Advantage Media, LLC v. City of Eden Prairie

• Decision Date: 13 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV042582DSDJJG.,CIV042582DSDJJG.
• Citation: 405 F.Supp.2d 1037
• Parties: ADVANTAGE MEDIA, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EDEN PRAIRIE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

405 F.Supp.2d 1037

ADVANTAGE MEDIA, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EDEN PRAIRIE, Defendant.

No. CIV042582DSDJJG.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

December 13, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

E. Adam Webb, and Webb & Porter, Atlanta, GA, and Stephen W. Cooper, Cooper Law Office, Loring Green East, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.

John M. Baker, Monte A. Mills, Pamela L. VanderWiel, Robin M. Wolpert, and Greene Espel, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.

ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Based upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated, the court grants defendant's motion and denies plaintiff's motion.

BACKGROUND

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged deprivation of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff Advantage Media, LLC ("Advantage Media"), develops and operates advertising signs. In May of 2004, defendant City of Eden Prairie ("Eden Prairie") denied Advantage Media's permit applications for proposed billboards because they did not conform with Eden Prairie's Sign Permit Ordinance ("sign code"). Advantage Media brought this suit in August of 2004, alleging that Eden Prairie's sign code violates the right to free speech, due process and equal protection under the law.

The stated purpose of Eden Prairie's sign code includes the protection and promotion of safety, order and aesthetics. Eden. Prairie, Minn., Code § 11.70, subd. 1 (see Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. Ex. C at 1.). The code imposes numerous limitations on signs as to size, height, type, density, location and design. It prohibits motion and non-accessory signs in all districts, with limited exceptions. A "motion sign" is "[a]ny sign which revolves, rotates or has any moving parts or message." Code § 11.70, subd. 2(14). A "non-accessory sign" is off-site, meaning that it relates in its subject matter to a business, profession, commodity, service or entertainment not sold or offered upon the site where the sign is located. Id., subd. 2(20). Within commercial districts, signs may not exceed eighty square feet in size or twenty feet in height, must be set back at least fifteen or twenty feet from any street right-of-way, may not number more than one sign per building frontage and must be at least 300 feet apart. Id., subd. 4(B)(1).

In February of 2004, Advantage Media submitted permit applications to Eden Prairie for fourteen proposed billboards. Thirteen of the billboards would be two-sided and measure 672 square feet, with triangular rotating columns to display three different images on each billboard face. The fourteenth billboard would be somewhat smaller at 160 square feet and would not rotate. On February 27, 2004, Eden Prairie City Planner Steven Durham notified Advantage Media that its applications were incomplete and requested additional information regarding location. On March 15, 2004, Advantage Media submitted the requested information.

On May 28, 2004, Eden Prairie denied Advantage Media's permit applications because some or all of the proposed signs exceeded the limits for height, size, sign base, number of signs per street front and space between sign faces, as set forth in the city's sign code. (See Baker Aff. Ex. R.) Further, the thirteen rotating billboards did not conform with setback requirements and violated the prohibitions against motion and non-accessory signs.

Plaintiff filed this suit on August 4, 2004, alleging that defendant's sign code deprived plaintiff and others of the right to free speech, due process and equal protection under the law pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff. specifically asserts that the sign code (1) impermissibly regulates non-accessory signs, political messages, temporary construction signs and publicly-owned directional signs, among others, based on content (2) lacks procedural safeguards, (3) affords officials undue discretion to grant or deny sign applications, (4) lacks evidence to supports its restrictions, (5) impermissibly restricts commercial speech and (6) favors certain businesses and organizations over others. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on all claims except damages and attorney's fees.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In order for the moving party to prevail, it must demonstrate to the court that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-moving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23. 106 S.Ct. 2548.

II. Standing

Plaintiff brings both as-applied and facial constitutional challenges to defendant's sign code. Defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing to bring its claims. A party invoking federal jurisdiction must satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements of standing. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1039 (8th Cir.2002). As to constitutional standing under Article III, the plaintiff has the burden to show each of the following: (1) an "injury in fact" that is actual, concrete and particularized, (2) that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the conduct complained of and (3) that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); see Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 791-92 (8th Cir.2004) (addressing standing requirement for First Amendment facial overbreadth claim).

In First Amendment cases, the fairly traceable prong of standing requires a plaintiff to challenge the statutory provisions upon which the restriction on speech was based. See Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of L.A., 328 F.3d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs' First Amendment claim was not fairly traceable to its injury because provision challenged was not the basis for restricting solicitation); cf. Brazos Valley Coalition for Life, Inc. v. City of Bryan, 421 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir.2005) (no standing to challenge ordinance that did not apply to plaintiff's activities). As to redressability, a favorable decision must provide a possibility of allowing the plaintiff to engage in the speech at issue. See N. Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir.1996) (plaintiff bookstore had standing because it challenged all provisions of zoning code that could preclude its operation); Harp Adver. Ill., Inc. v. Vill. of Chi. Ridge, 9 F.3d 1290, 1292 (7th Cir.1993) (plaintiff advertiser's inability to erect billboard would not be redressed by favorable decision because an unchallenged portion of sign code would block construction).

In addition to constitutional requirements, a prudential principle of standing requires that a plaintiff claim an injury to its own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights or interests of third parties. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). An exception to this prudential standing requirement is the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a party to challenge a statute on the ground that it could be unconstitutionally applied to others. See Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). A party may invoke the overbreadth doctrine and assert the legal rights of others if the party "can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal." Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (allowing third party standing for First Amendment overbreadth claim).

The "adversarial zeal" requirement of the overbreadth doctrine may be met in a First Amendment case if (1) the plaintiff seeks to protect third party activities that are "at the heart" of its own injury-in-fact and (2) the plaintiff's interests in challenging the statute are consistent with the First Amendment interests of the third party or parties it seeks to represent. See id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839; see also Heritage Pub. Co. v. Fishman, 634 F.Supp. 1489, 1495-96 (D.Minn.1986) (third party standing for overbreadth claim existed because plaintiff's relationship with third parties was directly related to First Amendment rights asserted). For example, when a commercial advertiser brings an overbreadth claim, it may assert the rights of noncommercial advertisers only if its displays...