Adedeji v. Cobble
| Decision Date | 05 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 10 C 0892,10 C 0892 |
| Parties | ABAYOMI ADEDEJI (R30123), Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW COBBLE, sued in his individual capacity, SHERIFF TOM DART, sued in his individual and official capacities, and COOK COUNTY, sued for purposes of indemnification, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Pro se plaintiff Abayomi Adedeji, an Illinois Department of Corrections inmate, has brought a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties have consented to proceed before this Court, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 23-25). Pending before the Court is defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 44). The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
The following facts are drawn from plaintiff's amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 40). For purposes of evaluating defendants' motions to dismiss, the facts are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are made in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001)). This Court also "construe[s] pro se complaints liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard thanformal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 417 F.3d 489, 492 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008)).
On November 16, 2009, plaintiff was assaulted by fellow inmate Georgio Gaines while they were in a bullpen area at the Cook County Jail. (Dkt. No. 40 at 5). Defendant Correctional Officer Matthew Cobble had allegedly failed to secure Gaines's handcuffs and other restraints prior to the assault. (Id.). Gaines removed his hands from the cuffs and used them as a weapon, repeatedly striking plaintiff on the head and side. (Id.). Plaintiff suffered a concussion and blood loss, requiring hospitalization. (Id.). Plaintiff sues Cobble, Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, and Cook County for monetary relief.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "To satisfy the notice-pleading standard, a complaint must provide a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' which is sufficient to provide the defendant[s] with 'fair notice' of the claim and its basis." Bridges, 557 F.3d at 545 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S at 89). "'To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "The complaint must actually suggestthat the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bridges, 557 F.3d at 546 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As an initial matter, plaintiff provides additional factual allegations in his response to the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 52). Defendant counters that the additional facts must be disregarded because plaintiff cannot amend his complaint through a response to a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 54 at 3-4).
Defendants are correct that a complaint cannot be amended by plaintiff's brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss. Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 683 F.3d 328, 348 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989)). But the prohibited amendment is the adding of new claims. Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2008). A plaintiff may supplement existing claims with additional factual allegations in the response to the motion to dismiss as long as the new facts are consistent with the original claims made in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff properly provides supplemental factual information in support of his claims. He is not adding any new claims. Defendants' request to strike the additional information in plaintiff's response is denied.
Turning to the merits of the motion to dismiss, defendant Cobble argues that he should be dismissed from this action with prejudice because plaintiff's complaint is untimely under the statute of limitations, and it also fails to state a claim for relief. Both arguments are rejected.
Regarding the statute of limitations, the incident occurred on November 16, 2009. (Dkt. No. 40 at 5). There is a two-year statute of limitations for the case. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff filed his original complaint in February 2010. (Dkt. No. 1). However, the original complaint did not satisfy the statute of limitations because Cobble was named as a John Doe. Hall v. Norfolk Southern R.R. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006). The present amended complaint, naming Cobble as a defendant, was not filed for more than two and half years after the incident, in June 2012. Cobble argues that the complaint is therefore untimely as to him.
Plaintiff is not required to anticipate or address the statute of limitations in the complaint, but defendant may raise the defense in a motion to dismiss when the elements of the defense are set forth by the complaint. Independent Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Unlike plaintiff, who may provide additional facts to supplement his claims, defendant's motion to dismiss is limited solely to the information presented on the face of the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, and documents subject to judicial notice. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745 n.1. Defendant must bring a motion for summary judgment if he wishes to look outside the complaint.
Here, the elements of the statute of limitations defense are not conclusively established on the basis of the information on the face of the complaint. Although Cobble was first named as a defendant more than two and half years after the incident, some of this time was presumably tolled due to plaintiff's requiredexhaustion of his administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a claim must be raised through an internal grievance process (if available) before it can be brought in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The statute of limitations is tolled while plaintiff exhausts his claim through the grievance process. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2008). The grievance history is not detailed in the complaint (and understandably so because plaintiff is not required to anticipate its role to toll the limitations period when bringing the complaint). Defendant must look beyond the complaint to consider the grievance history, a step that is not allowed on a motion to dismiss. Consequently, the statute of limitations cannot be decided at the motion to dismiss stage.
In addition, plaintiff argues that he was unable to discover defendant Cobble's identity in a timely fashion because defense counsel refused to respond to his discovery requests. (Dkt. No. 52 at 13). This alleged conduct may potentially result in equitable tolling and/or equitable estoppel. See Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593, 594-99 (7th Cir. 2001). Defendant counters that plaintiff cannot invoke tolling or estoppel. However, these doctrines also require the Court to look beyond the complaint to additional facts. This is an additional reason why the statute of limitations cannot be decided through the present motion to dismiss.
Thus, Cobble's statute of limitations defense is rejected at the motion to dismiss stage. Cobble is correct that he was identified more than two years after the incident. However, the defense is not so clear on the face of the complaint as toallow dismissal, as there are additional facts outside the record that must be considered in evaluating the defense. This requires the raising of the defense in a summary judgment motion if Cobble desires.
Cobble's second argument is that the complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to the risk of assault by a fellow inmate. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pre-trial detainees from punishment and places a duty upon jail officials to protect pre-trial detainees from violence." Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1994); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1996)). However, not every act of inmate-on-inmate violence results in a constitutional violation. Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006).
Although the claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, the Court applies the same deliberate indifference standard that governs Eighth Amendment claims. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). The standard contains both an objective prong, requiring a grave risk, and a subjective prong, requiring actual knowledge of the risk. Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). As to the objective requirement, plaintiff must show that "(1) he suffered an objectively sufficient serious injury; and (2) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.at 834). A condition that poses a substantial risk of harm is one where the "risks [are] so great that they are almost certain to materialize if nothing is done." Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005). This standard has been analogized to the threat posed...
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