Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. v. Town of Reading

• Decision Date: 15 April 1968
• Docket Number: ADDISON-WESLEY
• Citation: 236 N.E.2d 188,354 Mass. 181
• Parties: PUBLISHING COMPANY, Inc. v. TOWN OF READING et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 188

236 N.E.2d 188

354 Mass. 181

ADDISON-WESLEY PUBLISHING COMPANY, Inc. v. TOWN OF READING et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Jan. 4, 1968.

Decided April 15, 1968.

Avram G. Hammer, Boston (Gregory H. Arabian, Boston, with him), for interveners.

John R. Hally, Boston (Robert L. Dancy, Boston, with him), for petitioner.

James W. Killam, III, Town Counsel, for the Town of Reading.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK and REARDON, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

This petition was brought in the Land Court under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, and G.L. c. 185, § 1 (j 1/2), to determine the validity of a 1965 amendment to the zoning by-law of the town of Reading. The findings of the judge are summarized.

The petitioner is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the publication of textbooks, and owning land in a Business C district, the only district so classified under the town's zoning by-law. The interveners own homes 'neighboring the Business C district.' The permitted uses within such a district include among others the erection and employment of office and professional buildings, wholesale business and storage, and publishing, printing, and binding. Certain restrictions relative to Business C land use relate to the setback of buildings from street lines, size of buildings relative to lot sizes, off street parking, and loading areas.

At a town meeting held on October 26, 1964, § XI of the zoning by-law was amended to provide as follows: 'SECTION XI: 1. In a business A or B district no building shall exceed four (4) stories or forty-five (45) feet in height. 2. In a Business C District (a) No building shall exceed a height of twenty-five (25) feet within one hundred (100) feet of a Residential zone. (b) No building shall exceed a height of forty-five (45) feet within one hundred fifty (150) feet of a Residential zone. (c) No building shall exceed a height of sixty (60) feet.' At a town meeting held on April 26, 1965, it was voted to amend § XI by changing subheading (c) of paragraph 2 to read, 'No building shall exceed a height of eighty-five (85) feet,' and by adding to paragraph 2 a new subheading (d) reading as follows: 'Except that provisions a. and b. of paragraph 2 shall not apply when the applicable measuring distance to the nearest point of the residential zone crosses a public way, or portion thereof.' This amendment was approved by the Attorney General and became effective June 4, 1965. On July 22, 1965, the petitioner filed this petition, and on September 30, 1965, applied for and received a building permit to construct an office building eighty-two feet in height set back 126 feet from a public way. This building was under construction at the time of the hearing on the petition.

The petitioner has occupied its land, now approximately eighteen and one-half acres in amount, since 1956, and has erected in that time three buildings, to one of which an addition was constructed in 1962. Its land is bounded on the south by Route 128, a State highway, and to the west and north by residential property. The exhibits indicate that the petitioner's buildings and the land surrounding them are well kept and present an attractive appearance. In addition to the petitioner, which owns about two thirds of the land in the Business C district, there is one other business operation in the district in a one story building, and much of the remainder 'is broken up by the clover-leaf intersection of Routes 128 and 28.' A public way gives access to the petitioner's property and terminates there. While the interveners were not of the opinion that the petitioner's conduct of its business prior to the erection of the eighty- two foot building had any deleterious effect on their properties they believe that they will suffer a decrease in value of their holdings as a result of the April 26, 1965, amendment. In answer to the petition they alleged that the Land Court is without jurisdiction 'because the by-law provision in question does not purport to restrict or limit the petitioner's use or enjoyment of its land but instead excepts such land from restrictions and regulations elsewhere contained in such by-law,' because there is no controversy, and because the court is unable to make any binding determination of right since the petition does not describe any proposed use or structure sufficiently. The answer also questions the right of the town to pass the amendment since it has 'no relation to the public health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare, of the inhabitants of the town, has no public purpose whatever, and is instead for the exclusive economic benefit of the petitioner.' The petitioner and the interveners filed requests bearing on the points at issue which were duly passed upon by the judge in his decision. He ruled that the Land Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the petition and overruled the interveners' demurrer which attacked it. He also ruled that the exception contained in the new subheading (d) in paragraph 2 did not violate the requirement of uniformity as set forth in G.L. c. 40A, § 2. He found finally that the town acted in good faith in passing the amendment and ruled that it is valid 'as it relates to the property of the petitioner.' The interveners appealed from this decision and filed a bill of exceptions.

1. We are of opinion that the Land Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the 1965 amendment to § XI of the zoning by-law. Argument has been made by the interveners that the language of G.L. c. 240, § 14A, permits a petition for such determination only as to a by-law 'which purports to restrict or limit the present or future use * * * of * * * land' and that the amended § XI does not constitute a restriction on the petitioner in its use of its land but rather a liberation from 'previous restrictions which would prohibit the use which the petitioner has undertaken.' To read the statute as the interveners would have us read it would on occasion produce bizarre results. The plain purpose of the statute is to afford a procedure to quiet doubts springing from by-law restrictions without regard to whether prior to the bringing of a petition they had been liberalized or tightened. The owner who may be contemplating a large investment on his land is thus provided with a thoroughly sensible means of ensuring that he is safe in going ahead. In Pitman v. City of Medford, 312 Mass. 618, we said at page 620, 45 N.E.2d 973, at page 975, 'The statute authorizes the Land Court to render a declaratory judgment on the validity of a zoning ordinance or by-law and the extent to which it affects the land of a petitioner.' See Woods v. City of Newton, 349 Mass. 373, 376, 208 N.E.2d 508. In the light of well known principles governing statutory interpretation (see Sun Oil Co. v. Director of the Division on the Necessaries of Life. 340 Mass. 235, 236, 163 N.E.2d 276, 89 A.L.R.2d 896; McCarthy v. Woburn Housing Authority, 341 Mass. 539, 542, 170 N.E.2d 700; New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. New England Merchants Nat. Bank, 344 Mass....