Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Richmond

• Decision Date: 12 December 1927
• Parties: Æ TNA LIFE INS. CO. v. RICHMOND.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

139 A. 702

107 Conn. 117

Æ TNA LIFE INS. CO. v. RICHMOND.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 12, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Suit in equity by the AEtna Life Insurance Company against Elizabeth M. Richmond to obtain the cancellation and surrender of a policy of life insurance. Demurrer to the complaint overruled and, upon failure to plead further, judgment for plaintiff from which defendant appeals. Error, and case remanded with directions.

Frederick M. Peasley and Clayton L. Klein, both of Waterbury, for appellant.

William E. Thoms, of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and FOSTER JJ.

HAINES, J.

The plaintiff invokes the aid of a court of equity, alleging that on July 17, 1926, it executed a policy of insurance on the life of one Richmond in which the defendant was named beneficiary; that Richmond died on or about January 3, 1927; that the defendant is now in possession of the policy; and that there was no contract between Richmond and the plaintiff because the application for the policy, which was made a part of it, was not made by Richmond nor signed by him, nor was the first premium paid during his good health; and further, that the plaintiff has tendered and offered to return the premiums. Upon the facts so alleged, it prays for the cancellation and return of the policy. The defendant demurs to the complaint upon the ground that the facts alleged are a complete legal defense to an action on the policy; that to grant the prayer might deprive the defendant of the right of trial by jury; and that it nowhere appears that irreparable injury has resulted or may result to the plaintiff from the facts alleged. The trial court overruled this demurrer on the ground that the complaint sets up a good cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act and rules thereunder, and, upon failure to plead further, entered a judgment for the plaintiff adjudging the policy canceled and void. This is the basis of the present appeal. The first ground of demurrer is general and not special, and must for this reason have been disregarded by the trial court, had the plaintiff made the point; but the rights of the plaintiff are involved, and both the plaintiff and the trial court have waived the form of this ground of demurrer, and we shall treat it as the parties have and consider whether the complaint states any cause of action.

It is quite obvious that the plaintiff sought to state an equitable cause of action, and had not contemplated a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act until the trial court based its decision of the demurrer upon the terms of this legislation, the purpose of which is to declare rights rather than to execute them. Public Acts 1921, c. 258.

This complaint in no way suggests that a declaratory judgment is sought. It does not ask the court to declare the rights of the parties. Where such judgment is desired, it should be so stated with precision, in an appropriate prayer for relief, whether standing by itself or combined with a prayer for affirmative consequential relief. Practice Book, Rules, p. 256, § 64(b).

The challenge of the demurrer was not whether the complaint stated valid ground for a declaratory judgment, but whether it was an adequate statement of an equitable cause of action against the defendant. The trial court therefore held the complaint good on a ground not claimed and failed to decide the question which the demurrer presented. Nevertheless, if a proper conclusion was reached, the ruling must be sustained, even though the court based its ruling on a wrong ground. Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 367, 73 A. 754, 17 Ann.Cas. 324; British-American Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 77 Conn. 559, 564, 60 A. 293; Thresher v. Stonington Savings Bank, 68 Conn. 201, 205, 36 A. 38.

The only apparent purpose of the plaintiff in bringing this action was to forestall a legal action by the defendant, the beneficiary, and this could be effectively done if the policy were canceled and delivered to the plaintiff. The facts upon which it seeks to accomplish this, if set up and established in an action against the present plaintiff on the policy, would be a valid and complete defense, and so, the plaintiff's remedy would be complete and adequate. Pomeroy's Equity, vol. 2, § 911, and vol. 4, § § 1377, 1399; Bankers' Reserve Life Co. v. Omberson, 123 Minn. 285, 143 N.W. 735, 48 L.R.A. (N. S.) 265; Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 20 L.Ed. 501; Des Moines Life Ins. Co. v. Seifert, 210 Ill. 157, 71 N.E. 349.

In the last-named case, ...