Adelman v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 19 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14-cv-5826 (SJF) |
| Parties | JED C. ADELMAN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pro se plaintiff Jed Adelman ("Plaintiff") brought this action against the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), after multiple administrative hearings, decisions and appeals spanning approximately ten (10) years, challenging the Commissioner's ruling that Plaintiff must repay the Social Security Administration ("SSA") $10,102.80 in child's insurance benefits that he received between February 2002 and March 2003. The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 26); Plaintiff has filed opposition to the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 28), which is construed as a cross-motion under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the Commissioner's motion is denied, and Plaintiff's cross-motion is granted insofar as the Court finds that Plaintiff is not liable for the $10,102.80 repayment.
Plaintiff became eligible for insurance benefits under his father's Social Security account beginning in September 1999, and subsequently became eligible for Social Security Income benefits. (Transcript of Administrative Record (Dkt. 30-31) ("Tr.") at 15, 150-51). According to Plaintiff's mother, who acted as his representative payee, Plaintiff is "severely learning disabled," has neurological damage, epilepsy, and an IQ score of 62. (Id. at 217-21, 329).
Since February 2001, Plaintiff has been employed as a laboratory technician at Stony Brook University. (Id. at 26, 113). Among other things, Plaintiff delivers packages throughout the university and prepares hospital rooms before and after treatment. (Id. at 113). Since March 2001, he has earned more than nine hundred dollars ($900) per month after deducting work-related expenses incurred as a result of his impairments, such as fees for an employment coach. (Id. at 16, 206, 696, 907).
On January 30, 2003, the SSA sent a Work Activity Questionnaire to Plaintiff's employer, who checked a "yes" box indicating that Plaintiff's work was "fully worth the amount paid." (Id. at 1094-96). Less than three (3) months later, the SSA informed Plaintiff that he was no longer deemed disabled under the Social Security Act as a result of his participation in paid work and that he was thus no longer entitled to disability benefits. (Id. at 105-08). Ultimately, the SSA determined that Plaintiff's employment constituted a "substantial gainful activity" ("SGA")1 based upon the fact that his earnings exceeded relevant thresholds, and that Plaintiff had thus received Social Security benefits to which he was not entitled. (Id. at 15-16, 267-70). For example, in a letter dated May 31, 2002, the SSA informed Plaintiff that he had received benefits to which he was not entitled (the "May 2002 Letter"). (Id. at 100-04). The May 2002 Letter allowed Plaintiff to appeal and was later determined to be "pending [the] decision" of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 100, 332).
Plaintiff appealed the SSA's initial determination and appeared through his parents and/or counsel at four (4) administrative hearings between November 2005 and December 2011.Initially, Plaintiff sought a waiver for any overpayment at his first hearing on November 9, 2005, during which his parents testified on his behalf. (Id. at 185, 288-95, 498-521). Following that hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff had received benefits to which he was not entitled and was required to repay the SSA. Plaintiff requested and received review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, which remanded the case for further development of the record. (Id. at 29-36, 305, 305A, 393-96).
The second hearing took place on October 15, 2008, and Plaintiff's parents again testified on his behalf. (Id. at 49-67). The ALJ again denied Plaintiff's request for a waiver, and Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council, which again remanded the case for further development of the record. (Id. at 41-45, 597-606). The third hearing was held on November 1, 2011, and Plaintiff's mother and an attorney appeared on Plaintiff's behalf. (Id. at 1037-44). This hearing was ultimately adjourned so Plaintiff's job coaching coordinator, Judy Jacobs, could testify. (Id. at 1043-44). The fourth and final hearing occurred on December 22, 2011, at which Plaintiff's parents and his attorney appeared. (Id. at 76-93). Ms. Jacobs did not appear at the fourth hearing because, according to Plaintiff's attorney, her employer would not allow her to participate. (Id. 81).
Although Ms. Jacobs did not attend the fourth hearing, the record contains letters from Ms. Jacobs dated May 1, 2003 and August 12, 2011 that were submitted to the Commissioner. (Id. at 113-14, 251). In her May 1, 2003 letter, Ms. Jacobs set forth the number of hours that Plaintiff's job coach, Adeline Scornello, spent with Plaintiff each month between February 2001 and March 2003, and opined that Plaintiff "needs the ongoing services of his job coach ... in order to be successful and keep his job at Stony Brook University." (Id. at 251). In her August 12, 2011 letter, Ms. Jacobs explained that Plaintiff relied upon Ms. Scornello, "to perform job tasks, interactwith other employees and supervisors, find and use natural supports and cues, increase productivity, and communicate effectively with supervisors and peers." (Id. at 113). Initially, Ms. Scornello spent the entire day with Plaintiff at the worksite, but as time passed, the she spent only about one-fifth (1/5) of the day with Plaintiff at the worksite. (Id.). In her August 11, 2011 letter, Ms. Jacobs indicated that Plaintiff had been in a post-"job-stabilization ... extended phase for many years," and that Ms. Scornello was meeting with Plaintiff "at least twice monthly." (Id.). If necessary, Ms. Scornello met with Plaintiff for additional time to master new tasks or to work through any problems he was having in the workplace. (Id.). Ms. Jacobs concluded that Plaintiff (Id. at 114). Also, Plaintiff "has many accommodations that were put into place to help him perform his tasks." (Id.). Plaintiff's mother reinforced this sentiment during the ALJ hearings. (See id. at 342 ( ); see also id. at 80-81, 1040-41). Plaintiff's psychologist also concurred in this assessment. (Id. at 1084 ()).
Following the fourth hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff received insurance benefits to which he was not entitled and must repay the SSA. (Id. at 20-28). Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council which, on August 12, 2014, granted review and issued the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 11-19, 37-38). The Appeals Council determined that Plaintiff had been overpaid $10,102.80 in benefits between February 2002 and March 2003, denied Plaintiff's request for a waiver, and held that Plaintiff was liable to repay that sum. (Id. at 19). The Appeals Council concluded, in pertinent part, that: (1) Plaintiff had completed a trial workperiod in October 2001; (2) effective November 2001, he was no longer disabled under the Social Security Act due to his participation in SGA; (3) effective February 2002, Plaintiff was no longer entitled to benefits due to his participation in SGA; (4) Plaintiff was overpaid $10,102.80 in benefits from February 2002 through March 2003; and (5) Plaintiff was liable for repayment of $10,102.80. (Id. at 17-19).
Following the Commissioner's final decision, Plaintiff commenced this action and the parties each moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner seeks affirmation of its decision, and Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commissioner's decision.
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court construes his submissions liberally and interprets them "'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). This leeway, however, does not excuse Plaintiff "'from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'" Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (per curiam)).
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard applied to a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as that applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must plead"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In undertaking this analysis, the Court construes "the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is limited "to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., ...
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