Adkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1938
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 232
• Citation: Adkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 417, 179 So. 382 (Ala. 1938)
• Parties: ADKINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

179 So. 382

235 Ala. 417

ADKINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

6 Div. 232

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 24, 1938

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. Edgar Bowron, Judge.

Action to recover accidental death benefit provided by a policy of life insurance by Mrs. Chloe Adkins against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Taylor v. Higgins, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Cabaniss & Johnston and L.D. Gardner, Jr., all of Birmingham, for appellee.

KNIGHT Justice.

Suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy to recover accidental death benefit of $2,000, alleged to be due under the provisions of a policy of life insurance, issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, upon the life of Durward Adkins, a son of the beneficiary.

In the discussion of this case, we shall refer to the parties as plaintiff and defendant, just as they appeared in the court below.

The insured died on July 6, 1936, while the insurance contract was in full force and effect, and following his death the plaintiff submitted proof of death to the defendant, and the latter thereupon paid to the plaintiff the $2,000 called for in the face of the policy, but declined to pay the additional $2,000 claimed and demanded under the supplementary contract. So the suit involves only this last-named sum of money.

The complaint, consisting of one count is predicated upon the following provision contained in the policy contract:

The company "Hereby agreed to pay to the Beneficiary or Beneficiaries of record under said policy, in addition to the amount payable according to the terms of said policy, the sum of 2000.00 dollars upon receipt, at the Home Office of the Company in the City of New York, of due proof of the death of the insured, as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained through external violent and accidental means, provided, *** and (5) that death shall not have been the result of self destruction whether sane or insane, or caused by or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity." (Italics supplied.)

Upon the conclusion of the evidence the court gave, at the request of the defendant, the general affirmative charge in its behalf. There was verdict for defendant, and judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff, being of the opinion that under the evidence a jury question was presented, has prosecuted this appeal, and here assigns for error the above-stated ruling of the court in giving the affirmative charge for the defendant.

The appellant plaintiff says in brief: "Therefore, the sole question presented by this appeal is, whether death caused by heatstroke is accidental death within the meaning of the policy of insurance in question? If it is, the court below erred in giving the affirmative charge for the defendant, and judgment of the court below should be reversed. If it is not, then the court below was correct in its ruling, and judgment should be affirmed."

However, we are of the opinion that, under the policy contract, the first question presented is whether the insured's death from "heat stroke," the insured's exposure being voluntary and intentional, and nothing else appearing, was caused by or through accidental means within the meaning of the policy of insurance sued on. If it is held that such death was brought about or caused by external accidental means, within the meaning of the policy, or if, under the evidence, it was a jury question, then the next question to arise is, Did the evidence support, without adverse inference, the defendant's plea that the insured's death was caused by, or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity? This last-stated question was within the issues of the case.

The evidence tended to show that the insured was employed by the Tennessee, Coal & Iron Company, and worked in the company's power house of the blast furnace department. This building was 330 feet long by 150 feet wide and has steam turbines and steam condensers in it causing artificial heat. On an average it is approximately seven degrees warmer inside the building than it is on the outside. On July 3, 1936, the last day the insured worked, he worked on the condenser which had been shut off and was cool. He worked on this condenser in the usual manner. There was no testimony tending to show that the power house was any hotter on July 3, 1936, than was usual for that time of the year. None of the turbines or pipes broke on that day so as to let out steam in the power house. The insured worked the entire shift that day, and when he went to work on that morning he had the appearance of being a healthy man, as viewed by a fellow workman, who testified in the case. This fellow workman testified that he "went back to his home that night" with insured. The evidence does not show that insured complained of being then ill.

Dr. J.A. Moore, a member of the medical staff of the Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, testified that he attended the insured professionally during July, 1936, that he had examined, and was familiar with the condition of, the insured at the time of and just prior to his death. He gave it as his opinion that the cause of insured's death was heatstroke. He testified on cross-examination that the insured had Addison's disease, and that it was a fatal disease; that in this disease the adrenal glands "atrophy away"; that the insured had been afflicted with this disease for approximately five years; that witness made out the death certificate for the Bureau of Health of Jefferson County; and that he stated in the certificate that Addison's disease was a contributing cause of insured's death, "and it was." This witness gave it as his opinion that a person in the advanced stage of Addison's disease, such as to render the disease fatal, would not be able to perform the duties of a person working in a boiler room; that one of the characteristic symptoms of most individuals having the disease in the terminal stage is that they are not able to work.

Dr. George Graham was examined by, and testified on behalf of, defendant. This witness testified that he specialized in pathology, which is the laboratory side of medicine. That he performed an autopsy on insured on July 6, 1936, and found an advanced atrophy of the adrenal glands as the outstanding thing. The adrenal glands are two little glands that sit over the kidneys, and they have a very important regulating influence on body functions in general, particularly on circulation. If those glands are absent or have completely atrophied, the person will die. In this case witness could not see any adrenal glands at all. They could not be found. That witness examined the tissue with microscope, and was able to find only a few remaining cells. The glands were gone, and only traces could be found. That this condition alone was sufficient to produce death. A person suffering from Addison's disease is very susceptible to temperature and heat, much more susceptible. That, assuming this man had a heatstroke, it would be a reasonable assumption to say that the heatstroke and Addison's disease caused death. "In my opinion the evidence which I found of heat stroke was not in and of itself sufficient to cause death." In the opinion of the witness a person suffering with Addison's disease in an advanced stage could not perform hard manual labor.

This court, in line with the great weight of authority, has recognized and applied the distinction between accidental results and results produced by accidental means, in cases where the stipulated liability is for injury resulting from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means. This was pointed out in the case of Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 105, 163 So. 635, 636, 111 A.L.R. 622, where it was observed: "While some authorities seem not to draw, or to recognize, the distinction, yet by the great weight of the adjudged cases a distinction is drawn between an accidental result and a result which is caused by accidental means; the former class holding that the result need only be accidental, while the latter class hold that, not only must the result be accidental, but the cause or means which produced or brought about the result must also be accidental."

The above-stated conclusion was reached by this court only after a careful review of many adjudged cases throughout the United States. Many of these cases are cited and reviewed in the Northam Case, supra.

And in the case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Jordan, 227 Ala. 383, 150 So. 147, the distinction between accidental result and a result which is caused by accidental means, is recognized. There it was observed, "The test is the means of the injury."

In our case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Foster, 226 Ala. 348, 147 So. 127, 130, it was observed: "We think it is very well settled that freezing is not of itself an accident, but becomes so only when 'joined with a fortuitous, unusual, unexpected circumstance or event,' which operating upon cold weather a condition produces the result as a proximate consequence of such fortuitous circumstances. Freezing is then the result of 'external violent and accidental means,' but not so unless thus caused."

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. et al., 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 462, 78 L.Ed. 934, 90 A.L.R. 1382, in an opinion by Justice Stone, in construing a policy of insurance, in which petitioner sought recovery of amounts stipulated to be paid, if death should result "directly and independently...