Adeyemi v. Meeks, Civil Action No. 13-216 Erie

• Decision Date: 04 February 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-216 Erie
• Parties: SAMSON OLUMWSEUN ADEYEMI, Petitioner, v. BOBBY L. MEEKS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

SAMSON OLUMWSEUN ADEYEMI, Petitioner, v. BOBBY L. MEEKS, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 13-216 Erie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date: February 4, 2014

Judge Arthur J. Schwab

OPINION

I. Introduction

Before this Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by federal prisoner Samson Olumwseun Adeyemi pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, the petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Discussion

A. Relevant Background

In October of 2006, Petitioner was tried before a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for several crimes related to the robberies of two fast food restaurants located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In relevant part, at Counts 3 and 5 he was charged with using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury found Petitioner guilty of both charges.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii), the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence is not less than 7 years "if the firearm is brandished[.]" Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), in the case of a "second or subsequent conviction," the mandatory minimum sentence is not less than 25 years.

On January 8, 2007, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania sentenced Petitioner to the mandatory minimum term of 7 years' imprisonment on Count 3, and to a consecutive term of 25 years' imprisonment on Count Five.¹ At the time, the judge could decide, with respect to Petitioner's first conviction under § 924(c) (Count 3), whether Petitioner's conduct met the requirements to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years for "brandishing" a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court recently overruled its decision in Harris in Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. — , 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). In Alleyne, which was decided on direct appeal, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155-58.

Soon after Alleyne was decided, Petitioner, who is incarcerated within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of Pennsylvania, filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He alleges that the decision in Alleyne renders him actually innocent of the sentences imposed upon him at Counts 3 and 5. [ECF No. 4 at 6-7].²

Respondent has filed his Answer [ECF No. 13], to which Petitioner has filed a Reply [ECF No. 14].

B. Discussion

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]" Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). "Two federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2255, confer federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by federal inmates." Id. "The 'core' habeas corpus action is a prisoner challenging the authority of the entity detaining him to do so, usually on the ground that his predicate sentence or conviction is improper or invalid." McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010). That type of action is brought in the district court that tried and sentenced the prisoner by way of a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which permits a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence "upon the ground that [it] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]" In contrast, § 2241 "confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence," McGee, 627 F.3d at 935, such as, for example, the way in which the Bureau of Prisons is computing his sentence. See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990). A habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the custodial court - the federal district court in the district the prisoner is incarcerated - not the district court where the prisoner was tried and sentenced.

Importantly, § 2255 prohibits district courts from entertaining a § 2241 habeas corpus petition filed by a federal prisoner who is raising the types of claims that must be raised in a § 2255 motion unless it "appears that the remedy by [§ 2255 motion] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This provision of § 2255 is commonly referred to as the "savings clause," "safety valve," or "safety hatch."

Petitioner, who is imprisoned within the territorial boundaries of this Court, contends that the sentenced imposed upon him by Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional. His claims are precisely the type that must be brought in a § 2255 motion before the district court that tried and sentenced him. Of course, this Court is aware that since Petitioner has already filed one § 2255 motion in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, he cannot at the present time file a second one. That is because the 1996 amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") made to § 2255 bar a federal prisoner from filing a second or successive § 2255 motion unless the appropriate court of appeals certifies the filing contains, in relevant part, a claim based on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). Since the Supreme Court has not held that Alleyne is retroactive to cases on collateral review, the courts of appeals cannot authorize a federal prisoner to file a second or successive § 2255 motion based upon that decision. In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10^th Cir. 2013) (holding that Alleyne is "a new rule of constitutional law," but declining to authorize the petitioner to file a second or successive § 2255 motion because the Supreme Court has not made it retroactive to cases on collateral review); Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875, 876 (7^th Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Redd, 735 F.3d 88, 91 (2^nd Cir.2013) (even if Alleyne did announce "a new rule of constitutional law," the Supreme Court did not hold that it was retroactive to cases on collateral review).³

Thus, the question before this Court is whether the fact that Petitioner cannot raise his Alleyne claims in another § 2255 motion with the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania makes the § 2255 remedy "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention[,]" 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), thereby allowing him to utilize § 2241. It is Petitioner's burden to establish that the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See, e.g., Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). In this case, Petitioner has not met the requisite burden.

In its landmark case In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized the one circumstance under which it has found § 2255's remedy to be inadequate of ineffective since AEDPA amended § 2255 in 1996 to prohibit the filing of second or successive motions. Importantly, in that case the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stressed that § 2255's remedy is not "inadequate or ineffective" solely because the petitioner cannot meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of AEDPA and file a second or successive § 2255 motion with the district court that convicted and sentenced him. Although, the court in Dorsainvil concluded that the circumstance presented in that case was the rare one inwhich a federal prisoner could challenge the validity of his conviction under § 2241, it expressly stated:

We do not suggest that § 2255 would be "inadequate or ineffective" so as to enable a second petitioner to invoke § 2241 merely because that petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of [AEDPA's amendments to] § 2255. Such a holding would effectively eviscerate Congress's intent in amending § 2255."

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. See, e.g., Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) ("Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255."); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002); Young v. Yost, 363 F.App'x 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("Section 2255 is not 'inadequate or ineffective' merely because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied [the petitioner] permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion raising his present claim."); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1308 (10^th Cir. 2011) ("We join all other circuits in refusing to interpret the savings clause in a way that would drop the §2255(h) bar on second and successive motions, defeat its purpose, and render it pointless.")

The petitioner in Dorsainvil, Ocsulis Dorsainvil, was convicted, inter alia, of using a gun in connection with a drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was so convicted notwithstanding that he did not "use" the gun but the gun was merely present in the car from which the drugs were to be bought. After he had exhausted his appeals and litigated his first § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) construed the criminal statute under which Dorsainvil was convicted (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)) to exclude fromthe ambit of the statute...