Adoption of A.M.B., Matter of

• Decision Date: 30 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 930269,930269
• Citation: 514 N.W.2d 670
• Parties: In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF A.M.B., A Minor Child. R.A.K., Petitioner and Appellee, v. M.E.Z., Respondent and Appellant, and Henry C. Wessman as Executive Director of the North Dakota Department of Human Services, Respondent. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 670

514 N.W.2d 670

In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF A.M.B., A Minor Child.

R.A.K., Petitioner and Appellee, v. M.E.Z., Respondent and Appellant, and Henry C. Wessman as Executive Director of the North Dakota

Department of Human Services, Respondent.

Civ. No. 930269.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

March 30, 1994.

Richard J. Linnerooth, Fargo, for petitioner and appellee.

Erik R. Johnson, Solberg, Stewart, Miller & Johnson, Fargo, for respondent and appellant.

Appearance by M.E.Z.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.

Mike (a pseudonym), the natural father to A.M.B., appealed a district court's final decree of adoption of A.M.B. by A.M.B.'s stepfather, Ronald (a pseudonym), upon a finding that Mike's consent to the adoption was not required. We affirm.

Mike and Kim (a pseudonym) had a sexual relationship from October 1989 to July 1990, during which time A.M.B. was conceived. Both resided in the Minneapolis, Minnesota, metropolitan area. Mike and Kim saw each other frequently throughout Kim's pregnancy, and Mike attended and shared in half the expense of Kim's Lamaze classes.

Shortly before A.M.B.'s birth, Kim's feelings for Mike appear to have soured. Kim asked a friend to serve as her Lamaze coach. When A.M.B. was born, Kim refused Mike's request that the child be given his surname. Mike visited Kim and A.M.B. in the hospital, and he brought gifts. However, when Mike visited the hospital on the day Kim was scheduled to leave, Kim and A.M.B. had already departed. Mike immediately drove to Kim's apartment, but was told by Kim's mother that he was not welcome. A few days later, Kim permitted Mike and his mother to visit A.M.B. at Kim's residence, although they were required to remain on the porch and were not invited inside the apartment.

Five days after A.M.B.'s birth, Kim moved to Fargo, North Dakota, to live with her mother. Kim explained to Mike that she wanted her mother's assistance with the child. Mike called Kim once or twice a week for a time following the move, but purports to have been financially unable to visit Kim and A.M.B. in Fargo. After one month in Fargo, Kim began to express irritation with Mike's calls and asked Mike to stop harassing her. After approximately two months, Kim told Mike that he was not the father of the child and that he should stop calling.

Kim attended classes at North Dakota State University, and she and A.M.B. moved from her mother's residence to an apartment closer to campus. Kim did not list the phone number to her apartment in the local phone directory, but the number was listed in the university's student directory. Mike, discouraged by his inability to contact Kim and by Kim's coldness toward him, had virtually no contact with Kim and A.M.B. by the time A.M.B. was four months old.

In July 1991, on A.M.B.'s first birthday, Mike made an unannounced visit, his first since Kim had moved to Fargo. He was received coolly. Mike spent approximately an hour and one-half with Kim and approximately fifteen minutes with A.M.B. Mike gave A.M.B. a stuffed animal and left with Kim a duplicate set of pictures he had taken at the hospital during A.M.B.'s first days. Shortly after Mike's visit, Kim returned the pictures to Mike and reported that the stuffed animal had been thrown away.

By letter dated July 22, 1991, Kim informed Mike that "some type of visitation" with A.M.B. could be arranged, but that "I do not want to talk about other matters and I will not deal with you if it approaches harassment...." Kim also informed Mike that a paternity and support action soon would be brought against him by the State. Mike did not respond to the letter.

Two months later, the paternity action was commenced against Mike. Upon advice of counsel, Mike denied paternity. In December 1991, blood tests indicated a 99.4 percent probability that Mike was the father of A.M.B. Mike continued to deny paternity and demanded a trial by jury. The court directed Mike to make monthly child support payments into an escrow account, pending a final determination of paternity. Mike made the ordered payments.

While the paternity action was still pending, Mike attempted to visit A.M.B. on A.M.B.'s second birthday, in July 1992. Unable to locate Kim or the child, Mike left a present for A.M.B. with Kim's brother.

On December 15, 1992, Kim married Ronald, who immediately signed a petition for adoption. Upon Kim's request, the State moved to dismiss the paternity action against Mike, who continued to deny paternity. Mike resisted the motion to dismiss the paternity action. Nonetheless, the motion was granted and the paternity action dismissed, and the money Mike had paid into the escrow account, totalling nearly $1,500, was returned to him. Mike used the money to secure an attorney to challenge Ronald's petition to adopt A.M.B.

On May 13, 1993, following a hearing, the district court granted Ronald's petition for adoption. The court concluded that, although Mike did not consent to the adoption, his consent was not required because he had abandoned the child. NDCC Sec. 14-15-06(1)(a). Mike appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he had abandoned A.M.B. On de novo review, but with appreciable weight given to the trial court's findings, In Interest of C.K.H., 458 N.W.2d 303 (N.D.1990), we affirm.

Generally, parental consent is a prerequisite to adoption. NDCC Sec. 14-15-05. One statutory exception to this general rule is created by section 14-15-06(1)(a), NDCC, which negates the need for parental consent to adoption when the parent has abandoned the child. The legislature has not defined abandonment, and we have recognized that "[t]here is no single accepted definition of what to 'abandon' means." Pritchett v. Executive Dir. of Soc. Serv. Bd., 325 N.W.2d 217, 221 (N.D.1982). Abandonment is a question of fact which must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. In determining whether abandonment has taken place, we look to such factors as the parent's contact and communication with the child, the parent's love, care and affection toward the child, and the parent's intent. Id. Also relevant is the parent's acceptance of parental obligations, such as "to care for, protect, support, educate, give moral guidance to, and provide a home for the child." Id. at 221. "A parent's negligent failure to perform his parental duties is significant to the issue of abandonment." Id.

We note that an unwed father may possess a relationship with his child that is entitled to constitutional protection. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); see generally, Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d 25 (S.C.1993). The extent of this constitutional protection is dependent, in part, on the strength of the relationship; "parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2992, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 626 (1983) [quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ].

Due Process protection extends to the interest of the biological father in developing a relationship with his child. Id. However, this interest "is of limited duration as a constitutionally significant interest because of the child's need for early permanence and stability in parental relationships." Abernathy, supra, at 28 [citing Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional...