Adoption of Doe, Matter of
Decision Date | 24 March 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-1277,87-1277 |
Citation | 524 So.2d 1037,13 Fla. L. Weekly 1209 |
Parties | , 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1209, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 782 In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF John DOE, Infant Baby Boy. Richard ROE and Mary Roe, Appellants, v. Bob DOE and Jane Doe, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John L. O'Donnell, Jr., of DeWolf, Ward & Morris, P.A., Orlando, for appellants.
Chandler R. Muller, of Muller, Kirkconnell and Lindsey, P.A., Winter Park, for appellees.
The Roes, natural parents of the infant, John Doe, appeal from a judgment of adoption establishing parental rights in the Does to the child. The Roes argue that the natural mother's consent to the adoption was obtained under duress and should be invalidated. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the natural mother is bound by her consent. However, the Roes also argue the adoption is invalid because the natural father's consent to the adoption was not obtained. The trial court found his lack of consent should be excused because of certain irresponsible actions on his part prior to the child's birth, which the trial court found constituted abandonment. We reverse.
This case was tried over a period of months. It was ably and well presented by the attorneys for both sides. As do all contested adoption cases, it caused the trial judge and the appellate panel that heard it much concern, and empathy for all of the parties involved. 1
The transcripts of testimony in the case are lengthy, and contain conflicts regarding the natural mother's consent and the natural father's abandonment of her and the unborn child. After this adoption proceeding commenced, the natural parents married. There are numerous discrepancies between the natural mother's testimony at trial and the testimony concerning her prior statements to social workers, friends and professionals during her pregnancy with respect to the natural father abandoning her. In any event, there is evidence in this record to support the trial judge's fact findings, and we are bound as appellate judges to accept them as proven. 2
"Factual Findings of the Court
1. The natural father and mother met in Tempe, Arizona, in the summer of 1985.
2. During the course of their later relationship, the natural mother discovered she was pregnant and advised the natural father of this fact before going on a ski vacation over the Christmas break in December of 1985.
3. At the time he was advised of the natural mother's pregnancy, the natural father had accumulated savings and, additionally, had earned commissions in the amount of $10,000 during the month of December 1985 from the sale of solar water-heating units. The natural father was also aware he would need to obtain a new job beginning in January of 1986 because the tax credits for solar equipment were being terminated by the federal government in December of 1985.
4. Knowing of the ending of his employment and being advised of the natural mother's pregnancy, the natural father expended $4,000 on equipment and ski vacation expense.
7. During the time of her early pregnancy, the natural mother was living with a small son, born out of wedlock in another previous relationship, in an apartment in Phoenix, Arizona. She told the natural father she would not abort the child in utero, but that she could not raise two children as a single, unwed mother.
8. The natural mother lost her job in January of 1986, and her economic position deteriorated as the pregnancy continued. 3 The natural father, during the time he was urging the natural mother to abort the child, paid one month's rent for her in February 1986. Some family furniture and a microwave oven were also made available to the natural mother. No further repetitive or continual support in the form of contributions toward prenatal medical expense, care, food, rent or support was forthcoming from the natural father during the balance of the natural mother's pregnancy, which ended with the birth of a son on September 12, 1986.
9. The natural mother discussed the option of adoption with the natural father from the beginning of the pregnancy and during the entire term of the pregnancy.
10. The natural father knew from the beginning of the pregnancy that if he would not marry the natural mother, she wanted their child adopted into a loving, middle-class, Jewish home because the natural mother stated repeatedly and strongly that the child needed the stability and premanency [sic] of a loving, two-parent home. She was Jewish, and the natural father was not.
11. The natural father agreed to have the child placed for adoption, deferring to the wishes of the natural mother. 4 However, the natural father expressed that he did not want the child raised in a Jewish home.
12. In March 1986 the natural mother wrote a letter to the natural father's mother, which the natural father later discussed with his mother.
15. The natural father was aware of the natural mother's financial situation but did not offer any financial assistance for prenatal care.
16. The natural mother told her physician, mother, sister, and friend who tried to previously counsel the natural father against aborting the child, that she was going to Florida to start her life over and place the child with a Jewish family.
17. The natural mother's mother, a resident of Tampa, Florida, contacted a local rabbi and said her daughter was pregnant and that her daughter wanted her child placed with a Jewish family.
18. The prospective adoptive parents, a middle-class, Jewish couple, residents of central Florida, husband age 36, wife age 34, have been married since 1975, and have tried to conceive a child with no success.
19. The prospective adoptive parents have placed their names with several sources of adoption and heard through friends that there was a Jewish baby available, through the source of the Tampa rabbi previously contacted by the natural mother's mother.
20. An attorney whom the prospective adoptive parents had contacted as a source of adoption was then in contact with the natural mother's mother, who then had the attorney call the natural mother in Arizona.
21. In a long-distance telephone call lasting over one and one-half hours, the attorney questioned the natural mother at length about her motivation for placing the child for adoption.
22. The natural mother told the attorney that the natural father had washed his hands of her and the child and had not given needed prenatal financial and emotional support; that she did not love the natural father, and that it was best for her child to be placed with a two-parent home for adoption, because the natural mother was already raising one child on her own as a single parent and she could not afford, emotionally or financially, to raise two. She was happy to learn that the attorney was in contact with a Jewish couple fitting her criteria for adoption.
25. The natural mother and natural father were in telephonic contact up until just before the birth of the child.
26. The subject of the phone conversations primarily dealt with the relationship of the natural mother and natural father, with the natural father urging the natural mother to come to Phoenix to have the child, live with him and give him time to sort his life out and make the ultimate decision of marriage.
27. The natural mother told the natural father she would not live with him out of a marriage relationship and repeatedly told him why placing the child up for adoption was best for all.
28. The natural father had an insurance coupon book sent to the natural mother with a letter enclosed dated August 18, 1986. The natural mother dropped a copy of the letter by the intermediary attorney's office.
29. The letter discussed the relationship of the natural parents and also asked the mother to "at least think about" letting the natural father raise the child.
30. The attorneys concluded, based upon the lack of prenatal financial or emotional support given by the unwed father, that the natural father's consent fit the criteria for excusal by the Court under Florida's adoption statute. They did not contact the natural father or the prospective adoptive parents about the letter.
31. After sending the letter, the natural father and natural mother were in contact again by telephone. In the last telephonic contact before the birth of the child, the natural mother, after having heard within a short one- to two-week period the natural father say he would marry her and then say he had changed his mind and could not decide upon marriage, asked the natural father to let her make the decision. He did not say no. 6
32. The natural mother, during the two weeks before the birth of the child, was...
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