Ademiluyi v. Egbuonu

• Decision Date: 29 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 34, Sept. Term, 2018,34, Sept. Term, 2018
• Parties: April ADEMILUYI, et al. v. Chizoba EGBUONU, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

466 Md. 80

215 A.3d 329

April ADEMILUYI, et al.

v.Chizoba EGBUONU, et al.

No. 34, Sept. Term, 2018

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

August 29, 2019

Argued by Allen R. Dyer (Law Office of Allen R. Dyer, Ellicott City, MD; April T. Ademiluyi, Law Office of April T. Ademiluyi, Laurel, MD), on memorandum, for Appellants.

Argued by Bruce L. Marcus (Sydney M. Patterson, MarcusBonsib, LLC, Greenbelt, MD) and Argued by Andrea W. Trento, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on briefs, for Appellees.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J. ^* Greene, ^* Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Getty, J.

The State is not constitutionally barred from evincing a policy of nonpartisanship in judicial elections while nevertheless keeping the election process itself an inherently partisan affair; nor is it barred from relying on the long-established infrastructure of a political party primary to accommodate the election of candidates it desires to be selected on bases apart from partisan politics.

Judge Irma S. Raker

Suessmann v. Lamone ,

383 Md. 697, 727, 862 A.2d 1 (2004).

Maryland's electoral process for conducting elections of circuit court judges is an imperfect hybrid. As this Court discussed in Suessmann v. Lamone , 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 (2004), this judicial electoral process is a hybrid because it is neither purely partisan nor purely nonpartisan. Circuit court judges have run in partisan elections just as other candidates on the ballot since the Constitution of 1851. An appearance of nonpartisanship was achieved when the General Assembly passed a bill in the 1941 legislative session to remove the designation of party affiliation in the listing of candidates for the office of circuit court judge on the ballot.

More significantly, perhaps, the hybrid quality exists because this judicial electoral process serves two functions. First, in order for the incumbent judge to retain his or her seat, the judge is required to be a candidate in a potentially contested election. Incumbent judges are required to run after their initial gubernatorial appointment and at the end of each fifteen-year term. The process for initial appointment includes candidates being vetted through a judicial nominating commission. ¹

Second, the electoral process allows for challengers, who may or may not have been vetted through the judicial nominating commission, to file as candidates as long as they qualify under the constitutional provisions to serve as a circuit court judge.

The issue confronting this Court in the instant appeal arises from legislation enacted by the General Assembly in 2006 that allows non-principal parties to nominate candidates for circuit court judge elections through whatever nomination process is required by their party bylaws. The critical advantage of a circuit court judge candidate nominated by a non-principal party is that the nominee bypasses the primary election and moves directly to the general election.²

We are asked to determine whether the Circuit Court for Prince George's County erred by entering a preliminary injunction which prohibited the State Board of Elections ("the State Board") from certifying the ballot for the 2018 Gubernatorial General Election with April Ademiluyi listed as a candidate for circuit court judge. More specifically, we must determine whether nomination by the Libertarian Party of Maryland ("the Libertarian Party") of Ms. Ademiluyi was improper where the Libertarian Party's Constitution requires that its candidates for office be registered Libertarians and Ms. Ademiluyi was a registered Democrat. For two reasons, we concluded that Ms. Ademiluyi's candidacy was impermissible under the relevant provisions that regulate judicial elections in Maryland: (i) her candidacy is at odds with the Libertarian Party's Constitution, which requires all of its candidates for public office to be registered members of the party; and (ii) a judicial candidate's route to access the ballot is dependent upon his or her party affiliation—candidates registered with a principal party may only achieve this end through participation in primary elections.³

Upon learning of Ms. Ademiluyi's party affiliation through a Maryland Public Information Act ("MPIA") request, Chizoba N. Egbuonu, Luther V. Watkins, Sr., Manuel R. Geraldo, and Stella A. Grooms (collectively "Appellees"), challenged her qualifications for nomination as a circuit court judge under Maryland's election code. At a hearing before the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Ms. Ademiluyi failed to appear and therefore made no arguments. After the circuit court ordered that her name be removed from the ballot, Ms. Ademiluyi appealed to this Court and presented us with several questions for review in her appeal memorandum.⁴

However, a grant of preliminary injunction falls within the circuit court's discretion and the appropriate frame of review is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. See Schade v. Maryland State Bd. of Elections , 401 Md. 1, 33, 930 A.2d 304 (2007) ; see also Ehrlich v. Perez , 394 Md. 691, 707, 908 A.2d 1220 (2006).

Oral argument in the present appeal was held on September 6, 2018. That same day, we issued a per curiam order affirming the circuit court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief which enjoined the State Board from certifying the general election ballot with Ms. Ademiluyi's name listed as a candidate. Ademiluyi v. Egbuonu , 461 Md. 455, 193 A.3d 207 (2018). In that order, we indicated that an opinion detailing the reasoning behind our affirmance of the circuit court's decision would follow. In explanation of that per curiam order, we conclude that the Libertarian Party's nomination of Ms. Ademiluyi did not comport with the requirements of § 5-701 of the Election Law Article ("EL") and that the circuit court's grant of preliminary injunction is sufficiently supported by the appropriate factors.

We now give our reasons for the September 6, 2018 order. The election of judges in Maryland has been the subject of a lengthy and long-standing debate—initially emerging from constitutional reform of the mid-19th century. It is useful to begin our analysis with a historical review of the partisan underpinnings of this imperfect hybrid of an electoral process.

BACKGROUND

The History of Judicial Elections in Maryland

For the first seventy-five years of Maryland's history after the adoption of the Constitution of 1776, judges were appointed by the Governor and confirmed but were not required to run in contested elections. Maryland's first constitution provided for the Governor to appoint all judges with the advice and consent of the Governor's Council. Md. Const. of 1776 § 48 (1776). The Governor's Council, under the Constitution of 1776, consisted of five members chosen by vote of the State Senate and House of Delegates. The Governor's Council played an advisory role and generally provided the Governor with advice and assisted in his appointments, as provided for elsewhere in the Constitution. Md. Const. of 1776 § 26 (1776).⁵

In 1836, the Governor's Council was abolished by constitutional amendment and full executive power was vested in the Governor. 1836 Md. Laws ch. 197 § 13. Instead of confirmation by the Governor's Council, the Governor made judicial appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate. 1836 Md. Laws ch. 197 § 14.

Constitutional reform of the mid-19th century modified the method of selection of judicial candidates by introducing contested judicial elections similar to our contemporary system. During the Constitutional Reform Convention of 1850 ("1850 Convention"), a fierce debate emerged concerning the method of selecting judges. The debate primarily consisted of two different methodologies: (i) popular election; and (ii) appointment by the Governor for an indefinite term, with the Governor holding the power to impeach and remove an appointed judge only upon bad behavior.⁶ Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Constitutional Reform Convention to Revise the State Constitution, Vol. II (1851) ("1850 Debates and Proceedings"). The popular election system carried support from the Democrats while an appointed judiciary appealed to members of the Whig Party. Id.

As evidenced by the debates, both the Whigs and Democrats were concerned about partisan influence on judicial offices stemming from whichever selection process was adopted. Id. at 497–99. The Democrats expressed concern that appointment by the Governor would transform judicial offices into partisan offices. Id. at 457–62. Similarly, the Whigs expressed concern that, without indefinite terms, incoming Governors would have the power to dismiss incumbent judges throughout the State and appoint newly partisan judges. Id. at 470–73, 476.

In addition to debates concerning the method of selection, a secondary issue emerged concerning temporal aspects of judicial elections. Id. at 490–501. Primarily, some members of the 1850 Convention argued that elections for judicial offices and other courthouse officials including State's Attorneys and Clerks of the Court, should be held the year following elections for other public officers. Id. Those involved believed that temporal distance between elections for judicial offices and other public offices, such as the Governor and State Legislature, would distance judicial elections from the partisan undercurrent of elections for these public offices. Id. at 537–44.

Ezekiel F. Chambers, a member of the 1850 Convention and Judge of this Court, summarized the general concerns over the politicization of judicial elections in his sweeping remarks before the 1850 Convention:⁷

I am aware, Sir, that it is said the people are competent to elect other officers; and if so, why not to elect judges?

* * *

Now this is the relation in which the judge stands to the people. The judge is supposed to know the law; the people are

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