Addison v. Whittenberg

• Decision Date: 22 September 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 65813,65817,65822,s. 65813
• Citation: 529 N.E.2d 552,124 Ill.Dec. 571,124 Ill.2d 287
• Parties: , 124 Ill.Dec. 571 Franklin ADDISON, Appellee, v. James M. WHITTENBERG, M.D., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 552

529 N.E.2d 552

124 Ill.2d 287, 124 Ill.Dec. 571

Franklin ADDISON, Appellee, v. James M. WHITTENBERG, M.D., et al., Appellants.

Nos. 65813, 65817, 65822.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 22, 1988.

Michael F. Dahlen, Richard A. Green, Feirich/Schoen/Mager/Green, Carbondale, for Randolph Hosp. d/b/a Chester Memorial Hosp.

Gary D. McConnell, Andrew D. Dillon, Shepherd, Sandberg & Phoenix, P.C., St. Louis, Mo., for James M. Whittenberg.

Lee Ellen Starkweather, James W. Sanders, James W. Sanders and Associates, Marion, for Franklin Addison.

Dennis E. Rose, Donovan, Rose, Nester & Szewczyk, P.C., Belleville, for Shoss Radiological Group, Inc.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Franklin Addison, brought this action in the circuit court of Randolph County against the defendants, James M. Whittenberg, M.D., Shoss Radiological Group, Inc., and the Randolph Hospital District, d/b/a Chester Memorial Hospital, alleging medical malpractice. Following a hearing, the trial judge granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed that decision and remanded the cause for further proceedings. (159 Ill.App.3d 585, 111 Ill.Dec. 172, 512 N.E.2d 76.) We allowed the defendants' separate petitions for leave to appeal (see 107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and the causes were consolidated for purposes of argument and disposition.

The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on January 17, 1981, and was admitted that day to Chester Memorial Hospital, in Chester. There, X rays were taken of the plaintiff's spine and neck area, and he was treated for a strained neck and bruised shoulder. The plaintiff was discharged from Chester Memorial Hospital on January 20, 1981. Later that day the plaintiff entered a Veterans Administration hospital in Marion, where doctors, on the basis of their own X rays and examination of the plaintiff, diagnosed him as having a fractured vertebra of the neck. On January 22 the plaintiff was transferred to a Veterans Administration hospital in St. Louis for further treatment.

The plaintiff commenced the instant action on January 17, 1983, filing a five-count complaint. The basis for the action was the failure by the defendants to make a diagnosis of the plaintiff's broken vertebra during his three-day stay at Chester Memorial Hospital. Counts I and II of the complaint were directed against the hospital. Count I alleged that the hospital was negligent based on its staff's failure to diagnose the plaintiff's condition, and count II alleged that the hospital was negligent for allowing the release of the plaintiff without a correct diagnosis having been made. Counts III and IV of the complaint were directed against Dr. James Whittenberg the plaintiff's attending physician at Chester Memorial Hospital. Count III alleged that Dr. Whittenberg negligently failed to diagnose the fracture of the cervical spine during the plaintiff's stay at the hospital and negligently failed to order tests that would have disclosed that condition; count IV alleged that Dr. Whittenberg was negligent for releasing the plaintiff without having made the correct diagnosis. Count V was directed against Shoss Radiological Group, Inc., which provided radiology services at Chester Memorial Hospital, and alleged negligence in the X rays that were taken of the plaintiff.

The three defendants answered the complaint, denying the allegations of negligence. The defendants later filed separate motions for summary judgment. In support of their motions the defendants submitted the plaintiff's responses to certain interrogatories concerning the identities and opinions of the plaintiff's expert witnesses. The plaintiff identified four physicians whom he intended to use as witnesses at trial; three of the experts--Dr. Baysinger, Dr. Knoke, and Dr. Lee--had treated the plaintiff while he was a patient at the Veterans Administration hospital in Marion, and the fourth expert--Dr. Riaz--had treated the plaintiff at the Veterans Administration hospital in St. Louis. In response to the interrogatories, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the witnesses' testimony would concern the condition of the plaintiff at the time of his admission to the two Veterans Administration hospitals and the possible cause of his injury. Also, counsel indicated that the experts had concluded that the plaintiff, upon admission to the Veterans Administration hospitals, had a fracture of the cervical spine, which could have been caused by the automobile accident. In their motions, the defendants contended that Supreme Court Rule 220 (107 Ill.2d R. 220), which requires the disclosure in discovery of the identities and opinions of experts expected to be called as witnesses during trial, would preclude the plaintiff from presenting, at a trial, any additional expert testimony regarding the defendants' conduct.

In further support of their motions for summary judgment, the defendants offered excerpts from the deposition testimony of Dr. Whittenberg and Dr. Shoss, principal owner of defendant Shoss Radiological Group, Inc., and excerpts from the deposition testimony of the four expert witnesses identified by the plaintiff. Dr. Whittenberg testified that he relied on a report by the radiologist, Dr. Shoss, in diagnosing and treating the plaintiff's condition. Dr. Whittenberg and Dr. Shoss maintained in their depositions that the X rays taken at the time of the plaintiff's admission to Chester Memorial Hospital were of diagnostic quality and that the X rays did not indicate the presence of a cervical fracture. The evidence deposition testimony of the plaintiff's four expert witnesses disclosed that none of the witnesses had seen the X rays or other records from Chester Memorial Hospital and that none of the witnesses had any opinion regarding the treatment received by the plaintiff at Chester.

In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a response and several affidavits. In an affidavit, plaintiff's counsel expressed his intention to call as a trial witness Dr. Knoke, who was one of the plaintiff's physicians at the Veterans Administration hospital in Marion; counsel did not explain what Dr. Knoke's opinion would be, nor was an affidavit filed by Dr. Knoke. Counsel also submitted excerpts from the plaintiff's discovery deposition. In the deposition, the plaintiff testified that Dr. Whittenberg had said that the X rays would have to be sent to Cape Girardeau to be read; later, according to the plaintiff, Dr. Whittenberg told him that the X rays had not been read yet at Cape Girardeau, where Dr. Shoss maintained his office, but that he and another doctor had read them and that they were all right. Finally, counsel submitted affidavits by Juanita and Karl Addison, who apparently were relatives of the plaintiff. They attested that, at the time of the plaintiff's discharge from the Chester hospital, they overheard Dr. Whittenberg say that he had personally read the X rays and that he had not heard from the radiologist in Cape Girardeau.

The trial judge granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed that ruling, and the appellate court reversed. The appellate court believed that a genuine issue of material fact existed because, in the court's view, the evidence would support the drawing of several inferences favorable to the plaintiff. Specifically, the court reasoned that a trier of fact could infer that the plaintiff suffered the fractured vertebra in the automobile accident on January 17, 1981, that the fracture escaped diagnosis at Chester Memorial Hospital, and that the failure to make the diagnosis constituted negligence, because the fracture was, in the appellate court's words, "readily discovered" upon the plaintiff's admission to the Veterans Administration hospital in Marion on January 20. (159 Ill.App.3d at 590, 111 Ill.Dec. 172, 512 N.E.2d 76.) The appellate court also rejected the defendants' argument that Supreme Court Rule 220 would preclude the plaintiff from offering at trial any expert testimony different from what had already been disclosed in discovery. The appellate court suggested that the plaintiff had not yet completed discovery when the motions for summary judgment were granted, and the court did not believe that the rule would prevent the plaintiff's experts from later examining the Chester Memorial Hospital records and forming an opinion at that time.

The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine whether one exists. (Puttman v. May Excavating Co. (1987), 118 Ill.2d 107, 112, 112 Ill.Dec. 722, 514 N.E.2d 188.) A motion for summary judgment is to be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c).) The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file must be construed against the movant and in favor of the opponent (In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 177, 90 Ill.Dec. 892, 483 N.E.2d 210), but the opponent of the motion cannot rely simply on his complaint or answer to raise an issue of fact when the movant "supplies facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle such a party to a judgment as a matter of law" (Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457). An order allowing summary judgment will be reversed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Department of Revenue v. Heartland Investments, Inc. (1985), 106 Ill.2d 19, 31, 86 Ill.Dec. 912, 476 N.E.2d 413.

In support of their motions for summary judgment the defendants have argued, in this court as well as in the courts below, that Supreme Court Rule 220(d) would bar the plaintiff from...