Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 22 December 1897
• Citation: 48 N.E. 967,170 Ill. 580
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ADDYSTON PIPE & STEEL CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

170 Ill. 580

48 N.E. 967

ADDYSTON PIPE & STEEL CO.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1897.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Creditors' bill by the Addyston Pipe & Steel Company against the city of Chicago and another. A judgment sustaining a demurrer to the bill was affirmed by the appellate court (58 Ill. App. 273), and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

John T. Barker, for appellant.

William G. Beale, Corp. Counsel, Byron Boyden, and Edward B. Burling, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellees.

CRAIG, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the appellate court affirming a judgment of the superior court of Cook county sustaining a demurrer to a creditors' bill brought by the Addyston Pipe & Steel Company against the city of Chicago and one Michael J. Joyce. It is alleged in the bill that the defendant Joyce had a contract with the city of Chicago, in and about the performance of which the complainant furnished him material and labor, which he failed to pay for. The bill then alleges the obtaining of judgment, issuing of execution, and return of execution nulla bona; that the city holds money and effects which belong to the defendant Joyce; and prays discovery as is provided for in section 49, c. 22, Hurd's Rev. St. 1893. In brief, the claim made in the bill is that the city of Chicago is indebted to Joyce for labor performed under his contract with the city, and complainant is entitled by creditors' bill to reach the money, and compelits payment to complainant. The demurrer was sustained in the superior court, and the judgment affirmed in the appellate court, on the sole ground that a creditors' bill will not lie against a municipal corporation; and the correctness of that decision is the only question presented by this record.

This court held, in City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 596, that the property of a municipal corporation like Chicago could not be levied upon and sold under an execution. This decision was predicated upon the grounds of public policy. It is there said: ‘There can be no doubt that the property of a private corporation may be seized and sold under a fi. fa. for the payment of its debts, as in the case of an individual. * * * The nature, objects, and liabilities of political, municipal, or public corporations, we think, stand on different grounds. These corporations signify a community, and are clothed with very extensive civil authority and political power. All municipal corporations are both public and political bodies. They are the embodiment of so much political power as may be adjudged necessary by the legislature granting the charter for the proper government of the people within the limits of the city or town incorporated. * * * For those purposes, the authorities can raise revenue by taxation, make public improvements, and defray the expenses thereof by taxation.’ The court then goes on the show that, if the property of the city could be levied on and sold, it would be impossible for it to perform the functions to the people for which it was created. In Merwin v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 134, the question arose whether a municipal corporation was liable to garnishment; and the court, after referring to City of Chicago v. Hasley, supra, with approval, held that it was not so liable. It is there said: ‘The question has been often before the American courts, and, although the decisions are not uniform, in a large majority of the cases it has been held the writ would not lie. The reason given for these decisions is uniformly the same, and is substantially that given by this court in the case in 25 Ill. It must be decided as a question of public policy. These municipal corporations are in the exercise of governmental powers to a very large extent. They control pecuniary interests of great magnitude, and vast numbers of human beings, who are more dependent upon the municipal, for the security of life and property, than they are on either the state or the federal, government. To permit the great public duties of this corporation to be imperfectly performed, in order that individuals may the better collect their private debts, would be to pervert the great objects of its creation. That its efficiency for purposes of government would be impaired by holding it liable to garnishment cannot be doubted. A large and growing city, like Chicago, must constantly have hundreds of persons in its employment; and if the city cannot, at short intervals, make a settlement of these multitudinous accounts, but is liable to be drawn into court at the suit of every creditor of its numerous employés, it will not only be engaged in much expensive and vexatious litigation, in which it has no interest, but, if unable to safely pay its employés and contractors, it may lose the services of persons that may be of much value.’ A municipal corporation cannot be properly turned into an instrument or agency for the collection of private debts. It exists simply for the public welfare and cannot be required to consume the time of its officers or the money in its treasury in defending writs, in order that one private individual may the better collect a demand due from another. The doctrine announced in Merwin v. City of Chicago is fully sustained by the following authorities: Chamberlain v. Gaillard, 26 Ala. 504; City of Memphis v. Laski, 9 Heisk. 511;Spaun v. Mayor of Omaha, 2 Neb. 169;Hightower v. Slaton, 54 Ga. 110;Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 508;School Dist. v. Gage, 39 Mich. 486;McDougal v. Board, 4 Minn. 184 (Gil. 130); Burnham v. City of Fond...