Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, In re

Citation701 A.2d 110,347 Md. 295
Decision Date01 September 1996
Docket NumberNo. 40,40
PartiesIn re ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP NO. 3598 in the Circuit Court, for Harford County, Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Leslie Scherr (Elisabeth J. Lyons, Seymour & Scherr, Washington, DC; Dawn Oxley Musgrave, Baltimore, all on brief), for Petitioner.

Alfred N. Kramer, Aberdeen, for Respondent.

Before MURPHY, * C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI,* BELL and RAKER, JJ.

BELL, Judge.

The instant case concerns the adoption of a female minor child born in Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York. Over the objection of the biological father, pursuant to a private adoption agreement between the biological mother and prospective adoptive parents, the child was taken to Harford County, Maryland, where the adoptive parents, the petitioners, sought and were granted a decree of adoption. A divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County, finding that the trial court should not have granted the adoption, because of the petitioners' violation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md.App. 475, 503, 675 A.2d 170, 184, cert. granted, 342 Md. 582, 678 A.2d 1047(1996). We shall hold that the best interest of the child standard continues to be the uncompromising standard in all adoption proceedings and, in relying on that standard, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the adoption petition at issue. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We observe, however, that certain facts and circumstances may provide an adequate basis for the dismissal of an adoption petition as a penalty for violating the ICPC.

I.

In early 1991, Jerry C., the respondent and the natural father of Baby Girl S., and Amy S., her natural mother, both residents of State of New York, met at "Let's Dance," a night club located in Dutchess County, New York, and developed a casual friendship. The respondent and his brother were popular night club dancers; the natural mother frequented the area night clubs to dance and socialize with friends. As avid night club patrons, the respondent and the natural mother would meet at different clubs approximately twice a week. Over a short period of time, their casual relationship became intimate and, as a result, the natural mother, an eighteen year old high school senior, spent one night with the respondent and became pregnant. The respondent, known to the natural mother only by the nickname "Manny," was twenty-one years old at the time.

A few days following the sexual encounter, the natural mother's father moved to Vermont, thus prompting the natural mother to move to the other side of the Hudson River to live with her mother and stepfather in a mobile home. The respondent had no knowledge of either the natural mother's relocation or her pregnancy until he saw her at a night club several months later. 1 Upon learning of the pregnancy, the respondent did not deny paternity; rather, he expressed a willingness to support the child. According to his testimony, the respondent said, "If you say I am the father, I am the father. I will live up to my responsibilities." The respondent's assistance, as it turns out, materialized only in the form of casual services, not financial assistance. Although the natural mother was a high school student and the respondent was employed, the respondent never offered to pay any of the natural mother's medical expenses. 2 The only overt acts by the respondent evidencing his willingness to assist the natural mother during her pregnancy consisted of driving the natural mother, on two occasions, from school to Vassar Brothers Hospital for prenatal care. On the first occasion, the respondent waited outside and then drove the natural mother home. On the second occasion, when they left the hospital, the respondent took the natural mother to his home, where she met his mother and other family members. Because the natural mother was experiencing difficulties in connection with the pregnancy at her mother's home, the respondent's mother invited the natural mother to move in with the respondent's family, an invitation that, for reasons not in the record, the natural mother declined. On that occasion, after introducing the natural mother to his family, the respondent went out for the remainder of the evening without informing the natural mother of his whereabouts. In fact, when he had not returned by the next morning, and the natural mother had not received a phone call from him, the natural mother walked back to Vassar Brothers Hospital, where she called her relatives to come take her home.

Aside from the hospital visits, the respondent and the natural mother had minimal contact, especially during the last few months of the pregnancy. The respondent testified that the natural mother was responsible for the lack of contact, as he tried calling and visiting the natural mother, but the natural mother's mother and stepfather told him to stay away. On one occasion, the respondent and his mother visited the natural mother's mobile home, but were told by her stepfather to leave and that the natural mother did not want to see the respondent. The natural mother confirmed this incident, testifying that she was at home on that occasion, but that she did not want to see the respondent.

During the last couple of months of the pregnancy, the natural mother received home-teaching and began meeting with a school-sponsored social worker. The latter advised her to consider adoption as an option for the child after birth. Coincidentally, the social worker learned through a mutual friend that the petitioners, Paul and Deborah M. 3 , were interested in adopting a child. The natural mother testified that, faced with a Hobson choice, she concluded that, rather than rearing a child without financial support from the respondent, adoption was the optimal course of action for her. Therefore, she telephoned the petitioners and they began negotiating the terms of the adoption. 4 Throughout the negotiations, which included several telephone conversations and a personal meeting, the natural mother told the petitioners that the father of the child was "out of the picture" and was not interested. She also told them that she did not know his name.

In late April 1992, after the petitioners and the natural mother had agreed on the terms of the adoption, the petitioners engaged counsel in New York to represent the natural mother and to prepare and file the necessary documents to comply with the ICPC. On the application submitted to the New York State ICPC Administrator, the natural mother indicated that the father of the child was "unknown." Prior to trial, it was stipulated by all parties that the natural mother knew at all relevant times the identity and whereabouts of the respondent, the natural father.

On May 3, 1992, the natural mother gave birth to a female child, Baby Girl S., in Poughkeepsie, New York. Two days later, the respondent, accompanied by his mother and other family members, came to the hospital to see Baby Girl S. carrying balloons, flowers, and gifts. As soon as they reached the natural mother's floor, however, and, thus, before they were able to see new born Baby Girl S., at the behest of the natural mother's mother and one of the petitioners' relatives, pursuant to a complaint from the natural mother, hospital security escorted the respondent and his relatives out of the hospital. As the respondent and his family were being escorted out of the hospital under protest, Mrs. M., who had been in New York since the natural mother went into labor and who had spent time with Baby Girl S. the previous day, was waiting in the hospital lobby to take possession of Baby Girl S. Upon receiving custody of Baby Girl S. from the natural mother's attorney, Mrs. M. went to her father's house in New Paltz, New York to await permission from the ICPC Administrator to transport Baby Girl S. to Maryland.

Later that day, the natural mother, through counsel, filed an Affidavit Relating to the Biological-Father's Consent and an Extrajudicial Consent Form 2-G with the Surrogate's Court of Ulster County, New York. Those forms were necessary in order for the natural mother to obtain approval to place Baby Girl S. with the petitioners. The natural mother's affidavit, signed over her attorney's signature and notary seal, states, in pertinent part:

2. The biological father of the child is unknown to [the natural mother] and no person has taken steps to establish legal responsibility for the child.

3. The biological father, if known, has not made payment of pregnancy nor birth expenses.

4. The biological father, if known, has not publicly acknowledged paternity.

5. The biological father, if unknown, has taken no other steps to evince a commitment to the child.

Likewise, in the Extrajudicial Consent Form, the natural mother stated that the respondent's full name and address were "unknown." That statement, like its counterpart in the affidavit, was false. Moreover, the respondent was never notified of the proceedings in the Surrogate's Court. Thus, it is clear, and the petitioners do not dispute, that the natural mother's purpose in making these false statements was to obtain certification from the Surrogate's Court in order to effectuate the placement of the child and ultimately to facilitate the adoption.

Two days after the incident at the hospital, on May 7, 1992, the respondent filed a petition in the Family Court of Dutchess County, New York, for a Filiation Order, declaring him to be the father of Baby Girl S. In response to this petition, by letter dated May 15, 1992, addressed to the court, the natural mother's attorney informed the court that the natural mother admitted that the respondent was Baby Girl S.'s natural father. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
372 cases
  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 10, 1999
    ... ... at 623, 618 A.2d 266 ... See also, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 516, 675 A.2d 170 (1996) (finding no support for trial court's conclusion that appellant's home was "less than desirable," based ... ...
  • Lovelace v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 3, 1999
    ... ... 3598, 109 Md.App. 475, 516, 675 A.2d 170 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997) (finding no support for trial court's ... ...
  • Hill v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • October 4, 2000
    ... ...          In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 313, 701 A.2d 110 (1997) ( quoting North, supra, 102 Md.App. at 14, 648 A.2d 1025 ). See also Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, ... ...
  • Prince George's County v. Hartley
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • May 2, 2003
    ... ... 275, 288, 759 A.2d 1136 (2000) (quoting Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 604, 755 A.2d 1088 (2000) ) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 (1997)). "Thus, where a trial court's ruling is reasonable, even if we believe it might have gone the other way, we will not disturb it ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Judicial Oversight over the Interstate Placement of Foster Children: The Missing Element in Current Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
    • United States
    • Capital University Law Review No. 38-2, December 2009
    • December 1, 2009
    ...child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly.”) (internal quotation omitted); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 701 A.2d 110, 124 (Md. 1997) (“Certainly, the best interest of the child remains the overarching consideration and the needs of the child should not be su......
  • Interstate Adoptions
    • United States
    • Alabama State Bar Alabama Lawyer No. 83-3, May 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...detrimental and was in the best interests of the children are fully supported by the record."); cf. In re Adoption Guardianship No. 3598, 701 A. 2d 110, 323 (Md. Ct. App. 1997) ("[W]e do not rule out the possibility of a trial court, under appropriate circumstances, dismissing an adoption p......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT