Adi v. Mayorkas

Docket Number20-cv-01378
Decision Date28 January 2022
PartiesHASSAN ADI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN J THARP, JR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Hassan Adi, a noncitizen, brought suit under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and various officials of those agencies (collectively, “the Government”) seeking judicial review of the denial of his naturalization application.[1] The Government claims the Immigration and Naturalization Act's priority provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1429 precludes judicial review at this juncture and moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although the Court disagrees with some of the Government's reasoning, it concurs that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review USCIS's July 23, 2019 “final determination” of Mr. Adi's naturalization application. Accordingly, the Government's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is granted.

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

DHS is vested with the authority to execute the two core functions of immigration law: removal and naturalization. 8 U.S.C § 1103. When removal is deemed necessary, DHS-acting through U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or USCIS-initiates removal proceedings before an immigration court organized within the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. §§ 100, 239, 1003. A noncitizen may appeal an adverse removal decision by an immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals and then directly to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15.[2]

Naturalization, on the other hand, begins when a noncitizen files an application for naturalization with USCIS. 8 C.F.R. §§ 310, 334. A USCIS examining officer then conducts an investigation and an in-person examination of the applicant before issuing a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 335. If the examining officer does not issue a decision within 120 days of conducting the in-person examination, the applicant may apply to the United States District Court, which may then decide the matter outright or remand the application back to USCIS with instructions. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). If, however, the examining officer denies the application within the allotted 120 days, the applicant may request a hearing before a USCIS reviewing officer who reviews the application de novo and issues a “final determination.” 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a); 8 C.F.R. § 336. Finally, the applicant may appeal an adverse final naturalization determination to the United States District Court. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).

Historically, the removal process and the naturalization process could advance simultaneously. Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 543 (1955). A determination in one, however, would ipso facto terminate the other because each result precludes the other. Id.; see also Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A person who has been naturalized cannot be removed, and a person who has been removed cannot be naturalized.”). This often gave rise to “a race between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him.” Shomberg, 348 U.S. at 544. To put an end to this race, Congress in 1952 enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1429, which dictates that removal proceedings take precedence over naturalization applications. Id. For this reason, courts refer to section 1429 as the “priority provision.” See, e.g., Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2010); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 1429's priority provision reads: [N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” 8 U.S.C. § 1429.[3]

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Adi is a native and citizen of Palestine who entered the United States in 2003. He obtained lawful permanent resident status five years later through marriage to a United States citizen. Then in 2014, he applied for naturalization with USCIS.

In June 2015, an examining officer from the USCIS field office in Chicago conducted an in-person interview with Mr. Adi. The officer did not issue a decision on Mr. Adi's application within the allotted 120 days, however, and so, in July 2016, Mr. Adi filed suit under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) in this district. On a motion to remand, USCIS represented it was prepared to issue a decision on Mr. Adi's application within two weeks, and a remand followed in June 2017. Adi v. Rodriguez, No. 16-cv-06970 (N.D. Ill. remanded June 9, 2017). As promised, USCIS issued a decision on Mr. Adi's application on June 19, 2017-a denial.

USCIS denied Mr. Adi's application for naturalization based on a finding that Mr. Adi materially misrepresented his marital status; namely, that he omitted the fact that he was concurrently married to a woman living in Palestine at the time of his marriage to his United States wife. Two months later, on August 7, 2017, Mr. Adi applied under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) for a hearing to review the denial.[4]

Around this same time, USCIS issued Mr. Adi a notice to appear for removal proceedings in immigration court. Notably, the notice to appear did not include the date and time Mr. Adi was to appear. Instead, the notice stated that the date and time of the hearing were “to be set.”

Despite having issued a putative notice to appear as means to commence removal proceedings against Mr. Adi, USCIS continued to process Mr. Adi's section 1447(a) naturalization appeal in seeming contravention of the priority provision. In March 2019, nineteen months after the notice to appear for removal proceedings issued, a USCIS reviewing officer held a review hearing on the denial of Mr. Adi's naturalization application. About four months later, on July 23, 2019, that officer issued a “final determination” upholding the denial of Mr. Adi's naturalization application. (It is as to this ruling that Mr. Adi seeks review in this Court.)

But then, on September 12, 2019, after a review of Mr. Adi's record and on its own motion, USCIS withdrew the July 2019 final determination and administratively closed Mr. Adi's naturalization case. USCIS predicated this withdrawal on the ground that Mr. Adi's pending removal proceedings precluded the agency from considering his naturalization application. In other words, in the eyes of USCIS, the notice to appear, issued two years earlier, had commenced removal proceedings; and so, under section 1429's priority provision, the USCIS reviewing officer who issued Mr. Adi's final determination lacked jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, USCIS withdrew its final determination of Mr. Adi's naturalization application.

On February 25, 2020, Mr. Adi filed this suit under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) seeking judicial review of the July 2019 denial of his naturalization application along with other various claims for relief. The Government has moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because jurisdictional issues are dispositive, only the 12(b)(1) component of the Government's motion will be addressed.

III. LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court must “accept[] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw[] reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chi. v. Nielsen, 878 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, a court “may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation removed).

A. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) Jurisdiction - Effect of 8 U.S.C. § 1429

Mr. Adi asserts that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). That provision reads: “A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this title, may seek review of such denial before the United States district court . . . .” Section 1429's priority provision prevents immigration officers from considering naturalization applications during the pendency of a removal proceeding, but courts have reached different conclusions as to how this rule effects judicial review under section 1421(c). Some have found that section 1429 denies courts subject-matter jurisdiction. See Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 807 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2007). Others have found that section 1429 prevents courts from providing a remedy even though subject-matter jurisdiction is unaffected. See Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2004); Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit in Klene v. Napolitano rejected both of these conclusions. 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012).

In Klene, the Seventh Circuit held that section 1421(c) confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to review naturalization applications that have been denied notwithstanding the applicability of section 1429. Section 1421(c), it held, “authorize[s] district courts to decide whether aliens...

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