Admiral Ins. Co. v. Vprart, LLC
| Decision Date | 06 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-21312-BLOOM/ Otazo-Reyes |
| Parties | ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. VPRART, LLC; ERIN GILBERT and PATRICK GILBERT, individually and as Natural Parents and Guardians of their Minor Children, F.G., H.G., and P.G., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Admiral Insurance Company's (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. [35] (“Motion”). Defendants Erin Gilbert and Patrick Gilbert (collectively, the “Gilberts”) filed a response in opposition, ECF No. [36] (“Response”), which Defendant VPRART, LLC (“VPRART”) adopted, ECF No. [37]. Plaintiff filed a reply, ECF No. [40] (“Reply”). The Court has considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
According to the Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, ECF No. [4] (the “Complaint”), Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona. Id. ¶ 2. VPRART is a Florida limited liability company with its principal place of business in Florida. Id. ¶ 4. The Gilberts are U.S. citizens and permanent residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff issued VPRART a Commercial Lines Insurance Policy (the “Policy”). Id. ¶ 16. The Policy is a “Claims-Made” policy. Id. ¶ 17. In pertinent part, the Policy offers two types of coverages one for bodily injury (“Coverage A”) and one for professional liability (“Coverage D”). Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 27. Coverage A provides that:
Id. ¶ 19. Furthermore, “[t]his insurance applies to ‘bodily injury' . . . only if: (2) The ‘bodily injury' . . . did not occur before the Retroactive Date, if any, shown in the Declarations or after the end of the policy period.” Id. ¶ 20. Coverage D states:
[Plaintiff] will pay on behalf of [VPRART] those amounts which [VPRART] is legally obligated to pay as damages caused by a professional incident taking place within the “coverage territory” and occurring in its entirety after the Retroactive Date shown in the ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS SCHEDULE above and before the end of the policy period, for which a claim is first made against [VPRART] during the policy period or any extended reporting period [Plaintiff] provide[s].
Id. at 27. According to the Additional Declarations Schedule, the Policy's retroactive date is November 12 2019. Id. ¶¶ 23, 28. The “Pre-Existing Damage Exclusion” further states:
This insurance does not apply to:
On September 25, 2019, the Gilberts filed a lawsuit against several entities in Florida State Court for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of using a vaping product (the “Underlying Litigation”) and added VPRART as a defendant in their amended complaint on March 20, 2020. Id. ¶ 35-36. According to the Gilberts' amended complaint in the Underlying Litigation, on August 15, 2019, Erin Gilbert (“Ms. Gilbert”) purchased a flavored vape cartridge that VPRART designed, manufactured, tested, labeled, marketed, distributed, and/or placed into the stream of commerce. Id. ¶¶ 38, 43. Ms. Gilbert used the vaping product from August 15, 2019, to August 18, 2019. Id. ¶ 39. From August 19, 2019, through October 2, 2019, Ms. Gilbert was hospitalized for various injuries allegedly resulting from the use of the vaping product. Id. ¶ 41-42. The Gilberts raise several counts against VPRART in the Underlying Litigation for Ms. Gilbert's injuries. Id. ¶ 44-55. On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff denied VPRART coverage for the Underlying Litigation. Id. ¶ 61.
On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a one-count Complaint seeking declaratory relief against VPRART and the Gilberts (collectively, “Defendants”) in connection with the Underlying Litigation. Id. at 1. Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the Policy does not require Plaintiff to indemnify, defend, or otherwise provide coverage for VPRART in the Underlying Litigation (“Count 1”). Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the pleadings because Defendants concede that (1) the retroactive date is November 12, 2019; (2) VPRART designed, manufactured, tested, labeled, marketed, distributed, and/or placed into the stream of commerce the vaping product before the retroactive date; and (3) the Gilberts allege in the Underlying Litigation that Ms. Gilbert first incurred her injuries before the retroactive date. ECF No. [35] at 1-3. Defendants respond that the Policy is inconsistent with Florida law and ambiguous, and that the Court should therefore interpret the Policy in their favor to require Plaintiff to indemnify, defend, and otherwise provide coverage for VPRART in the Underlying Litigation. ECF Nos. [36]; [37]. Plaintiff replies that the Policy is consistent with Florida law and unambiguous, and that the Court should therefore interpret the Policy to not require Plaintiff to indemnify, defend, or otherwise provide coverage for VPRART in the Underlying Litigation. ECF No. [40].
“After the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014); Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the [non-moving party's] factual allegations and impels the district court to reach a legal conclusion based on those facts.” Gachette v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co., No. 19-23680-CIV, 2020 WL 2850587, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2020) (quoting Dozier v. Prof'l Found. for Heath Care, Inc., 944 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir. 1991)). “In determining whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, [courts] accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving party's pleading, and [] view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Perez, 774 F.3d at 1335 (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” King v. Akima Glob. Servs., LLC, 775 Fed.Appx. 617, 620 (11th Cir. 2019).
“A court must deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings if a ‘comparison of the averments in the competing pleadings reveals a material dispute of fact.'” United States v. Khan, No. 3:17-CV-965-J-PDB, 2018 WL 6308678, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting Perez, 774 F.3d at 1335). Generally, “federal courts are unwilling to grant a judgment under Rule 12(c) unless it is clear that the merits of the controversy can be fairly and fully decided in this summary manner.” Pete Vicari Gen. Contractor LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 17-23733-CIV, 2018 WL 6308695, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2018) (citation omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has established that, under Florida law, [1] insurance contracts must be construed according to their plain meaning. See Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company v. Pastukov, 750 Fed.Appx. 909, 911 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla. 2007)); see also Grife v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 493 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff'd, 512 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003)). The Eleventh Circuit has also established that “[i]f the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the [sic] another limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous.” Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v. Washington Nat. Ins. Corp., 671 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000)); see also Sphinx Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 412 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005).
However a policy is not ambiguous simply because it is complex or requires analysis. See Southern-Owners Insurance Company v. Easdon Rhodes & Associates LLC, 872 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc., 845 So.2d at 165). Furthermore, a policy with an exclusionary provision is not necessarily ambiguous if the provision excludes coverage for only a subset of claims that would ordinarily fall within the policy's insuring provisions. Zucker for BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 1343, 1352 (...
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