Adler v. Duval County School Bd.

Decision Date06 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 94-2638,94-2638
Citation112 F.3d 1475
Parties, 118 Ed. Law Rep. 39, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 890 Karen ADLER, individually, and as Next Friend of the Minor, Leslie Adler, and all others similarly situated, Laura Jaffa, individually and all others similarly situated, Robin Zion, individually and all others similarly situated, Robin Rand, individually and as Next Friend of the minor, Doug Rand, and all others, similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Larry Zenke, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Duval County Public School District, Don Buckley, in his official capacity as member of the Duval County School Board, Stan Jordan, in his official capacity as member of the Duval County School Board, Nancy Corwin, in her official capacity as member of the Duval County School Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Student Coalition for Free Speech, American Jewish Congress, Amici, Sharon Green, as parent and next friend of Jennifer Green, minor child, and Joshua Green, minor child, Linda Muhlbauer, as parent and next friend of Mandy Muhlbauer, minor child, and Mark Muhlbauer, minor child, Linda Gaston, parent and next friend of Matthew Gaston, minor child, Rhonda Sellers, parent and next friend of Steven Sellers, minor child, et al., Intervenors-Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

D. Gray Thomas, William J. Sheppard, Sheppard & White, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jessica Smith, Washington, DC, for amicus National Pearl.

Marc D. Stern, New York City, for amicus American Jewish Congress & National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Counsel.

Stephen M. Durden, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Frederick H. Nelson, Mathew D. Staver, Orlando, FL, for Intervenors-Defendants-Appellees Sharon Green, et al.

Mitchell A. Stone, Jacksonville, FL, Jay A. Sekulow, Washington, DC, for American Jewish Congress (amicus in District Court).

Steven T. McFarland, Center for Law & Religious Freedom, Annandale, VA, for amicus Christian Legal Society.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges, and VINING *, Senior District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

Appellants are four former high school students 1 in the Duval County, Florida, school system who brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), alleging that a Duval County school policy permitting student-initiated prayer at high school graduation ceremonies (the "policy") violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 They named as defendants the Duval County School Board, the Board's members in their official capacity, the Duval County School District, and Dalton Epting, the principal of Mandarin Senior High School ("Mandarin"), in his official capacity. These defendants are all appellees in the present appeal. The remaining appellees are a group of parents who intervened as defendants to assert their children's free exercise rights to have prayers at graduation.

I.

Appellants Adler, Laura Jaffa, and Robin Zion filed a two-count complaint on June 2, 1993. Count one alleged that the policy constitutes an establishment of religion. Count two alleged that the policy infringes on the appellants' free exercise of religion. They asked for equitable relief in the form of a judgment declaring the policy unconstitutional and enjoining the School Board from permitting prayers at high school graduation ceremonies. They also sought money damages.

On June 7, 1993, appellants Adler, Jaffa, and Zion graduated from Mandarin, one of the schools in the Duval County system. On June 10, 1993, they amended their complaint to include, inter alia, a request that the court certify their action as a class action. They amended their complaint a second time on November 1, 1993, to add appellant Rand, a student at another school in the Duval County system, as a plaintiff. 3

The plaintiffs, defendants, and defendant-intervenors filed cross-motions for summary judgment on March 3, 1994. On May 4, 1994, the district court denied the appellants' motion and granted the appellees' motions. In its dispositive memorandum opinion and order, the court found the policy constitutional and entered final judgment for the appellees. Adler, 851 F.Supp. at 456. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 9, 1994.

Appellant Rand subsequently graduated in June 1994. Because all four appellants have graduated, we find that to the extent they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, their case is moot. The only justiciable controversy in this case is the appellants' claim for money damages. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the appellees on this claim, but we do so without reviewing the merits of the district court's constitutional analysis.

II.

We begin by noting that appellants' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. All appellants have graduated, and none are threatened with harm from possible prayers in future Duval County graduation ceremonies. In short, the appellants have no legally cognizable need for relief declaring the policy unconstitutional and preventing the School Board from allowing prayers at future graduations.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of certain "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The doctrine of mootness is derived from this limitation because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 604 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986). "[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Any decision on the merits of a moot case would be an impermissible advisory opinion. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 777 F.2d at 604 (citing Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201-02, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per curiam)).

To apply the doctrine of mootness to this case, we must distinguish the appellants' claims for equitable relief from their claim for money damages. Although neither the appellants nor the district court treated the appellants' claim for damages as distinct from their claims for equitable relief, these claims are distinct by nature. Equitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries. In contrast, a claim for money damages looks back in time and is intended to redress a past injury.

Frequently, a plaintiff will seek both forms of relief in the same cause of action when challenging a defendant's course of conduct that began before the initiation of the lawsuit and is likely to continue in the future. The plaintiff requests money damages to redress injuries caused by the defendant's past conduct and seeks equitable relief to prevent the defendant's future conduct from causing future injury.

When the threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury. This is precisely what happened in this case.

Appellants argue that, despite their graduation from high school, their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not moot because the original injury is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). This exception to the mootness doctrine is narrow.

[I]n the absence of a class action, the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine [is] limited to the situation where two elements combine[ ]: (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam). This case does not satisfy the second element. Because the complaining students have graduated from high school, there is no reasonable expectation that they will be subjected to the same injury again. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (finding challenge to law school admission policy moot because petitioner "will never again be required to run the gauntlet of the Law School's admission process").

Appellants contend, however, that two of the named plaintiffs, Karen Adler and Robin Rand, are parents of other children who will graduate sometime in the future from high schools in Duval County and may be subjected to the same injury. In the complaint, however, the caption notwithstanding, neither parent is described as a plaintiff and no theories have ever been advanced to support an individual action by either parent, nor were any allegations made in the complaint regarding the existence of other children. The former students are the only plaintiffs before us, 4 and as to them, any claim for equitable relief is clearly moot. See Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir.1975) (holding constitutional challenge to graduation requirement brought by student who then graduated moot); 5 Laurenzo v. Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 662 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec.1981) (holding constitutional challenge to student-transfer rule brought by student who then graduated moot despite argument that student's parent had other children who might suffer same injury). 6

Because any claim for equitable relief has been rendered moot by the appellants' graduations, we must vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment to the appellees on the appellants' claims...

To continue reading

Request your trial
262 cases
  • Waln v. Dysart Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • February 28, 2021
    ...Sch. Bd. , 851 F. Supp. 446, 454 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding high school graduation ceremony was limited public forum), aff'd , 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997). Compare Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. , 530 U.S. at 302-04, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (concluding "extremely selective access of the policy [regard......
  • Bauchman for Bauchman v. West High School
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • December 18, 1997
    ...allegations as to other children, we conclude Ms. Rachel Bauchman is the only plaintiff before the court. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th Cir.1997); see also Laurenzo v. Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 662 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (5th Cir.1981). As the law r......
  • Adler v. Duval County School Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • May 11, 1999
    ...the students had all graduated, their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477-78 (11th Cir.1997) (Adler II ). The Adler II court also held that the students waived their damages claim on appeal. See Adler II, 112 F.3d a......
  • U.S. v. Pielago
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • February 17, 1998
    ...did not request, pursuant to legal theories they did not outline, based on facts they did not relate." Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1481 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997). Because the contemporaneous objection rule is essential to the integrity and efficiency of our judicial process......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT