Aetna Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strickland

• Decision Date: 08 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 61091,61091
• Citation: 33 Ill.App.3d 52,337 N.E.2d 285
• Parties: AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. Otis STRICKLAND, Administrator of the Estate of James T. Strickland, Deceased, and Renate Eaton a/k/a Renate Strickland, Defendants-Appellants. Valerie Phyllis Strickland a/k/a Valeria Phyllis Turkstra et al.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 285

337 N.E.2d 285

33 Ill.App.3d 52

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. Otis STRICKLAND, Administrator of the Estate of James T Strickland, Deceased, and Renate Eaton a/k/a Renate Strickland, Defendants-Appellants Valerie Phyllis Strickland a/k/a Valeria Phyllis Turkstra et al.

No. 61091.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Oct. 8, 1975.

Albert Koretzky, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; D. Kendall Griffith, Thomas M. Crisham, Robert J. Kennedy, Chicago, of counsel.

Michael J. Madigan, Chicago, guardian ad litem.

ADESKO, Justice:

This is an appeal from certain orders of the Circuit Court of Cook County entered in an interpleader action brought in chancery to determine the rightful claimants to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. Appeal is also taken from an order entered dismissing an action at law (which had been consolidated with the interpleader action) brought by certain claimants to recover the proceeds of the policy.

On February 11, 1974, an interpleader complaint was filed in chancery by appellee, Aetna Life Insurance Co., Inc. (Aetna), naming two groups of beneficiaries as having adverse claims to the proceeds of a group life insurance policy providing coverage on the life of the decedent, James T. Strickland. The complaint in interpleader was filed against: Otis Strickland, administrator of the estate of decedent; Valerie Phyllis Strickland, a/k/a Valeria Phyllis Turkstra; David James Strickland (David), a minor, and Stephen Strickland (Steven), a minor, a/k/a Richard Henry Turkstra, by and through Otto J. Nerad, guardian of the estates of said minors; and Renate Eaton, a/k/a Renate Strickland. The complaint alleged that all of the individuals named were making claims for the proceeds of the policy and prayed that Aetna be allowed to deposit the proceeds with the court and be discharged from further liability under the insurance policy.

Valeria P. Strickland and Otto J. Nerad, guardian of the estates of the two minors filed an action at law against Aetna to recover the proceeds of the insurance policy. Subsequently they also moved to dismiss the complaint in interpleader, asserting that no real dispute existed regarding the right to the proceeds.

On April 30, 1974, Michael J. Madigan and Philip H. Mitchel were appointed to act as guardians Ad litem for David and Steven respectively in the interpleader action.

Valeria P. Strickland (Valeria) and Otto J. Nerad (Otto) moved to vacate these appointments; however, following submission of memoranda of law, both this motion as well as their prior motion to dismiss the complaint in interpleader were denied on June 25, 1974.

On July 2, 1974, the action at law brought by Valeria and Otto was consolidated with the interpleader action. That same day, an order was entered finding the interpleader petition to be properly filed and allowing Aetna to deposit the proceeds with the Clerk of the Court.

Prior to July 24, 1974, Valeria and Otto filed a petition for removal of the consolidated cause to the United States District Court. On Aetna's motion the United States District Court remanded the cause to the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Valeria and Otto subsequently moved to dismiss the interpleader action on the ground that a necessary party had not been joined. Meanwhile, Aetna had moved for orders discharging it from the interpleader cause, restraining the interpleaded parties from prosecuting any further actions against Aetna, and dismissing the complaint at law.

On September 4, 1974, the trial court entered orders dismissing the complaint at law, denying the motion to dismiss the interpleader complaint for improper joinder, discharging Aetna from the interpleader cause, and restraining the interpleaded parties from prosecuting any further actions against Aetna.

It is from these orders, as well as the prior orders relating to the appointment of the guardians Ad litem and the deposit of funds that Valeria and Otto (hereinafter also referred to as appellants) appeal.

The first question raised by appellants is whether plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action in interpleader. Appellants argue that the complaint in interpleader does not 'allege any facts showing that there are adverse claimants who are making claims against (the) proceeds * * * which (claims) are not utterly baseless.' Appellants do not contend that the complaint fails to allege the existence of adverse claims.

Section 26.2 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 26.2) provides that a cause of action in interpleader exists when persons have claims against the plaintiff arising out of the same subject matter and those claims may expose the plaintiff to double liability. The Civil Practice Act provides that the act is to be liberally construed (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 4) and that pleadings shall be liberally construed to do substantial justice between the parties. Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 33(3).

A purpose of the interpleader is to relieve the stakeholder of the burden and peril of weighing the relative merits of the adverse claims. The stakeholder usually does not know the facts behind the adverse claims, and those facts which are known are usually in conflict. Moreover, the stakeholder does not possess the legal knowledge necessary to evaluate those facts. Therefore, this court does not believe that a stakeholder need allege in his interpleader complaint that the adverse claims are not utterly baseless. To do so would be contrary to the purpose and spirit of the interpleader doctrine. An additional purpose of interpleader is to relieve the stakeholder of the harassment and expense of adverse claims. Even when baseless claims are asserted against a stakeholder, they nevertheless must be defended. We believe the interpleader doctrine was designed to relieve a stakeholder from this harassment and expense so long as there was in fact a claim. In other words, the stakeholder must be in good faith when asserting that adverse claims have been presented to him.

In Byers v. Sansom-Thayer Commission Co. (1904), 111 Ill.App. 575, the court stated at 578--79:

'The objections set forth in the first, second and third special grounds of demurrer may be reduced to one, namely: that the claims of the other defendants, as stated in the bill, do not show their right to compel the demurring defendants to interplead with them.

The objection is without merit. Appellants cannot be presumed to know all the facts upon which the several defendants claim this money; and they are therefore not required to set forth in detail the alleged title of any of them. A bill of interpleader proceeds upon the ground that the complainant, from ignorance of the rights of the several defendants, is unable to ascertain to which of the defendants he is to account (cases cited.) Appellants are not called upon to decide disputed questions of fact, nor to resolve doubtful points of law, under the penalty of dismissal of their bill. Having stated their danger, in this, that opposing claims...