Adimora-Nweke v. CenterPoint Energy, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action H-22-3155 |
| Parties | Ernest Adimora-Nweke, Plaintiff, v. CenterPoint Energy, Inc., AT&T Servs., Inc., North Fort Bend Water Authority, Property Acquisition Servs., Inc,, Mark Heidaker, Steve Bonjonia, Sean Patrick Kennedy, Comcast, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., CenterPoint Houston Electric, LLC, Comcast Holdings Corp., City of Houston, CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, and Houston Police Department Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the court are numerous motions.[1] This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), The court recommends that Plaintiffs federal claims be dismissed and that the remaining state law claims be remanded to state court.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the Civil County Court at Law Number 3 in Harris County, Texas, on August 11, 2022. ECF No. 1-6. On September 15, 2022, Comcast removed the case based on federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 3-4.
In his Third Amended Complaint, ECF No, 41, the operative pleading in this case, Plaintiff alleges that his parents, Ngozi Adimora-Nweke and Ernest A. Nweke (Owners), are the sole owners of a home located at 6826 Caddo Lake Lane in Houston Texas (the Property). Id. at 1. Owners purchased the Property on July 23, 1993. Id. at 5. A survey performed at the time of the purchase noted an eighty-foot easement. Id. at 6. The survey did not show any telephone poles or underground electric boxes on the Property. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants CenterPoint, Comcast, and AT&T illegally accessed the Property, installed various equipment on the Property, and continue to operate their equipment on the Property. Id. at 8, 11, 20. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants North Fort Bend Water Authority (NFBWA), Property Acquisition Services (PAS), Sean Patrick Kennedy, and Steve Bonjonia defrauded Plaintiffs mother by having her sign documents allowing Defendants to access the property. Id. at 14-15, 22-25. Plaintiff alleges that the City of Houston and the Houston Police Department participated with the other Defendants in their illegal conduct by attempting to force their way onto the property. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff alleges federal and state causes of action on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of Owners and the Property's past and future owners, residents, invitees, and beneficiaries. ECF No. 41 at 1. Against CenterPoint AT&T, and Comcast, Plaintiff alleges federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1986. Id. at 18-21. He also alleges claims under state law for inverse condemnation,[2] fraud, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, premises liability, slander of title, an action to quiet title, invasion of privacy, and violations of the Texas Property Code. Id. at 18-21. Against NFBWA, PAS, and their employees, in addition to the federal and state causes of action listed above, Plaintiff alleges claims under state law for fraud by forgery and defamation/false light. Id. at 21-29. It is unclear what causes of action Plaintiff is asserting against the City of Houston and the Houston Police Department, but the court broadly reads Plaintiffs complaint to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff seeks $1,000,900,000 in damages as well as various forms of injunctive relief. ECF No. 41. All Defendants that have been served have filed motions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF No. 45 at 1; ECF No. 47 at 1; ECF No. 48 at 6; ECF No. 49 at 3-4; ECF No. 51 at 3-6, ISIS; ECF No. 52 at 4-5.
The court first addresses its subject matter jurisdiction over this case. This case was removed to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction only-not diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. This matter was removed to federal court based on Plaintiffs federal claims. Id. at 3; ECF No. 41 at 18, 21. Plaintiff alleges federal claims on his own behalf and on behalf of others. A central question is whether Plaintiff has standing to bring these claims under Article III of the Constitution. All Defendants have raised this issue. ECF No. 45 at 1; ECF No. 47 at 1; ECF No. 48 at 6; ECF No. 49 at 3-4; ECF No. 51 at 36, 13-15; ECF No. 52 at 4-5.
Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In cases removed under section 1331, federal courts may also have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court applies the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. That is, “[a] federal question exists only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction extends “only to ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016) (quoting U.S. Const, art. Ill. § 2). Constitutional “[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy” and is an “essential component]] of federal subject matter jurisdiction [that] can be raised at any time by either party or the court.” Id. at 338; McCall v. Dretke, 390 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). The elements of constitutional standing are that the plaintiff: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338. To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must have suffered “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is ‘concrete and particularized' and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'” Id. at 339 (emphasis added) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A particularized injury is one that affects the plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Id. “[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that particular conduct is illegal.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
Rather, it often “turns on the nature and. source of the claim asserted.” Id.
As mentioned, Plaintiff seeks to bring federal claims on behalf of Owners, who are his parents, and others. The court understands this to mean that Plaintiff is seeking damages suffered by these other individuals. Plaintiff has not pleaded any injuries personal to him that can be traced to the challenged conduct of Defendants against the Owners and others.
Early in the case, Plaintiff sought to appear pro hac vice. In its November 3, 2022 Order, the court denied that request and explained that ECF No. 39. In his response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff now asserts that the claims of others have been assigned to him. ECF No. 54 at 6-9. In support of that argument, he cites this language from his mother's affidavit: “[Plaintiff] is my counsel and attorney-in-fact on all claims and legal matters resulting on or from the subject property.” ECF No. 41 at 35, The court does not read this language to be an assignment of claims. Rather, it is authorization for Plaintiff to act on his mother's behalf. The claims were not assigned. Nor are Owners or anyone other than Plaintiff parties to this case. Ernest Adimora-Nweke is the only person to have signed the pleadings in this case, and he is the only person listed as a plaintiff in the complaint and its amendments. ECF Nos. 16, 20, 38, 41; cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a) (); Fed. R. Civ. P, 11 (). The court even explained this in its order and stated that ECF No. 39. For the above reasons, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of others in this case. His 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims not brought in his personal capacity should be dismissed for lack of standing.
The question then becomes whether the federal claims for which Plaintiff lacks standing under federal law should be remanded to state court or dismissed without prejudice. When the court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim in a removed case, that claim should generally be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c)(2); 1447(c). However, an exception to the remand requirement exists in cases where it is “sufficiently certain” that the plaintiff would also lack standing in state court. See Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1991). In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807-08 (Tex. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Thus, if a plaintiff lacks standing in federal court, he will also lack standing in Texas...
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