Adoption of BGD, Matter of

Decision Date30 May 1986
Docket NumberNo. C-85-1,C-85-1
Citation719 P.2d 1373
PartiesIn the Matter of the ADOPTION OF BGD, a Minor. TD, By and Through her next friend and parents JD and ZD, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. LDP and MFP, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court
ORDER ON REHEARING

This case came on before the Court pursuant to Order Granting Petition for Rehearing and Denying Petition for the Appointment of Weston County DEPASS as Guardian Ad Litem to Investigate the Parties to Aid in Determining What is in the Best Interest of BGD, a Minor, and Denying Motion to Disqualify Supreme Court Justices entered on March 28, 1986, 716 P.2d 983, and the Appellees' Brief on Order Granting Rehearing and the Appellant's Answer, and the Court having heard the oral arguments of counsel for the parties, and having examined the file and record of the Court and the opinion of the Court in this case which was filed on February 14, 1986, 713 P.2d 1191, and being fully advised in the premises, finds that the opinion of the Court filed on February 14, 1986, should be confirmed in all respects; and it therefore is

ORDERED that the opinion of this Court filed in this case on February 14, 1986, be and the same hereby is, confirmed.

BROWN, Justice, specially concurring, in which RAPER, Justice (Retired), joins.

It was with a heavy heart that I voted with the majority in this court's decision of February 14, 1986. It was equally difficult to join the majority in confirming the court's original opinion. A judge is no stranger to difficult and unpopular decisions. However, he must vote according to his conscience and uphold what he perceives to be the law.

After the court's opinion of February 14, 1986, the Supreme Court was inundated with letters urging us to change our determination, which is unfortunate. Over fifty of these letters were directed personally to me. It was reported that one of those Those who organized the letter writing campaign misconceived the judicial process. A judge cannot properly be influenced by public opinion or pressure. I wish to assure the public that the letters did not have any influence whatsoever on the court's decision to grant a rehearing. It would be totally improper for the court to succumb to pressure or be influenced by public opinion. Those interested in this case must understand that the courts cannot tinker with the rules in order to accommodate one circumstance. The law applies the same to everyone in the state.

active in the letter writing campaign said: "I think the publicity and the letter writing campaign * * * probably helped" (obtain a rehearing). Casper Star Tribune, May 29, 1986; Newcastle Newsletter Journal, April 3, 1986.

If I ever make a decision based upon pressure or because of public opinion instead of my own professional judgment, I would have to resign from this court. In that circumstance I would have compromised my principles, violated my oath, sacrificed my integrity, and no longer be of any value to the court. The other members of this court feel the same way.

CARDINE, Justice, specially concurring, with whom BROWN, Justice, and RAPER, Justice, Retired, join.

The only question presented on rehearing is whether the court correctly interpreted and applied § 1-22-109 and § 1-22-104, W.S.1977 to the facts of this case. A review of these facts is helpful in answering that question.

TD, a young, unwed, pregnant girl employed a doctor to deliver her baby. The doctor's office manager MFP, wanted to adopt a baby. The doctor discussed the "possibility [of adoption at] nearly every visit" of TD. He advised MFP that "we have a baby that will be available." On March 15, 1983, seven days before the birth of baby girl D, the doctor advised TD that he knew a lawyer who handled adoptions. The doctor then testified,

"I phoned him stating that I had a young lady who was interested, asked if he would see her * * * could he see her at the same time she came for the appointment, could he please tell her about the legal aspects. I did not ask [the attorney] to prepare any form, and I did not ask [TD] to sign anything. I did ask her to please go and talk to him about the legal aspects * * *.

When TD returned from the lawyer's office after signing a consent to adoption, the doctor testified,

"I was surprised. I did not realize she was going to sign anything that day. My only basis for sending her was for her to gain information about legal aspects of this procedure."

The lawyer testified,

"I had been called by Doctor Reimer and advised they were in town and would be coming down to see me, the purpose being to sign a Consent for Adoption, for her to give up her parental rights to a child."

The lawyer, who had been employed by MFP and had previously prepared the consent form, advised TD that it "would be necessary for her to sign."

Baby girl D was born March 22, 1983. The doctor had previously told TD concerning the adoption, "you can change your mind at any time." TD testified that she informed the doctor in the delivery room before the birth that she wanted to keep her baby. The doctor testified,

"I do not recall that exact statement. I certainly do know that she was ambivalent about this, and, you know, a part of her did not want to do this, and she may have said that to me and I do not recall that exact statement."

Whatever the situation, the doctor admits that he lied to TD when he told her that it was too late to "keep her baby" because the adoptive parents were flying in from California. That evening, seven hours after baby girl D was born, the doctor took the baby from the hospital to his home where he delivered it to his office manager During trial the judge said to the doctor, who was on the witness stand,

MFP and her husband LDP, the prospective adoptive parents.

"THE COURT: Doctor, let me say to you, * * * who are you representing here? Don't you realize you've put yourself in a predicament? I hope you don't ever do that again. Now, were you representing the adoptive parents or were you representing this girl who had the baby? You can't carry water on both shoulders, and that's what you're trying to do."

Shortly after the birth of her baby, when it was still at the hospital, TD called the lawyer and said,

"I told him that--I asked him if the parents would change their mind on the adoption and that I wanted her back, and he told me that I was 16 years old and I wouldn't be able to take care of a baby and also that if I wanted another baby I could have another one; and that's when I told him that the adoptive parents can adopt another baby and they don't have to have mine."

The next morning TD asked to see her baby and was told it was gone. TD then checked out of the hospital fast "so I could go home and start trying to find a lawyer."

In this case the adoptive parents contend that they should prevail because they have had possession of baby girl D for approximately three years, and because they are financially better able to provide for her. In a similar case, an eighteen-year-old unmarried natural mother signed a consent and surrendered her child to the adoptive parents. Within two or three weeks she decided it was a mistake and asked that her daughter be returned. The adoptive parents refused. The natural mother resisted the adoption and brought habeas corpus. In deciding in favor of the natural mother, the court stated,

"The hardships produced by a separation of the child and the petitioners at this time are in substantial measure the result of the petitioners' resistance to the natural mother's efforts to regain custody. Those hoping to become adoptive parents cannot create their best argument for keeping a child's custody by thwarting a natural parent's known wishes."

and continuing, the court stated,

"Where, as here, a natural mother not represented by legal counsel at the time consent is given attempts to withdraw that consent within a few weeks and thereafter takes reasonable steps available to regain the custody of her child, neither so-called 'vested rights' nor superior economic or social position of the proposed adoptive parents will serve to deprive that withdrawal of legal effect." Small v. Andrews, 20 Or.App. 6, 530 P.2d 540 (1975).

See also Adoption of Vaida, 34 Or.App. 631, 579 P.2d 313 (1978), wherein it was stated,

"Knowing and voluntary consent by a child's parent or parents is the basis of the adoption process. The integrity of the private placement system requires that such consent be scrupulously obtained.

"The interests of the child are always a primary consideration, and it does not come easy to render a decision which appears to be inconsistent with his interests emotionally, economically, and environmentally. But we are not authorized to

" ' * * * interfere with the natural relationship of parent and child upon the sole ground that the proposed adoptive parents are able to give the child superior advantages over those within the means or social status of the natural parents.' "

The adoptive parents also contend that TD's consent obtained before the birth of baby girl D was irrevocable and, therefore, they should be permitted to keep TD's baby. The contention finds little support in law. And even where the consent form is executed after the birth of a child, undue influence (over-persuasion) will result in an insufficient consent.

Thus, in In Re Alsdurf's Petition, 270 Minn. 236, 133 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1965) the court stated:

"[T]he natural mother has been the victim of misguided meddling and officious pressures on the part of persons who were bent on persuading her to part with the custody of her infant daughter.

* * *

* * *

"From the moment Charlotte Sadler first consulted her doctor on February 5, 1962, she was subjected to pressures from every source. * * * Shortly after the birth of the child, a hospital employee, characterized by the court as a self-styled unofficial social worker, intruded herself, uninvited, into Miss Sadler's double room...

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6 cases
  • In re Atws
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 5 Mayo 2021
    ... 486 P.3d 158 In the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF: ATWS, Minor Child, KA, Appellant (Petitioner). S-20-0184 Supreme Court of ... adoption statutes in a manner which will promote this purpose." Matter of Adoption of BGD , 719 P.2d 1373, 1382 (Wyo. 1986) ; see also 3A J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory ... ...
  • In re MAJB
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    ... 478 P.3d 196 In the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF: MAJB f/k/a ZJC, minor child, DLB and DAB, Appellants (Petitioners). S-20-0120 ... construe adoption statutes in a manner which will promote this purpose." Matter of Adoption of BGD , 719 P.2d 1373, 1382 (Wyo. 1986) ; see also 3A J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory ... ...
  • TR, Matter of, C-88-10
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    • 21 Julio 1989
    ...(Wyo.1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) and Matter of Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, reh'g granted 716 P.2d 983, opinion confirmed 719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo.1986). Even though the original trial judge who conducted the two trials has now retired, I disfavor putting these children through the proces......
  • J.M.P., In re
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    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 3 Junio 1988
    ... Page 1002 ... 528 So.2d 1002 ... In re Mr. & Mrs. J.M.P. Applying for Adoption ... No. 88-C-0008 ... 528 So.2d 1002 ... Supreme Court of Louisiana ... June 3, 1988 ... has been determined by it and when the other party knew or should have known that the matter affected by the error was the cause of the obligation for the party in error. La.Civ.Code art ... See, e.g., In re Adoption of BGD, 719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo.1986) ...         The controversial issue considered in Sorentino ... ...
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