court must then decide whether the challenger has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Our Supreme Court has held that the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only African American venire person on the panel establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004); see also Graham v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (). Here, the State used its peremptory strikes to remove Pettigrew, Henderson, Turner, and Swanigan--the only African American venire persons; thus, the trial court properly found that Addison made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury selection process.
Next, pursuant to Batson, the State was required to present race-neutral explanations for removing potential jurors Turner and Swanigan. A "race-neutral explanation" is "an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror." McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1111.
The record reveals that the State expressed concern that Turner would be overly deferential to the medical experts' opinions regarding whether Addison was legally insane at the time of the offense. As to Swanigan, the State explained that it had misgivings about him because he had previously served as a juror in a homicide/feticide trial that resulted in a not guilty verdict.
Inasmuch as Addison claims that the State's explanations were unsupported and applied as well to non-African American jurors who were permitted to serve, we cannot agree. He invites us to employ a more stringent legal test than has been prescribed by the United States Supreme Court, which has "declared that the race neutral explanation must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, but [] need not be 'persuasive, or even plausible.'" McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1110 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 768 (1995)). The United States Supreme Court has noted further that " " McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1110 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the State's proffered explanations were facially valid and that no racially discriminatory intent was inherent therein; thus, the State had offered permissible race-neutral bases for striking potential jurors Turner and Swanigan. The trial court's rejection of Addison's Batson challenges was not clearly erroneous.
Next, Addison argues that the trial court erred "in not finding defense witness Lola Hall unavailable and admitting her sworn deposition testimony regarding [his] history of mental illness which was relevant to the issue of insanity." Addison's Br. at 11. He maintains that in light of Lola's refusal to travel from Georgia to testify at his trial, the trial court should have admitted her prior deposition testimony...
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