Adrian Trucking, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | C20-99-LTS |
| Citation | 609 F.Supp.3d 728 |
| Parties | ADRIAN TRUCKING, INC., Plaintiff, v. NAVISTAR, INC. and Centre State International Trucks, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
John L. Riccolo, Joshua Lloyd Christensen, Tim Semelroth, RSH Legal PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Lawrence Ray Lassiter, Pro Hac Vice, Warren M. Armstrong, Pro Hac Vice, Miller Weisbrod, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Bradley J. Kaspar, Terry J. Abernathy, Stephanie L. Hinz, Pickens Barnes & Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, IA, Brian J. Sawyer, Pro Hac Vice, Clayton J. Callen, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey S. Patterson, Pro Hac Vice, Hartline Barger, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.
This case is before me on motions for summary judgment (Docs. 69, 70)1 filed by defendants Navistar, Inc. (Navistar), and Centre State International Trucks, Inc. (Centre). Plaintiff Adrian Trucking, Inc. (Adrian), has filed resistances (Docs. 83, 85) and Navistar and Centre have filed replies (Docs. 88, 89). I find that oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).
Adrian commenced this action by filing a petition at law and jury demand in the Iowa District Court for Linn County in December 2015. Doc. 4. At the time, the lawsuit named several other parties as plaintiffs and defendants. Id. Navistar and Centre filed answers and the parties engaged in discovery. Doc. 2-4. In November 2016, the state court severed (Doc. 2-2) the case into four separate cases. Navistar and Centre then removed (Doc. 2) this case to this court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
In February 2017, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to be included in a multidistrict litigation (MDL) pending in that court. Doc. 10. In September 2020, the MDL court returned the case to this court. Doc. 22. On October 9, 2020, Navistar and Centre filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 28), which I denied as moot (Doc. 53) after allowing Adrian to file an amended complaint (Doc. 48).
As amended, Adrian's complaint asserts various contract and tort law claims. Counts I, II and VI assert that Navistar breached an express warranty, that Navistar breached a contract and that Navistar limited or disclaimed warranties in an unconscionable manner. Id. at 7, 10, 26. Count III alleges that Centre breached an implied warranty. Id. at 12. Count IV alleges fraud against both defendants and Count V alleges fraudulent concealment2 against both defendants. Id. at 14, 21. Trial is scheduled to begin February 6, 2023. Doc. 93.
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A material fact is one that " ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. Facts that are "critical" under the substantive law are material, while facts that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are not. Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman , 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ), or when " ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Evidence that only provides "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, or evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, does not make an issue of material fact genuine. "Mere allegations not supported with specific facts are insufficient to establish a material issue of fact and will not withstand a summary judgment motion." Henthorn v. Capitol Communications, Inc. , 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004).
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute" so as to "require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears "the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel , 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods , 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, "because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co. , 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, "the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine." Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc. , 90 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (8th Cir. 1996).
Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of the pending motions for summary judgment:
Adrian owns and operates a commercial trucking fleet that hauls general freight across the United States. Doc. 70-2 at 1, ¶ 1. Howard Adrian has been the sole owner of Adrian since 1994. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. Centre is a vehicle dealership that has a dealership agreement with Navistar. Id. at 10, ¶ 77. The dealership agreement states that Centre "is not Navistar's agent in any respect and is not authorized to incur any obligations or make any promises or representations in its behalf." Id. ; Doc. 71 at 4.
At some point in late 2012, two Centre representatives made a sales visit to Adrian and spoke with Howard Adrian. Doc. 83-1 at 2, ¶¶ 5-7. The two Centre representatives were Rex Ott, Centre's General Manager, and Raymond (Ray) Ott, Rex's son and a Centre sales representative. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 6-7. Howard Adrian "understood that Navistar was a separate legal entity from Centre." Doc. 70-2 at 10, ¶ 74. However, Adrian alleges that "the dealer[ship] agreement has numerous provisions imposed by Navistar that give rise to an appearance of apparent authority." Doc. 83-1 at 15, ¶ 77.
Rex Ott and Ray Ott were the only individuals Howard Adrian spoke with before deciding to purchase six Navistar-manufactured trucks with Navistar MaxxForce engines. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 9, 12-13, 15-16. He talked to them for about 90 minutes before agreeing to buy the trucks at a price of $76,500 each.3 Id. at 3, ¶ 9. A day or two after this visit, Howard Adrian called Centre to request to purchase the five additional trucks. Id. at 3, ¶ 10. Adrian purchased six of the trucks in December 2012, four of the trucks in January 2013 and the last truck in April 2013. Id. at 2, ¶ 3.
Each of the eleven trucks had previously been used and "operated between 185,902 miles to 232,797 miles, with an average of approximately 206,035 miles." Id. at 4, ¶ 26. They all came with three custom service contracts that were transferred to Adrian, along with each truck's standard limited warranty. Id. at 6-7, ¶ 42. Howard Adrian stated that the warranties were "very good" and the three custom service contracts "basically covered everything on the truck for me." Id. at 10, ¶¶ 71-72.
The warranty limited Adrian's remedies to "repair or replace any part of this vehicle which proves defective in material and/or workmanship in normal use and service." Doc. 70-3 at 13. The warranty specifically does not cover "[l]oss of time or use of the vehicle, loss of profits, inconvenience, or other consequential or incidental damages or expenses." Doc. 70-3 at 14. The warranty also states:
no warranties are given beyond those described herein. This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied. [Navistar] specifically disclaims warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, all other representations to the user/purchaser, and all other obligations or liabilities. [Navistar] further excludes liability for incidental and consequential damages on the part of [Navistar] or seller.
The three custom service contracts extended the length of the original warranty coverage and specifically covered the MaxxForce engines, parts related to the fan, electrical, air conditioning and heating. Id. at 16-17, 19, 21. Each stated that Navistar "will repair or replace any part of this vehicle...
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