Adoption of D------

• Decision Date: 09 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 7864,7864
• Parties: In re Adoption of D_____.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 223

252 P.2d 223

122 Utah 525

In re Adoption of D_____.

No. 7864.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 9, 1953.

Benjamin Spence, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Young, Young & Sorensen, Provo, for respondent.

CROCKETT, Justice.

After contested trial, the district court granted respondents a decree of adoption of the minor above referred to and denied the claims of appellant, the child's natural mother. She appeals. Affirmed.

This question is presented: Does a parent who has appeared before a court in connection with an adoption proceeding and voluntarily consented to the adoption of her child, have the right, arbitrarily and without cause, to revoke that consent, when as here, the adoptive parents have accepted the child, kept it in their home for a considerable period of time so that mutual affections have developed, gone to trouble and expense in providing care and in making a home for said child and have in all respects satisfied the requirements of the law as to adoptive parents? Our answer is that under those circumstances she has no such arbitrary right.

The child D_____ was born April 28, 1948, so is now 4 years 9 months old. She was placed with respondents over two years ago (in December of 1950) by her maternal great- grandmother who had been trying to care for her, but felt unable to continue doing so. A brief review of the antecedents to the placement of this child with respondents seems appropriate.

Appellant was herself a victim of unfortunate home circumstances. She had no acquaintance with her father; her mother died when she was six and she thereafter lived with her grandmother with whom she did not get along very well. She married at 17; lived with her husband but intermittently until the child, D_____, was born, but within three weeks thereafter he deserted them for good.

Right after the child's birth, appellant took her to her grandmother's who cared for D_____ until December, 1950 when she was placed in respondent's home. The basis of this decision being what it is, it is unnecessary to delineate herein the details concerning appellant's conduct and lack of interest in this child. Her grandmother, her aunts and others all advised her that she should either take an interest in D_____, give her a mother's love and the care and attention she should have or let someone adopt her because her grandmother, well up in her sixties and in poor health, was neither physically nor economically able to continue giving the child a home and care. Nevertheless, the situation did not change, which finally caused the grandmother to arrange to place D_____ with the respondents, promising them that she would do everything she could to help them adopt her. That is the basis upon which they accepted her, assuming full responsibility for her care and not expecting compensation from anyone.

The child D_____ was then in poor health; she was very thin; suffering from mastoid trouble; had a heart murmur and her feet were turning in. Respondents procured special medical and other care for her which has greatly improved these conditions and her general health. They have provided a room of her own, child's play facilities and otherwise made a comfortable, attractive and proper home for her. Within a month after the placement respondents' attorney, Mr. Dallas H. Young, brought appellant to the home; she was assured she could visit D_____ whenever she desired, but she did not do so.

It was necessary for the child to be in respondents' home for a full year before a decree of adoption could be granted. ¹ Apparently looking to this, after she had been there ten months, that is in October, 1951, a petition for adoption was duly filed and appellant appeared before the district court, was questioned concerning her desires and voluntarily signed the consent to adoption. Meanwhile, because of delay in contacting the child's father, who was in Korea, the proceeding did not go through when the year was up in December as it might have done. (The father later gave consent in court.) It was not until fourteen months after the placement, or on February 8, 1952, appellant filed objections to the proposed adoption purporting to revoke the consent she had given. She claimed the right to do so on two grounds: (1) That she was the victim of 'duress and undue influence' in signing the consent, and (2) 'that a parent of a minor child could withdraw her consent * * * at any time before the adoption, * * * even though it was obtained voluntarily and without undue influence, coercion or persuasion * * *.' (quotes from her brief).

In considering the question of duress, we do not overlook the fact that often a natural parent, particularly a young mother left alone with the responsibility of a child, because of economic conditions or other circumstances, in order to avoid shame, embarrassment or hardship to herself or others, or out of solicitude for the child, may be an easy prey to undue influence of designing or conniving persons. Therefore, whenever such a charge is made, the court should carefully scrutinize the evidence, lest an honest, worthy and well meaning natural parent be unjustly deprived of her child. ²

However, in the instant case the evidence clearly manifests that the trial court was right in its findings that appellant was not a victim of duress or undue influence. She had many months to consider the matter. She had conferences with her grandmother and other relatives and with counsel for respondent, and thereafter voluntarily appeared before the court; she was questioned concerning her attitude and desires and freely signed the relinquishment and consent. Thus, even though this proceeding is equitable in the highest degree, and this court may review the evidence, ³ there is no basis for disturbing the trial court's finding.

That brings us to the question of importance and real interest in the case: the claimed arbitrary right to revoke the consent. Appellant cites no case where revocation has been allowed under facts analogous to the instant one, but places reliance principally upon generalities. We are referred to a text statement at 138 A.L.R. 1038 to the effect that the majority view is that the natural parent may withdraw the consent at any time before the adoption takes place. An analysis of the cases purporting to support that statement shows that it is much too broad. The key one of these cases is In re White. ⁴ It was submitted upon stipulated facts; the reasons for the revocation were not shown; the child had been out of the possession of the mother for only a relatively short period of time. The court recited:

'* * * that under the circumstances of this case, no vested rights having intervened, the natural mother had the right to withdraw her consent * * *.'

With respect to the case, the A.L.R. text further states:

'It has also been indicated that intervening vested rights on the part of the adopting parents or the child might preclude the natural parents from withdrawing consent and thus barring the adoption.' ⁵ (Emphasis added.)

Four additional cases, representing three other states, are listed as supporting the proposition claimed by appellant. ⁶ Limitations of space dissuade us from discussing each herein, but none of them could properly be said to apply to the instant case in favor of appellant's position, nor do they justify the rule as contended for by her. Reading of many cases on this subject teaches that each depends upon its own facts: the circumstances of the placement of the child; those under which the consent was given; the length of time the adopting parents have had the child; any 'vested rights' that have intervened; the welfare of the child; the conduct, as well as the character and ability of the respective claimants; these and the particular governing statute are all given consideration in determining whether the consent may be revoked. ⁷

Illustrative of this is our own recent case of Taylor v. Waddoups ⁸ which appellant urges upon us as compelling a reversal of the trial court. Actually it is an excellent example of the error of her contention. This court did state that the natural mother, prior to the adoption, had effectively revoked any consent to the adoption, but as pointed out by Mr. Justice Henriod, the revocation was permitted, 'when applied to the facts of this case.' (Emphasis added.) The facts are greatly at variance with those here. There the Welfare Department placed the children with the Waddoups as a paid boarding home. When the purported relinquishment was signed, the mother was up against an impossible situation, both economically and on account of her health; but the most important and controlling fact was that the purported consent was not executed before the court as required by statute, but was an attempt to execute a consent in a manner not authorized by law.

That the text statement relied upon by appellant, earlier referred to herein, cannot justifiably be said to support her contention is plainly demonstrated in a subsequent A.L.R. annotation on this subject. ⁹ The following observation expressed in that text appears to be an accurate appraisal of the adjudicated cases on this subject:

'While, as brought out in the earlier annotation, there is authority for the view that a natural parent's consent * * * may be effectively withdrawn * * * before the adoption has been finally approved * * * it must now be said, in view of the later cases * * * that the trend of the more recent authority is toward the position that where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to the adoption * * * and the proposed adoptive parents have acted upon such consent by bringing adoption proceedings, the consent is ordinarily binding * * * and cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn * * * particularly where, in reliance upon such consent, the proposed adoptive parents have taken the child into their custody and care for a substantial period of time, and...