Advance Realty Co. v. Spanos
| Decision Date | 03 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,32 |
| Citation | 348 Mich. 464,83 N.W.2d 342 |
| Parties | ADVANCE REALTY COMPANY, a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kora SPANOS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Sinas, Dramis & Brake, Lansing, for appellant.
Hammond & Schram, Lansing, for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiff real estate company brought suit for a $700 real estate commission claimed to have been due it as the result of an exclusive real estate agency contract for the sale of defendant's house. The facts are not in dispute. The agency contract provided in its crucial paragraph as follows:
Following the execution of the agency contract plaintiff put a sign on the property advertised it in the Lansing State Journal and made efforts to sell it.
On February 16, 1955, one Laurah A. Morton made an offer in writing through Marguerite R. Moore, a real estate broker not a member of the Lansing Board of Realtors, to purchase defendant's property for $14,000 cash. The parties agree that this offer was in accordance with the terms of the listing agreement and that the deposit therein required was made. It is conceded that Mrs. Morton was ready, able and willing to purchase the property and consummate the deal. It is further conceded that plaintiff had no prior knowledge of anyone other than defendant having any interest in the property.
The agreed appendix on appeal further recites that when plaintiff took the offer of Mrs. Morton to the defendant, she refused to accept it, giving as a reason that her niece had a half interest in the property. It further indicates that at some time subsequent to this, defendant sold the property for $16,000.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony defendant moved for a directed verdict on the facts as recited and the motion was denied. Defendant then rested without putting in any proofs and again moved for directed verdict which was again denied. Thereupon plaintiff moved for a directed verdict for $700, plus costs, and this motion was granted.
The sole question in this case is whether the facts recited above represent compliance with the provision of the exclusive sales contract previously quoted, 'or if you or any member of the Lansing Board of Realtors produce a purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase the property.'
Appellant states the issue as follows:
The answer to the question turns on the definition of the verb 'produce.' Among the definitions of this verb in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., p. 1974, are the following: 'to bring forward; to lead forth; to offer to view or notice; to exhibit; show; as, to produce a witness in court; to cause to be or to happen; to bring about.'
We believe that in the current context the verb 'produce' may properly be held to have the meaning of 'to bring forth' (Lineberger v. Johnson, 213 Iowa 800, 806, 239 N.W. 679, 682; Spiller v. McGehee, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S.W.2d 1093, 1095) or 'to be the cause of' (Elder v. State, 162 Ala. 41, 52, 50 So. 370, 373, 374). See also, 72 C.J.S. Produce pp. 1208-1209.
From the facts recited above it is obvious that as between the instant plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant, plaintiff brought the offer to the defendant as a result of a prior contact with the Moore agency. All of the prospective purchaser's contact with defendant was through the plaintiff. In effect, the Moore agency was a subagent of the plaintiff in securing a purchaser.
On the point in question, 8 Am.Jur., Brokers, § 151, says as follows:
'As between principal and real-estate broker, it is generally considered immaterial that the purchaser of the real estate is secured through the efforts of a subagent, rather than by the personal efforts of the broker himself.'
The legal point involved is dealt with squarely in an annotation (and cases cited thereunder) in 3 A.L.R.2d 535:
'The broker with whom the property has been listed is deemed to be the procuring cause of the sale to one interested by a subagent.'
Michigan has frequently held that the test of a real estate agent's right to a commission was generally whether or not he was the procuring or the producing cause of the sale; and where the evidence was in conflict, this question was generally held a jury question. Wood v. Wells, 103 Mich. 320, 61 N.W. 503; Reade v. Haak, 147 Mich. 42, 110 N.W. 130; Beatty v. Goodrich, 224 Mich. 538, 194 N.W. 985.
It is, of course, settled law in Michigan as well as in other States (there being nothing in the sales agreement to the contrary) that a...
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Ladd v. Teichman
...allowed on an affirmative finding in Davis-Fisher Co. v. Hall, 182 Mich. 574, 148 N.W. 713, L.R.A.1915A, 1224, and Advance Realty Co. v. Spanos, 348 Mich. 464, 83 N.W.2d 342. Where the broker was held not to have produced the sale, recovery was denied in Crawford v. Cicotte, supra, and Pitt......
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Sase v. Eifrate
...judgment in Common Pleas considered, is supported by Beatty v. Goodrich, 224 Mich. 538, 194 N.W. 985 (followed in Advance Realty Co. v. Spanos, 348 Mich. 464, 83 N.W.2d 342). The circuit court in these circumstances could do naught but affirm (Freedman v. Palmer Park Theater Co., 345 Mich. ......
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Barber v. Vernon, Docket No. 1881
...and inadmissible. This is the basis for defendants' first allegation of error. By contract and by law (Advance Realty Company v. Spanos (1957), 348 Mich. 464, 83 N.W.2d 342) plaintiff was entitled to his commission when he produced a buyer 'ready, willing and able' to purchase within the te......
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Lee v. Desenberg, 778
...The Court held the defendant liable for the commission because he had prevented consummation of the sale. In Advance Realty Co. v. Spanos (1957), 348 Mich. 464, 83 N.W.2d 342, the Court held that the broker was entitled to a commission pursuant to an exclusive listing after the owner refuse......