Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 910016

Decision Date31 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 910016,910016
Citation473 N.W.2d 442
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
PartiesADOLPH RUB TRUST, First Trust Company of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Duane E. RUB, Defendant and Appellant, Marlys M. Rub, NoDak Ranch & Home Supply and United States of America, acting through Farmers Home Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendants. Civ.

Duane E. Rub, pro se.

Lucas and Smith, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by A. William Lucas, Bismarck.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

Duane E. Rub (Rub) appealed from an order issued by the District Court for Grant County, South Central Judicial District, dated January 2, 1991, denying his demand for change of judge. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action initiated by First Trust Company of North Dakota as Trustee for the Adolph Rub Trust (the Trust), to foreclose on a contract for deed in conjunction with Rub's failure to make the required payments, in district court case number 3662 for Grant County.

Rub filed three notices of appeal from district court case number 3662. The first notice of appeal was filed on December 31, 1990, and concerns an order dated December 20, 1990, by the district court striking jury trial. The first appeal was assigned civil number 910004 by this Court. The second notice of appeal was filed on January 14, 1991, and concerns an order dated January 2, 1991, denying Rub's demand for change of judge. The second appeal was assigned civil number 910016 by this Court and involves the instant case. The third notice of appeal was filed on February 20, 1991, and is an appeal from a judgment dated December 21, 1990, which cancelled the contract for deed and dismissed Rub's counterclaim. The third notice of appeal was assigned civil number 910051 by this Court. Cases 910004 and 910051 have been consolidated on appeal. Because the instant case involves only those issues relating to whether or not it was proper for District Judge William F. Hodny to preside over the district court proceedings, we will limit our recitation of facts to those facts which are relevant to the disposition of those issues.

Rub filed a demand for change of judge on December 6, 1990. On December 7, 1990, the Presiding District Judge, Benny A. Graff, of the South Central Judicial District denied the demand on the basis it was untimely. The presiding judge's handwritten denial and signature appear on the last page of Rub's demand for change of judge.

A trial was conducted on December 18, 1990, and the judgment was filed on December 21, 1990. On December 31, 1990, Rub filed a second demand for change of judge, a motion for new trial, and a number of other documents not relevant to this appeal. The second demand for change of judge was denied by an order of the Presiding District Judge, Benny A. Graff, dated January 2, 1991. This appeal stems from the January 2, 1991, order denying the demand for change of judge, a copy of which was attached to the notice of appeal in this case.

Normally, an order denying a demand for change of judge by itself is a nonappealable order. See section 28-27-02, N.D.C.C., for orders that are appealable. 1 However, as Rub currently has an appeal pending before this Court from the district court's judgment [civil number 910051] and as a party is entitled to have an interlocutory order considered on an appeal from a final judgment, we will address his appeal from the order denying the change of judge in this opinion.

As previously stated, Rub filed his first demand for change of judge on December 6, 1990, and his second demand for change of judge on December 31, 1990. Both were denied on the basis that they were untimely. Section 29-15-21(2) of the North Dakota Century Code reads:

"2. The demand is invalid unless it is filed with the clerk of the court not later than ten days after the occurrence of the earliest of any one of the following events:

a. The date of the notice of assignment or reassignment of a judge for trial of the case;

b. The date of notice that a trial has been scheduled; or

c. The date of service of any exparte order in the case signed by the judge against whom the demand is filed."

The notice that trial had been scheduled for December 18, 1990, before Judge Hodny, is dated September 25, 1990. Both demands were made in excess of ten days after the date of the notice. Therefore, both demands were untimely pursuant to Sec. 29-15-21(2)(b), N.D.C.C.

Although Rub's demands for change of judge were untimely, we believe it is appropriate to review his assertions on appeal in light of the fact that the second demand for change of judge was filed in conjunction with a motion for new trial and his assertions are directed at the behavior of the judge during the proceedings. We will consider Rub's assertions to be in the nature of a request for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(b)(1), N.D.R.Civ.P., which reads:

"(b) Causes for New Trial. The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a new trial granted on the application of a party aggrieved for any of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of the party:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial."

Rub asserts the following issues on appeal:

"FIRST ISSUE:

THAT JUDGE WILLIAM HODNY DID MAKE A STATEMENT OF INTEREST, DECLARING PUBLIC OFFICE TO BE A PUBLIC TRUST.

"SECOND ISSUE:

JUDGE WILLIAM HODNY, DID TAKE A OATH OF OFFICE.

"THIRD ISSUE:

JUDGE WILLIAM HODNY, HAS NOT DISPLAYED PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT.

"FOURTH ISSUE:

JUDGE WILLIAM HODNY, TRIED TO HOLD TRIAL IN WRONG VENUE.

"FIFTH ISSUE:

JUDGE WILLIAM HODGY [SIC], DID SHOW BIAS AND PREJUDICE IN ALL CASES."

A trial court's decision to deny a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. E.g., Napoleon Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Rohrich, 406 N.W.2d 346, 355 (N.D.1987). The trial court has abused its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. E.g., Lange v. Cusey, 379 N.W.2d 775, 777 (N.D.1985).

Rub apparently seeks a new trial on the basis of irregularity in the proceedings of the court pursuant to Rule 59(b)(1), N.D.R.Civ.P. A new trial pursuant to Rule 59(b)(1) is justified if the irregularity of the court is patent, obvious, or evident from the record. See Lange, 379 N.W.2d at 777.

Rub's first issue seems to assert that Judge Hodny violated public confidence and trust. Rub has not provided any citation of authority or referred to any particular part of the record to illustrate and support his assertion. 2 Our review of the record does not reveal any patent, obvious or evident irregularity. Therefore, we find Rub's first assertion to be without merit.

Rub's second issue is apparently that Judge Hodny violated his oath of office by denying Rub's request for a jury trial. As the order denying the request for a jury trial is the subject of another appeal [civil number 910004], we decline to address this issue at length here. It is sufficient to say he is not entitled to a jury trial in this case because the foreclosure of a contract for deed is an action in equity and not an action at law. First National Bank and Trust of Williston v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635 (N.D.1991).

For Rub's third issue he asserts that Judge Hodny did not display professional and proper judicial conduct. Rub has failed to particularize the conduct he believes to be improper. Our review of the record does not reveal any patent, obvious, or evident irregularity in regard to unprofessional or non-judicial conduct. 3 Rub's third issue is, therefore, without merit.

For his fourth issue, Rub asserts that Judge Hodny attempted to hold trial in the wrong venue. He does not assert that trial was actually held in the wrong county. Once again Rub has failed to particularize and has failed to refer us to relevant case or statutory law. 4 The fourth issue is without merit.

Rub's fifth and final assertion...

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6 cases
  • Dieterle v. Dieterle
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 18 Agosto 2022
    ...discussion. [¶17] "Normally, an order denying a demand for change of judge by itself is a nonappealable order." Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub , 473 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1991). However, an interlocutory order can be considered on an appeal from a final order or judgment. Id. In Rub , as in this case, ......
  • Estate of Ketterling, Matter of
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 20 Abril 1994
    ...and not appealable in itself, we will review an intermediate order on appeal from a final judgment. NDRAppP 35(a); Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 473 N.W.2d 442, 444 (N.D.1991). We conclude that we have jurisdiction of Lloyd's Whether Lloyd's challenge to Arnold's will is procedurally viable depe......
  • Production Credit Ass'n of Mandan v. Rub
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 11 Septiembre 1991
    ...and the Rubs's bald assertions of bias and prejudice are meritless. Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 33 (N.D.1991); Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 473 N.W.2d 442 (N.D.1991). The district court judgments and orders are ERICKSTAD, C.J., LEVINE, and MESCHKE, JJ., and EVERETT NELS OLSON, District ......
  • State v. Velasquez, No. 990097
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 1 Diciembre 1999
    ...of the case. Thus, Velasquez's demand for change of judge was untimely according to N.D.C.C. § 29-15-21(2)(a). See Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 473 N.W.2d 442, 445 (N.D.1991) (stating where demand for change of judge was in excess of ten days after the date of notice, the demand was untimely pu......
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