Adkins v. Pierson

• Decision Date: 22 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 17130.,17130.
• Citation: 374 F.2d 860
• Parties: Hazel ADKINS and Howard Adkins, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard L. PIERSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

374 F.2d 860 (1967)

Hazel ADKINS and Howard Adkins, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard L. PIERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17130.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

March 22, 1967.

Sherwin Schreier, Detroit, Mich., Maile, Leach & Silver, Detroit, Mich., on brief, for appellants.

John D. Hayes, Detroit, Mich., Ward, Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt & Peacock, Detroit, Mich., on brief, for appellee.

Before CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges, and PORTER^*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Two actions were filed in the District Court arising out of an automobile collision on December 16, 1961, at 9:30 p. m. on U. S. 24, Monroe County, Michigan, between a vehicle owned and operated by Richard L. Pierson, hereinafter referred to as Appellee, and a vehicle in which Hazel and Howard Adkins, hereinafter referred to as Appellants, were passengers. The vehicle, in which the Appellants were passengers in the rear seat, was struck from the rear after it had become disabled upon the highway and was not in motion and was without lights or other illumination.

In Civil Action No. 23,309, Appellee Pierson sued the owner and driver of the vehicle in which the Appellants were passengers. In Civil Action No. 24,240, Pierson was sued by the Appellants. The two cases were consolidated for trial. In Case No. 24,240, in which Appellee Pierson was Defendant, the defense was that he was confronted with a sudden emergency which created the perilous condition causing the collision. The jury, hearing the two cases jointly, awarded a money judgment to Appellee Pierson in Case No. 23,309, and returned a verdict in favor of Appellee Pierson against the Appellants of no cause of action in Case No. 24,240.

This appeal is initiated only from the jury's verdict in Case No. 24,240.

The only issue raised on appeal is whether or not the Trial Court properly instructed the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency.

Appellants contend that the Trial Court committed reversible error when it failed to include in its charge the specific language of the emergency doctrine, "that the party is entitled to the benefit of the rule only if the emergency occurs through no fault of his own". Appellants took their exception to the Court's charge and also asked the Court to correct its charge prior to the jury beginning deliberation. The Court refused to do so, believing its charge adequately covered this request.

Appellee contends that the charge, when viewed as a whole, properly instructed the jury as to the applicable law. This Court must apply the Michigan law.

The sudden emergency doctrine has been fully defined by the Michigan Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin, 313 Mich. 528, 21 N.W.2d 841 (1946), wherein the Court said:

"It is claimed that the charge as given ignored the limitation that the socalled emergency doctrine did not apply if the peril was caused by negligence on the part of plaintiff\'s driver or if his negligence contributed to such result. The general rule is stated in Huddy on Automobiles, 8th Ed., p. 359, as follows:

"`One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.\' The rule so stated was quoted, with approval by this Court in Walker v. Rebeuhr, 255 Mich. 204, 237 N.W. 389.

"In view of the conflicting testimony as to how and why the accident happened, the jury should have been told that plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the emergency doctrine if his negligence contributed to or brought about the sudden peril by which it claims its driver was confronted. Under the holdings of this Court in Walker v. Rebeuhr, supra; Lagassee v. Quick, 273 Mich. 295, 262 N.W. 915, and other decisions of like import, we think that the failure to state the rule in such manner as to embody the necessary qualifications was erroneous."

This doctrine was reiterated in Hicks v. B & B Distributors, Inc., 353 Mich. 488, 91 N.W.2d 882 (1958) when the Court held:

"The charge failed to advise

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