Adler v. State
| Decision Date | 20 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 30958,30958 |
| Parties | David Wallace ADLER, Robert Lewis Bragg, Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Tom G. Jones, Franklin, for appellants.
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Charles J. Deiter, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Johnson Circuit Court in which a jury found the appellants guilty of the offense of robbery in two counts.
The evidence reveals that when John Lee Williams, twenty-nine years of age, left home on the evening of December 16, 1964, he had about $100.00 on his person in a billfold and a diamond ring worth about $1,000.00. That evening Williams, apparently intoxicated, met the two appellants and Mrs. Sizemore in a bar at Columbus, Indiana. It appears that they were drinking intoxicating liquors; that there was a scuffle between appellant Adler and Williams when Williams put his arm around Mrs. Sizemore at times. Finally, all of the parties got into a Volkswagen driven by the appellant Adler; Mrs. Sizemore sat in the front with Adler, and Bragg and Williams sat in the rear seat. The story Mrs. Sizemore told was that as they drove down the highway Williams started kicking, the car went off the road, and Adler was finally pushed out of the car by Williams. After some more suffling between Bragg, Williams and Adler, they all got back in the car. Thereafter they drove down the highway a little farther. Something was said about pushing Williams out of the car, and finally Williams ended up on the roadside and the other parties drove away. Thereafter Mrs. Sizemore says that Bragg said Williams didn't have very much money on him and that the ring was tight-fitting.
A state policeman testified that on December 17, 1964 he found a body lying in a ditch on the east side of county road 300 West face down, and there was a trench coat on top of the body. The hands of the deceased did not have any ring on them. There was no wallet found on the body. It was identified as John Lee Williams.
The main contention of the appellants is that they did not have a fair trial because Mrs. Sizemore was coerced, threatened, and illegally detained and was also offered immunity to testify against the appellants. The further contention is that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct and improprieties in threatening Mrs. Sizemore and in making improper statements in the closing argument, primarily using the theme that the appellants were guilty of homicide, although the charge was merely robbery.
The evidence with reference to the treatment of Mrs. Sizemore is that the Bartholomew county sheriff, with deputies, went to Spencer, Indiana where she lived, as part of the investigation of the death of Williams. From there it is claimed she was taken to Columbus against her wishes and placed in jail for four days without any charge being filed against her; that she was there threatened with being charged as an accessory to a murder and that her children would be taken away from her, while on the other hand, she would be granted immunity if she would willingly testify at the trial against the appellants.
Appellants claim their constitutional rights were violated because the alleged constitutional rights of Mrs. Sizemore, a witness, were violated. All the cases cited by the appellants to support this principle are cases where a defendant's rights in a criminal case were involved. Constitutional rights are personal, and violation of a third party's constitutional rights cannot be claimed by a defendant in his trial. It is well settled that an illegal search of a third party's property (other than that of the defendant) cannot be made the basis of a claim of a defendant for the exclusion of such evidence. May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439.
It likewise follows that the same principle is involved with reference to the alleged violation of Mrs. Sizemore's personal rights. If she were a defendant in this case, the principle urged by the appellants would be applicable.
At the same time, no one can exclude the relevant testimony of a witness from a trial as long as such witness is competent under the statute, regardless of the fact that such witness may be threatened, bribed, or influenced.
The statute fixes who shall be competent witnesses. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 235, p. 584, being Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. § 9--1603 (1956 Repl.) The Criminal Code provides that the competency of witnesses in criminal cases shall be the same as that in civil cases, and further specifically provides that an accomplice may testify. At common law a convict was an incompetent witness. 33 I.L.E., Witnesses, sec. 25, p. 18. However, under our code it was felt that justice demanded that such a witness should be a competent witness, but that his conviction or other matters affecting his credibility could be shown. Acts 1881 (Spec.Sess.), ch. 38, § 284, p. 240, being Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. § 2--1725 (1946 Repl.)
All of the evidence with reference to bribery, threats and other influences which affect and influence the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given the testimony of a witness should certainly go before the jury. Keesier v. State (1900), 154 Ind. 242, 56 N.E. 232.
In this case it appears all such testimony with reference to the alleged abuse of the witness was presented to the jury, including the circumstances and facts as to the immunity granted by the prosecuting attorney to Mrs. Sizemore.
The record likewise shows that the prosecuting attorney, outside the presence of the jury during the trial and after Mrs. Sizemore had been on the stand, warned her 'you had better shape up or I'll have you in front of another judge.' This evidence was also properly given to the jury for their...
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