Adickes v. Kress Company, No. 79

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtHARLAN
Citation26 L.Ed.2d 142,398 U.S. 144,90 S.Ct. 1598
Docket NumberNo. 79
Decision Date01 June 1970
PartiesSandra ADICKES, Petitioner, v. S. H. KRESS & COMPANY

398 U.S. 144
90 S.Ct. 1598
26 L.Ed.2d 142
Sandra ADICKES, Petitioner,

v.

S. H. KRESS & COMPANY.

No. 79.
Argued Nov. 12, 1969.
Decided June 1, 1970.

[Syllabus from pages 144-146 intentionally omitted]

Page 146

Eleanor Jackson Piel, New York City, for petitioner.

Sanford M. Litvack, New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, Sandra Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against respondent S. H. Kress & Co. ('Kress') to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 for an alleged violation of her constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit arises out of Kress' refusal to serve lunch to Miss Adickes at its restaurant facilities in its Hattiesburg, Mississippi, store on August 14, 1964, and Miss Adickes' subsequent arrest upon her departure from the store by the Hattiesburg police on a charge of vagrancy. At the time of both the refusal to serve and the arrest, Miss Adickes was with six young people, all Negroes, who were her students in a Mississippi 'Freedom School' where she was

Page 147

teaching that summer. Unlike Miss Adickes, the students were offered service, and were not arrested.

Petitioner's complaint had two counts,2 each bottomed on § 1983, and each alleging that Kress had deprived her of the right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to be discriminated against on the basis of race. The first count charged that Miss Adickes had been refused service by Kress because she was a 'Caucasian in the company of Negroes.' Petitioner sought, inter alia, to prove that the refusal to serve her was pursuant to a 'custom of the community to segregate the races in public eating places.' However, in a pretrial decision, 252 F.Supp. 140 (1966), the District Court ruled that to recover under this court, Miss Adickes would have to prove that at the time she was refused service, there was a specific 'custom * * * of refusing service to whites in the company of Negroes' and that this custom was 'enforced by the State' under Mississippi's criminal trespass statute.3 Because petitioner was unable to prove at the trial that there were other instances in Hattiesburg of a white person having been refused service while in the company of Negroes,

Page 148

the District Court directed a verdict in favor of respondent. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed on this ground, also holding that § 1983 'requires that the discriminatory custom or usage be proved to exist in the locale where the discrimination took place, and in the State generally,' and that petitioner's 'proof on both points was deficient,' 409 F.2d 121, 124 (1968).

The second count of her complaint, alleging that both the refusal of service and her subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress and the Hattiesburg police, was dismissed before trial on a motion for summary judgment. The District Court ruled that petitioner had 'failed to allege any facts from which a conspiracy might be inferred.' 252 F.Supp., at 144. This determination was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 409 F.2d, at 126—127.

Miss Adickes, in seeking review here, claims that the District Court erred both in directing a verdict on the substantive count, and in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy count. Last Term we granted certiorari, 394 U.S. 1011, 89 S.Ct. 1635, 23 L.Ed.2d 38 (1969), and we now reverse and remand for further proceedings on each of the two counts.

As explained in Part I, because the respondent failed to show the absence of any disputed material fact, we think the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. With respect to the substantive count, for reasons explained in Part II, we think petitioner will have made out a claim under § 1983 for violation of her equal protection rights if she proves that she was refused service by Kress because of a state-enforced custom requiring racial segregation in Hattiesburg restaurants. We think the courts below erred (1) in assuming that the only proof relevant to showing that a custom was state-enforced related to the Mississippi criminal trespass statute; (2) in defining the relevant

Page 149

state-enforced custom as requiring proof of a practice both in Hattiesburg and throughout Mississippi, of refusing to serve white persons in the company of Negroes rather than simply proof of state-enforced segregation of the races in Hattiesburg restaurants.

I

Briefly stated, the conspiracy count of petitioner's complaint made the following allegations: While serving as a volunteer teacher at a 'Freedom School' for Negro children in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, petitioner went with six of her students to the Hattiesburg Public Library at about noon on August 14, 1964. The librarian refused to allow the Negro students to use the library, and asked them to leave. Because they did not leave, the librarian called the Hattiesburg chief of police who told petitioner and her students that the library was closed, and ordered them to leave. From the library, petitioner and the students proceeded to respondent's store where they wished to eat lunch. According to the complaint, after the group sat down to eat, a policeman came into the store 'and observed (Miss Adickes) in the company of the Negro students.' A waitress then came to the booth where petitioner was sitting, took the orders of the Negro students, but refused to serve petitioner because she was a white person 'in the company of Negroes.' The complaint goes on to allege that after this refusal of service, petitioner and her students left the Kress store. When the group reached the sidewalk outside the store, 'the Officer of the Law who had previously entered (the) store' arrested petitioner on a groundless charge of vagrancy and took her into custody.

On the basis of these underlying facts petitioner alleged that Kress and the Hattiesburg police had conspired (1) 'to deprive (her) of her right to enjoy equal treatment and service in a place of public accommoda-

Page 150

tion'; and (2) to cause her arrest 'on the false charge of vagrancy.'

A. CONSPIRACIES BETWEEN PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE PERSONS GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The terms of § 1983 make plain two elements that are necessary for recovery. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the 'Constitution and laws' of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.' This second element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted 'under color of law.'4

As noted earlier we read both counts of petitioner's complaint to allege discrimination based on race in violation of petitioner's equal protection rights.5 Few prin-

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ciples of law are more firmly stitched into our constitutional fabric than the proposition that a State must not discriminate against a person because of his race

Page 152

or the race of his companions, or in any way act to compel or encourage racial segregation.6 Although this is a lawsuit against a private party, not the State or one of its officials, our cases make clear that petitioner will have made out a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights and will be entitled to relief under § 1983 if she can prove that a Kress employee, in the course of employment, and a Hattiesburg policeman somehow reached an understanding to deny Miss Adickes service in The Kress store, or to cause her subsequent arrest because she was a white person in the company of Negroes.

The involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy plainly provides the state action essential to show a direct violation of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, whether or not the actions of the police were officially authorized, or lawful; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107—111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038—1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99—100, 71 S.Ct. 576, 578—579, 95 L.Ed. 774 (1951). Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983. 'Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,' United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 (1966).7

Page 153

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

We now proceed to consider whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy count. In granting respondent's motion, the District Court simply stated that there was 'no evidence in the complaint or in the affidavits and other papers from which a 'reasonably-minded person' might draw an inference of conspiracy,' 252 F.Supp., at 144, aff'd, 409 F.2d, at 126—127. Our own scrutiny of the factual allegations of petitioner's complaint, as well as the material found in the affidavits and depositions presented by Kress to the District Court, however, convinces us that summary judgment was improper here, for we think respondent failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact. Before explaining why this is so, it is useful to state the factual arguments, made by the parties concerning summary judgment, and the reasoning of the courts below.

In moving for summary judgment, Kress argued that 'uncontested facts'...

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20383 practice notes
  • Burrell v. City University of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8711(RWS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • February 26, 1998
    ...863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2 (Brennan, J. dissenting) and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); see United States v. Diebold Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Cartier v. L......
  • Price v. Sery, No. 06-35159.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • January 22, 2008
    ...Monell claim based on a "longstanding procedure," even if the City's policy as written is constitutional. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Ulrich, 308 F.3d at Price emphasizes the City's concession in legal arguments before t......
  • Johnston v. Henderson, No. 00-6445CIV.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • May 1, 2001
    ...exacting standard. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). That is, "[t]he moving party bears `the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the b......
  • Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co. v. Paramount Concrete, Inc., No. 3:11cv578SRU.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
    • March 31, 2014
    ...Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (court is re......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
20404 cases
  • Burrell v. City University of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8711(RWS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • February 26, 1998
    ...863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2 (Brennan, J. dissenting) and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); see United States v. Diebold Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Cartier v. L......
  • Price v. Sery, No. 06-35159.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • January 22, 2008
    ...Monell claim based on a "longstanding procedure," even if the City's policy as written is constitutional. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Ulrich, 308 F.3d at Price emphasizes the City's concession in legal arguments before t......
  • Johnston v. Henderson, No. 00-6445CIV.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • May 1, 2001
    ...exacting standard. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). That is, "[t]he moving party bears `the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the b......
  • Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co. v. Paramount Concrete, Inc., No. 3:11cv578SRU.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
    • March 31, 2014
    ...Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (court is re......
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5 books & journal articles
  • EQUITY'S FEDERALISM.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 Nbr. 5, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). (141) Mat 237. (142) E.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (143) E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). (144) Although civil rights removal was moribu......
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    • Criminal Justice Policy Review Nbr. 12-3, September 2001
    • September 1, 2001
    ...as“moving force” behind the constitutional violation.REFERENCESAdams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994).Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-163 (1970).Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987).Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1998).Beggerly v. Walke......
  • The Public–Private Distinction: Insights for Public Administration from the State Action Doctrine
    • United States
    • Public Administration Review Nbr. 75-1, January 2015
    • January 1, 2015
    ...actually value judgments, where justices interpret the facts to f‌i t their ideological position?Cases CitedAdickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1940).American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. ......
  • POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND PLEADING DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 169 Nbr. 8, August 2021
    • August 1, 2021
    ...PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE 225 (1938). (18) 350 U.S. 544 (1947). (19) 355 U.S. 41 (1957)- (20) See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (21) See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010). (22) See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Fact Pleading, 76 TEX. L. REV. 174......
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