Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 18 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-4805,78-4805
• Citation: 292 N.W.2d 532,96 Mich.App. 310
• Parties: AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY a Connecticut Corporation, Plaintiff, v. William G. BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant, and Steve J. Jarson and Robert Gresser, jointly and severally, Defendants- Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 532

292 N.W.2d 532

96 Mich.App. 310

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY a Connecticut Corporation, Plaintiff, v. William G. BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant, and Steve J. Jarson and Robert Gresser, jointly and severally,

Defendants- Appellees.

No. 78-4805.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 18, 1980.

Released for Publication May 28, 1980.

R. Burke Fossee, St. Clair Shores, for Brooks.

J. Russell Labarge, Jr., Roseville, for defendants-appellees.

Before KELLY, P. J., and BRONSON and RILEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises out of claims for benefits payable under a $25,000 life insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to Chrysler Corporation employees, including the decedent Lee F. Lamirand. Plaintiff filed a complaint in interpleader joining defendant-appellant William G. Brooks and defendant-appellees Steve J. Jarson and Robert Gresser. After payment of the proceeds of the policy to the Wayne County Circuit Court, the plaintiff was discharged from the case. Following a two-day trial on October 24 and 25, 1978, the judge awarded benefits to the appellees.

Appellant raises several issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the trial court erred in admitting statements of the decedent into evidence under a hearsay rule exception.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. People v. Hoerl, 88 Mich.App. 693, 701, 278 N.W.2d 721 (1979). Such statements are excluded from evidence absent an applicable exception to the hearsay rule. People v. Haney, 86 Mich.App. 311, 316, 272 N.W.2d 640 (1978).

The new Michigan Rules of Evidence under which this case was tried provide an exception for "state-of-mind evidence".

"Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will." MRE 803(3).

The dispute litigated below centered on whether the decedent successfully changed his life insurance beneficiary from appellant to the appellees. At trial, the judge permitted Jarson to testify regarding the decedent's request for forms to change his policy, finding that such statement fell within the above state-of-mind exception.

Although it is a close question, we believe that the statement would be excludable hearsay if offered to prove that the decedent did procure the forms and alter his policy. However, the judge properly admitted it for the limited purpose of showing Mr. Lamirand's state of mind, specifically, to show his intent and plan to change beneficiaries. Assertions indicative of a declarant's state of mind have always been admissible when mental state has been at issue, as in the instant case. See People v. White, 401 Mich. 482, 502-503, 257 N.W.2d 912 (1977); In re Traub Estate, 354 Mich. 263, 92 N.W.2d 480 (1958). Therefore, admission of the decedent's statement was proper.

Appellant also argues that the trial judge improperly admitted two irrelevant pieces of evidence decedent's will and a change of beneficiary form for group accident insurance.

Relevancy is now determined by the new Michigan rule of evidence which states:

" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MRE 401.

Relevant information will generally be admitted if the probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 489-490, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976). Admissibility rests within the trial judge's discretion and his determination will not be set aside unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Jarecki v. Ford Motor Co., 65 Mich.App. 78, 83, 237 N.W.2d 191 (1975).

Appellant asserts that decedent's will was improperly admitted into evidence as it is irrelevant to the issue of the life insurance beneficiaries' identities. The will clearly did not, and could not, effect a change of beneficiary. Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W.2d 1 (1943). Rather, it was introduced to show the insured's intent and the continuity of his state of mind regarding the appellees. An admission for this purpose is entirely proper. Traub, supra ; Harris v. Copeland, 337 Mich. 30, 34, 59 N.W.2d 70 (1953).

Appellant further attacks the relevancy of the admitted group accident insurance form. At trial, the parties agreed that the decedent had only one policy of Aetna insurance, the group life insurance, and did not, and could not, have group accident insurance; that the decedent had executed a change of beneficiary from appellant to appellee Steve Jarson in his Chrysler Thriftstock program; and that decedent had executed a change of beneficiary from appellant to appellee on a group accident insurance form. As the accident insurance form could be viewed as a manifestation of the decedent's intent to alter his life insurance beneficiary (since he had no group accident insurance), we believe that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting that form.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously...