Adler v. Lincoln Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 14 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-619-A,91-619-A
• Citation: 623 A.2d 20
• Parties: Amy ADLER v. LINCOLN HOUSING AUTHORITY et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 20

623 A.2d 20

Amy ADLER v. LINCOLN HOUSING AUTHORITY et al.

No. 91-619-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 14, 1993.

Lauren E. Jones, Jones Associates, Joseph Penza, Jr., Olenn & Penza, Providence, for plaintiff.

M. Durkan Cannon, Woonsocket, for defendants.

OPINION

SHEA, Justice.

This case comes before the court on the plaintiff's appeal of the trial justice's denial of her motion for issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment against the defendants. We vacate the trial justice's order and remand the case to the Superior Court for a review of facts to determine if the issuance of a writ of mandamus would be effectual.

This appeal is the latest chapter in a dispute between the parties that arose ten years ago. Amy Adler (Adler), plaintiff, was an employee of defendant town of Lincoln Housing Authority (LHA) and supervised by defendant John Palma (Palma), executive director of LHA. On February 5, 1982, Adler was terminated by Palma from her position as LHA's secretary/bookkeeper and leased-housing manager. It is undisputed that her termination resulted from her efforts to inform LHA's board of commissioners of Palma's alleged misfeasance. On March 18, 1982, the board of commissioners convened a hearing and sustained Palma's decision to terminate Adler.

Adler then brought a civil rights action in Superior Court against LHA and Palma under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her termination was punishment for her exercise of constitutionally protected speech. The trial justice granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. In our first encounter with this controversy, we reversed the directed verdict against Adler, reinstated the § 1983 claims against LHA and Palma, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. Adler v. Lincoln Housing Authority, 544 A.2d 576 (R.I.1988). The defendants' attempt to obtain a review of this court's decision, by petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, was denied. Palma v. Adler, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 496, 102 L.Ed.2d 532 (1988).

Eventually the case was retried in the Superior Court as we had ordered. On February 23, 1989, the jury returned verdicts against both defendants for compensatory damages in the amount of $57,500 and against Palma for punitive damages in the amount of $50,000. ¹ In addition, Adler's attorneys requested and were awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The defendants then came before this court a second time and appealed both the jury award and the fee award. They were ordered to show cause why their appeal should not be summarily denied and dismissed. On April 26, 1990, this court decided that cause had not been shown, and the appeal was dismissed accordingly. The trial justice awarded additional attorneys' fees from the date of the first award up to and including May 3, 1990.

It is the proceedings to satisfy the judgments that brings the case before us now for the third time. On May 3, 1990, Adler computed the total amount due her, including the amounts sought in the second fee request, and submitted it to LHA and Palma. Having received no response, she filed a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus with respect to the amounts then owed by LHA on May 18, 1990. Both LHA and Palma jointly objected to the petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus, and a hearing was held May 30, 1990. The trial justice reserved decision at that time.

Also on May 18, 1990, an execution was issued against defendants. Adler also filed a number of other motions in order to collect the judgment with respect to Palma. In this appeal we are concerned only with the execution and motion for a writ of mandamus filed on that day. On August 3, 1990, LHA moved to quash the execution and vacate the return. The trial justice reserved decision and entered an order staying the proceedings on August 14, 1990.

The trial justice rendered a decision on February 13, 1991, on all the pending matters. In that decision the trial justice ruled that the execution should be quashed, "in that R.I.G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 45-27-14 exempts public housing authorities from execution." Adler then filed a motion to reconsider and clarify the decision. An amended decision was issued on April 26, 1991, which expanded on that of February 13, 1991, by stating:

"The plain and clear language of § 45-27-14 exempts all property of the authority from levy and sale by execution. Such laws of the forum are controlling regarding the exemption of property from execution, these exemptions constituting remedies rather than rights. * * * Consequently, counsel's additional argument that § 45-27-14 is a state statute which hampers an individual's rights per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is without merit. At issue here is exemption of property from execution, not immunity from liability of persons."

In addition, the trial justice denied Adler's petition for a writ of mandamus and went on to say that "the court denies plaintiff's prayer for a writ of mandamus and instead leaves counsel to their remedies under available statutes for supplementary proceedings, § 9-28-1 et seq., and per R.C.P. 69."

Following the issuance of the amended decision, plaintiff's counsel next filed a motion for instructions in regard to the preparation of judgment on June 3, 1991. The trial justice responded in a letter to plaintiff's counsel by reiterating that mandamus against LHA, other than in its capacity as garnishee of Palma's assets, was denied. Subsequently a judgment was entered, and Adler initiated her appeal to this court.

The primary issue in this latest appeal concerns the trial court's denial of the motion for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Adler argues that such denial has left her with only a moral victory, a valid judgment with no means of collecting her damage award. We agree.

I

In the amended decision the trial justice denied Adler's prayer for a writ of mandamus and "left counsel to their remedies under the available statutes for supplementary proceedings, § 9-28-1, et seq. and per R.C.P. 69." Presumably the trial justice's denial of the writ was based on a belief that supplemental proceedings were indeed available to Adler that would give her an adequate remedy. This conclusion is not correct, however, because the supplemental proceedings under G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) chapter 28 of title 9 are not applicable to LHA, a public housing authority.

Governmental bodies generally enjoy the privilege of exemption of property from execution. In Richmond v. Kettelle, 42 R.I. 192, 206, 106 A. 292, 298 (1919), this court relied on 2 Black, The Law of Judgments, § 985a at 1445 (2nd ed. 1902) when it held that a judgment against a town treasurer cannot be collected by execution. This court quoted Black in emphasizing that " '[a]s a general rule, the property of a municipal corporation necessary to the exercise of its functions * * * or property which has been destined and set apart by statute as a source of permanent revenue for the corporation, cannot be seized or sold on execution against it." ' 42 R.I. at 207, 106 A. at 298. Execution could not issue against a town because "there is no property of the town subject to the lien of such execution * * *." Id. at 206, 106 A. at 297.

The "long-standing principle of exemption of public property" is justified by the public purpose for which municipalities and other public corporations are created. Hamrick Construction Corp. v. Rainsville Housing Authority, 447 So.2d 1295, 1299 (Ala.1984).

"The reason for the exemption is obvious. Municipal corporations are created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate or public capacity. That they may properly discharge such public functions corporate property and revenues are essential, and to deny them these would impede and in some instances practically destroy the purposes of their creation." Id. (quoting 10 E. McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 28.57 (3d rev. ed.1981)).

An alternative to execution for a plaintiff with a valid judgment against a municipality or public corporation may be mandamus which compels municipal officials to pay a valid judgment. 447 So.2d at 1299.

We have repeatedly held in our past decisions that a housing authority is clothed with some of the attributes of a municipal body. Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 238-39, 397 A.2d 884, 888 (1979). A housing authority constitutes " 'a public body and a body corporate and politic." ' Jackvony v. Berard, 66 R.I. 290, 295, 18 A.2d 889, 892 (1941). A housing authority is "a public or quasi-municipal corporation which exercise[s] police powers in the general public interest * * *." State ex rel. Costello v. Powers, 80 R.I. 390, 394, 97 A.2d 584, 586 (1953). A housing authority has "a dual nature which partakes of a public as well as a private character." Housing Authority of Woonsocket v. Fetzik, 110 R.I. 26, 33, 289 A.2d 658, 662 (1972) (citing Parent v. Woonsocket Housing Authority, 87 R.I. 444, 448, 143 A.2d 146, 148 (1958)). In Fetzik this court pointed out:

"The housing authority is not a political subdivision of the state. Once created it becomes an autonomous body, subject only to the limits of power imposed by law. * * * [A]ctually a housing authority is one of a large class of corporations created by the government to undertake public enterprises in which the public interests are involved to such an extent as to justify conferring upon such corporations important governmental privileges and powers, such as eminent domain, but which are not created for political purposes and which are not instruments of the government created for its own uses or subject to its direct control." 110 R.I. at 33, 289 A.2d at 662.

In G.L.1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-27-14 the Legislature codified the exemption from execution inherent under the holding of Richmond v. Kettelle. The statute provides:

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