Adkinson v. Digby, Inc.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DIMMICK; WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS
• Citation: Adkinson v. Digby, Inc., 99 Wn.2d 206, 660 P.2d 756 (Wash. 1983)
• Decision Date: 24 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 49000-7
• Parties: James R. ADKINSON, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. DIGBY, INC., et al., Defendants/Appellees.

Page 206

99 Wn.2d 206

660 P.2d 756

James R. ADKINSON, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. DIGBY, INC., et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 49000-7.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

March 24, 1983.

A. Lee Petersen, Anchorage, for plaintiffs/appellants.

Lee, Smart, Cook & Martin, P.S., Inc., Nicholas C. Newman Chris Rigos, Seattle, for defendants/appellees.

DIMMICK, Justice.

The following issue was certified by the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:

Is an action timely filed under RCW 4.16.170 if the complaint is filed on the last day permitted under the relevant statute of limitations and the defendant, although not served with process within 90 days thereafter, files a voluntary notice of appearance within those 90 days?

Our answer is no.

The stipulated facts reveal the following chronology
                October 6, 1976    Automobile accident involving the
                                   parties occurring on Interstate 5
                October 4, 1979    Plaintiffs' counsel sent a copy of
                                   complaint to defendants' insurance
                                   adjustor advising that service
                                   of process would be withheld until
                                   October 15 to allow for a response
                                   to a settlement proposal.  When
                                   the adjustor received the complaint
                                   he transmitted it to the
                                   home office.
                October 5, 1979    Plaintiffs, Alaskan residents, filed
                                   summons and complaint in the
                                   United States District Court for
                                   the District of Alaska pursuant to
                                   28 U.S.C.ss 1331-32.
                October 6, 1979    Three years from the date of the
                                   accident.  Applicable statute of
                                   limitation period ends.  RCW
                                   4.16.080.
                October 19, 1979   Defendants' insurance adjustor
                                   wrote plaintiffs' counsel informing
                                   him that steps toward effecting
                                   out-of-state service on defendants
                                   should be undertaken.
                November 7, 1979   Defendants' attorney filed a
                                   Notice of Appearance which
                                   specifically stated that they entered
                                   their appearance "without waiving
                                   objections to proper service or
                                   jurisdiction, or venue".
                January 5, 1980    Ninety days after filing of the
                                   complaint.
                January 21, 1980   Defendant Digby, Inc. served.
                February 12, 1980  Defendant Harley Lee served.
                

On defendants' motion for summary judgment the District Court determined that Washington law applied and that plaintiffs had failed to comply with RCW 4.16.170 in that they did not serve process on defendants within the time prescribed. Thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled and plaintiffs' action was time barred. The court also determined that defendants were not equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. Judgment of the District Court was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

RCW 4.16.170 provides in pertinent part:

For the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations an action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed or summons is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint. If ... following filing, service is not so made, the action shall be deemed to not have been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.

Filing the summons and complaint and service upon at least one defendant must occur within the 90 days before the statute of limitations is tolled. Seamans v. Walgren, 82 Wash.2d 771, 514 P.2d 166 (1973). Both must occur or the suit is a nullity. Citizens Interested in the Transfusion of Yesteryear v. Board of Regents, 86 Wash.2d 323, 544 P.2d 740 (1976).

Service was not made on defendants in the instant case until after the 90-day period had passed. Plaintiffs contend that regardless of this fact their suit should not be dismissed. They argue that defendants, by filing a notice of appearance, waived any objections based upon RCW 4.16.170 and the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs rely upon RCW 4.28.020 which provides in part: "A voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to a personal service of the summons upon him." This portion of RCW 4.28.020 has, however, been superseded by CR 4(d)(5) ¹, which provides:

A voluntary appearance of a defendant does not preclude his right to challenge lack of jurisdiction over his person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b). [CR 12(b) provides that a party may make some defenses including those based on lack of jurisdiction and insufficient service of process by motion.]

An untimely service of process is necessarily insufficient; thus the rule is applicable. The notice of appearance entered by defendants does not preclude them from challenging the insufficient service of process.

To hold otherwise would require us to ignore our civil rules as well as reestablish a long-abolished distinction between special and general appearances. Former...