Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Crowther, Inc.

• Citation: 581 N.E.2d 833,163 Ill.Dec. 679,221 Ill.App.3d 275
• Decision Date: 05 November 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 3-91-0196,s. 3-91-0196
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 163 Ill.Dec. 679 AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Paul Benigni, Defendant). AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Tom Clark, Defendant). AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Craig Nixon, Defendant). to 3-91-0198.

Page 833

581 N.E.2d 833

221 Ill.App.3d 275, 163 Ill.Dec. 679

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Paul Benigni, Defendant).

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Tom Clark, Defendant).

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWTHER, INC., Defendant-Appellee (Craig Nixon, Defendant).

Nos. 3-91-0196 to 3-91-0198.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

Nov. 5, 1991.

Georgene M. Wilson (argued), Sweeney & Riman, Chicago, for Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

Roger D. Rickmon (argued), Herschbach, Tracy, Johnson, Bertani & Wilson, Joliet, for Crowther, Inc.

Justice McCUSKEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna), appeals from an order of the circuit court which quashed the service of summons on defendant, Crowther, Inc. (Crowther), for lack of personal jurisdiction. The issue presented is whether Crowther, a nonresident defendant, transacted business in this State so as to come within the reach of the State's long arm jurisdiction. We conclude that the provisions of the long arm statute were met in this case. Therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court.

In 1979, Crowther and Aetna entered into contracts for workers' compensation and general liability insurance coverage for Crowther's roofing business. The terms of the workers' compensation policy limited coverage to injuries and claims made under the workers' compensation laws of Florida. Crowther is a Florida corporation and is not registered as a foreign corporation in Illinois.

In 1980, Lee Crowther, president of Crowther, contacted defendants Paul Benigni, Tom Clark, and Craig Dixon in Illinois and offered them summer employment with Crowther in Florida. Benigni and Clark were contacted by telephone; the offer of employment to Dixon was relayed by his father. Lee Crowther arranged for Benigni and Clark to drive to Florida from Illinois in an automobile registered to Crowther. Dixon was instructed to travel by airplane and seek reimbursement from Crowther.

On June 9, 1980, Benigni, Clark, and Dixon were injured in Florida during the course of their employment for Crowther. The three filed claims for workers' compensation benefits in Illinois. Crowther demanded coverage from Aetna for the Illinois claims. On June 1, 1990, Aetna filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Will County to determine Aetna's liability to Crowther.

Service of process was made upon Crowther's registered agent in Florida. Crowther filed a special and limited appearance and moved to quash the service of summons on the ground that Crowther had not transacted any business in Illinois within the meaning of Illinois' long arm statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-209.) The court agreed and entered an order quashing service. Aetna appeals.

We find instructive the Illinois Appellate Court's analysis of personal jurisdiction in Ideal Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Shipyard Marine, Inc. (2d Dist.1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 675, 678, 157 Ill.Dec. 284, 286, 572 N.E.2d 353, 355:

"The issue before this court is whether the State of Illinois can properly exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. This issue involves three similar but distinct analyses which can easily be confused and combined. The first is whether a nonresident defendant was 'doing business' in this State so as to maintain a presence subjecting it to in personam jurisdiction for all matters. The second analysis is, alternatively, where a defendant is not doing business in this State generally, whether it has sufficiently transacted a business act in this State to come within the 'long-arm' jurisdiction. Third, whether the defendant has created certain minimum contacts with this State such that due process of law would not be violated in compelling it to litigate the controversy in this State."

The Illinois Supreme Court recently clarified the Illinois jurisdictional analysis. (Rollins v. Ellwood (1990), 141 Ill.2d 244, 152 Ill.Dec. 384, 565 N.E.2d 1302.) In Rollins, the court stated that the question of whether it is fair to subject a nonresident defendant to Illinois jurisdiction cannot be determined solely by looking at the express terms of the long arm statute or the Federal due process standard. Rather, Illinois courts must consider whether "it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois." 141 Ill.2d at 275, 152 Ill.Dec. at 398, 565 N.E.2d at 1316.

The first prong of the Ideal Insurance analysis is not at issue in the present case since jurisdiction was not alleged on the basis that Crowther was doing business in this State such that it maintained a presence here. Crowther denied that it maintained an office or employees in Illinois, and Aetna admitted that Crowther conducted its business in Fort Meyers, Florida.

Aetna does aver, however, that jurisdiction is proper under Illinois' long arm statute, which provides:

"(a) Any person * * * who * * * does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated[ ] thereby submits such person * * * to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:

(1) The transaction of any business within this State;

* * *

(c) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him or her is based upon this Section." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-209.

To constitute the "transaction of any business" within this State, a defendant must voluntarily seek the benefits and protections of the laws of this State. (Konicki v. Wirta (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 21, 26, 119 Ill.Dec. 692, 696, 523 N.E.2d 160, 164.)

"The purpose of the phrase 'arising from' is to insure that there is a close relationship between a cause of action against a nonresident defendant and his jurisdictional activities. The minimum relationship required by the phrase is that ...