Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Braukman

• Decision Date: 01 May 1934
• Docket Number: 972.,No. 969,969
• Citation: Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Braukman, 70 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1934)
• Parties: ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. v. BRAUKMAN. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

70 F.2d 647 (1934)

ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. v. BRAUKMAN.^*

NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. SAME.^*

Nos. 969, 972.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 1, 1934.

John P. Akolt and Josiah G. Holland, both of Denver, Colo. (Elmer L. Brock, E. R. Campbell, Milton Smith, Jr., W. W. Grant, Jr., Erl H. Ellis, Morrison Shaforth, and Henry W. Toll, all of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellants.

Clarence A. Brandenburg, of Denver, Colo. (Stanley C. Brandenburg, of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LEWIS and BRATTON, Circuit Judges, and KENNEDY, District Judge.

KENNEDY, District Judge.

The above-entitled causes were presented together upon the appeal, for the reason that the identical point is present in each case, with one additional point in the Ætna case relating to interest.

The controversy involves life insurance policies carrying indemnity clauses providing for the double payment of the amount of the face of the policy in the event the insured died through accidental means. The insured here had the same type of policy in the two companies, who are appellants, and therefore the facts concerning the death are applicable in each case. The causes come before this court upon a stipulation and pleadings in the court below, in view of which the insurance companies elected to stand upon the pleadings, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the appellee in each case upon the double indemnity clauses. The policies carried provisions providing for the payment of the double indemnity, where death resulted through external and accidental means, if such accident was evidenced by visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, with the additional condition that death did not result from suicide while sane or insane. The companies paid the amount admittedly due upon the straight death clauses, but refused to pay claims based upon the double indemnity clauses. Suits were interposed against the companies setting forth, among other necessary allegations, that the death of the insured occurred through bodily injuries effected by gunshot wound through accidental means, evidenced by a visible contusion or a wound on the exterior of the body. The defendants, answering, admitted all of the material allegations, but set up as a defense that the death of the insured occurred by committing suicide while sane. Demurrers to the affirmative defenses were interposed by plaintiff, sustained by the trial court, and, the defendants electing to stand upon such answers, judgments were entered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal in accordance with the rights reserved by the stipulation and exceptions properly taken to the court rulings.

The litigation arises in consequence of a statute of the state of Colorado, of which state the insured was a resident at the time of his death, which occurred at Denver on June 1, 1932. This statute was enacted in 1903, and was later changed by an amendment inserting the clause pertaining to the first policy year, which is not material to the matter here under investigation. The statute reads as follows: "From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year, of any life insurance company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policy holder was sane or insane." Section 2532, Colo. Compiled Laws 1921.

In view of the long-standing rule that other courts are bound by a construction placed upon a state statute by the highest court of the state Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Wertheimer, 64 F.(2d) 438 (C. C. A. 10), it would seem pertinent to first consider the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court to ascertain what, if anything, has been said in the way of a construction of this statute which would facilitate the solution of the point presented. The Colorado cases having a bearing upon the issue are: Head Camp Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, 112 P. 49, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831; Modern Brotherhood of America v. Lock, 22 Colo. App. 409, 125 P. 556; Weber v. Woodmen of the World, 60 Colo. 529, 154 P. 728; Officer v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 74 Colo. 217, 220 P. 499; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo. 441, 242 P. 989, and Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469, 288 P. 888.

A fair synopsis of the first three of these decisions is that the above statute there under consideration is constitutional and that it applied to all life insurance companies contracting to pay death benefits. In the first Officer Case the clause relating to sanity or insanity was first considered. It was conceded that the insured committed suicide while insane, and the court held that a provision in the policy exempting liability of the company when suicide resulted as a result of insanity in contravention of the statutory provision was a nullity, but further stated, whether necessary to the conclusion or not, that the taking of one's life while insane is an accident. In the second Officer Case the court again considered a case of admitted suicide while insane, and held that an insurance contract covering an exemption on account of suicide was void. In the Massachusetts Protective Association Case, which was likewise a case of suicide while insane, the court reiterated its former ruling. This case, decided in 1930, appears to be the last pronouncement of the Colorado court upon the question. A significant portion of the opinion in the last cited case found on page 889 of 288 P., 87 Colo. 469, may bear quotation:

"In 1913, the Legislature passed an act, C. L. § 2532, that provides as follows: `From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year, of any life insurance company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policy holder was sane or insane.'

"In this case the suicide occurred after the first policy year. We have held that such provision is not in conflict with the Constitution; that it applies to life insurance policies, whether issued by a life insurance company or by an accident insurance company; and that any provision in a policy attempting to relieve an insurer from liability in case of suicide is a nullity. Head Camp Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, 112 P. 49, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831; Officer v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 74 Colo. 217, 220 P. 499."

From the foregoing it appears that a case involving suicide while sane has never been presented to, or decided by, the Supreme Court of Colorado. With the federal courts, in Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott, 17 F.(2d) 4 (C. C. A. 8), a case of suicide while insane arising in Colorado was considered, and the court there observed that the Supreme Court of Colorado had up to that time only considered cases of suicide while insane, and declined to go farther than that court had gone in construing the provisions of the statute, although the opinion contains language concerning suicide while sane which in some aspects points with favor to appellant's contention.

Counsel have discussed at length a somewhat similar Missouri statute and the court decisions in relation thereto. This statute (Mo. St. Ann. § 5740, p. 4385), reads as follows: "In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void."

The Supreme Court of Missouri in Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S. W. 948, considered the Missouri statute and as to whether or not the limitation in the policy upon the amount of recovery in the event of death by suicide could be sustained, but it is not clear that the question of the sanity or the insanity of the insured was directly in issue. On page 950 of 47 S. W., 146 Mo. 114, the court uses the following language: "No rule of construction, short of one applied for distortion and destruction, can relieve accident insurance companies, issuing policies of insurance on life in this state, from the operation and influences of section 5855, which, in plain and unambiguous terms, declares that, in all suits upon policies of insurance on life thereafter issued, it shall be no defense that the assured committed suicide, unless it shall have been shown to the satisfaction of the court or judge trying the cause that the insured contemplated suicide at the time of making his application for the policy, all stipulations in the policy to the contrary being void."

Some years later a case arose in the federal District Court in Missouri involving the same statute with the same type of policy, which was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, to the effect that the suicide was brought about by a pistol shot intentionally fired by the insured with the purpose of taking his life. The trial court adjudged that the recovery was limited to the terms of the policy, to wit, one-tenth of the principal sum under such circumstances. The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari, where it was reversed. In Whitfield v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489, at page 496, ...