Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand

• Decision Date: 10 April 2019
• Docket Number: SJC-12380
• Citation: 120 N.E.3d 297,481 Mass. 830
• Parties: Ruth ADJARTEY & Others v. CENTRAL DIVISION OF the HOUSING COURT DEPARTMENT& Others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

481 Mass. 830

120 N.E.3d 297

Ruth ADJARTEY & Others¹

v.CENTRAL DIVISION OF the HOUSING COURT DEPARTMENT² & Others.³

SJC-12380

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued December 6, 2018.

Decided April 10, 2019.

Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the Central Division of the Housing Court Department.

Brian Linehan, Cambridge, for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

Marjorie Evans, pro se.

Christine Hilton, pro se.

John Schumacher, pro se.

Annette Bent, pro se.

Mychelyne Oliveira, pro se.

Ruth A. Bourquin, Jessie J. Rossman, & Matthew R. Segal, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

GANTS, C.J.

The petitioners in this case raise numerous concerns regarding summary process proceedings in the Worcester Division of the Housing Court Department, now part of the Central Division(Housing Court).⁴SeeSt. 2017, c. 47, § 78.Although we affirm the single justice's order denying the petitioners' request for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we take this opportunity to clarify several important issues raised by the facts alleged in this case: (1) the appropriate process for waiving court fees and costs based on indigency; (2) more narrowly, the process for waiving the cost of audio recordings of prior court proceedings for those found indigent; and (3) the obligation of Massachusetts courts to provide reasonable accommodations for parties with disabilities.In providing this guidance, we recognize that the complexity and speed of summary process cases can present formidable challenges to individuals facing eviction, particularly where those individuals are not represented by an attorney.⁵

Background.Each petitioner in this case is or was involved in a summary process eviction action commenced in the Housing Court.Although the alleged experiences of these petitioners vary widely, each claims that he or she was improperly denied a fee waiver for audio recordings of his or her trial court proceedings, was unable to access audio recordings in time to prepare for a Housing Court or appellate court proceeding, or was required to reveal his or her indigency in open court while requesting audio recordings.The petitioners who were denied access to audio recordings argue that they were unable to learn what had happened at court hearings they were unable to attend or fully understand, and that they were therefore unable to adequately protect themselves from adverse legal action.Several petitioners further claim that the Housing Court denied them reasonable accommodations for their disabilities, thereby depriving them of equal access to the courts.

On or about February 28, 2017, the petitioners in this case applied for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court.They argued in their petition that this court should exercise its superintendence power to (1) require that all requested audio recordings be provided to all indigent parties or, in the alternative, that recordings be provided without hearing in certain limited circumstances; (2) bar courts from following procedures that require parties publicly to reveal their indigency; (3) halt eviction executions for all indigent individuals pending thorough review of the Housing Court's denial of requests for audio recordings; (4) rewind petitioners' cases back to the point at which they were denied access to an audio recording; (5) order all courts hearing summary process actions visibly to display at least one poster explaining the rights of indigent litigants; (6) send an explanatory memorandum to judges and clerk-magistrates regarding the proper treatment of indigent litigants; and (7) reimburse indigent petitioners who paid for their audio recordings, or had others pay for them on their behalf.The petition further stated that the Housing Court repeatedly failed to provide reasonable accommodations for petitioners with disabilities.

The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the petition on behalf of the Housing Court, arguing that the relief sought by the petitioners was available through the normal appellate process and that the petition failed to comply with a court rule requiring petitions filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to "name as respondents and make service upon all parties to the proceeding before the lower court."S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302(1996).The petitioners filed an opposition to the Attorney General's motion.

On June 30, 2017, the single justice allowed the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the petition and ordered that the petition be denied without hearing.Having granted the motion to dismiss, the single justice made no findings of fact.The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and this motion was likewise denied without hearing.The petitioners filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the single justice's dismissal of their petition and denial of their motion for reconsideration, and the appeal was entered in this court.

Discussion."Decisions of a single justice will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error of law or abuse of discretion."Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 106, 546 N.E.2d 354(1989)."Parties seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, must demonstrate both a violation of their substantive rights and the absence of another adequate or effective avenue of relief"(quotations and citation omitted).McDonough, petitioner, 457 Mass. 512, 517-518, 930 N.E.2d 1279(2010).Because the petitioners had adequate alternative avenues to seek review of their claims, we conclude that the single justice did not abuse his discretion or commit clear error of law in denying the petitioners' G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.⁶In light of the facts alleged in this case, however, we think it important to clarify three issues: (1) the proper application of the so-called Indigent Court Costs Law, G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A - 27G;(2) the process for obtaining audio recordings of Housing Court proceedings; and (3) the obligation of courts to provide reasonable accommodations for parties with disabilities.

1.The complexity and speed of summary process cases, and disparities in legal representation between landlords and tenants.Before we confront the specific issues raised by this case, we must address its broader context: the unique nature of a summary process eviction.Specifically, we note that summary process cases are complex, fast-moving, and generally litigated by landlords who are represented by attorneys and tenants who are not.⁷See Housing Court Department, Fiscal Year 2018 Statistics.

We include a full discussion of the complexities and speed of an eviction case in an Appendix to this opinion, but briefly summarize the process here.In a summary process action pursuant to G. L. c. 239, a landlord or homeowner asserts a statutory right to remove an occupant from property and recover possession of the property.SeeFafard v. Lincoln Pharmacy of Milford, Inc., 439 Mass. 512, 515, 789 N.E.2d 147(2003)("Summary process is a purely statutory procedure and can be maintained only in the instances specifically provided for in the statute"[citation omitted]).Before filing a summary process action in court, a landlord must serve his or her tenant with a "notice to quit" informing the tenant that after a specified period of time, the landlord intends to evict the tenant.SeeCambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 122, 113 N.E.3d 303(2018)("legally effective notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action and part of the landlord's prima facie case").

Once the period specified in the notice to quit has ended, a landlord may serve his or her tenant with a "summons and complaint" specifying, among other things, the reasons for the requested eviction and the entry date by which the case will be commenced in the court.SeeRule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993);Rule 2(d) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).This entry date must be scheduled for a Monday seven to thirty days after the tenant's receipt of the summons and complaint.SeeRule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules ;Rule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).The tenant's deadline to file an answer is determined from the entry date: no later than the Monday following the entry date, the tenant must file an answer denying any disputed statement in the complaint and setting forth all applicable defenses or counterclaims.SeeRule 3 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993);Rule 5 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980).Also by the Monday following the entry date, either party may file a request for discovery.SeeRule 7(a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).

An eviction hearing is automatically scheduled to take place on the second Thursday following the entry date.SeeRule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.If either party files a request for discovery, this hearing is postponed to the fourth Thursday following the entry date.SeeRule 7(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).On the date of the hearing, the parties may settle the dispute themselves, mediate their dispute with a housing specialist, or proceed to trial.If the parties reach an agreement, whether through settlement discussions or mediation, and that agreement is approved by a judge, it becomes a binding court order.SeeBoston Hous. Auth. v. Cassio, 428 Mass. 112, 113-114, 697 N.E.2d 128(1998).If the parties proceed to trial, the judge issues a decision from which either party may appeal within ten days.G. L. c. 239, § 5 (a ).

Where a judgment enters in favor of the landlord after trial and the tenant files a notice of appeal, the tenant generally may not be evicted until the appeal is resolved because execution upon the judgment generally is stayed pending appeal.⁸SeeMass. R. Civ. P. 62 (d), 365 Mass. 829(1974).However, a court may order that the tenant...