Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills
| Decision Date | 05 April 1972 |
| Citation | 60 N.J. 342,289 A.2d 257 |
| Parties | AFFILIATED DISTILLERS BRANDS CORP., a corporation of the State of New York, Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. Arthur J. SILLS, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and Joseph P. Lordi, Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the Department of Law and Public Safety of New Jersey, Appellants-Cross-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Charles Danzig, Newark, for the respondent-cross-appellant (Riker, Danzig, Scherer & Brown, Newark, attorneys).
Alfred C. Clapp, Newark, for the intervenors (Clapp & Eisenberg, Newark, attorneys; Alfred C. Clapp, and Stuart L. Pachman, Newark, of counsel).
Elias Abelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellants-cross-respondents (George F. Kugler, Jr., Atty. Gen., attorney; David S. Piltzer, Deputy Atty. Gen., on the brief).
John J. Francis, Jr., Newark, for certain wholesalers as amicus curiae (Shanley & Fisher, Newark, attys.; Harold H. Fisher and Pitney, Hardin & Kipp by S. Joseph Fortunato, Newark, of counsel; John J. Francis, Jr., Newark, on the brief.
We originally held in this case that the tied-house prohibition in the first amendatory paragraph of Chapter 58 of the Laws of 1966, N.J.S.A. 33:1--43, was valid but that the 'grandfather clause' therein was unconstitutional. We further held that this clause was severable from the main body of the aforesaid paragraph. 56 N.J. 251, 265 A.2d 809 (1969). The facts are fully recited in our earlier opinion and need not be repeated here.
Subsequent to our decision several wholesale licensees who would be protected by the 'grandfather clause' moved to intervene on the ground that they had not been heard and that the effect of our decision would jeopardize their businesses. Leave to intervene was granted and the effect of the decision was stayed. The intervenors and the plaintiff, Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp., then petitioned for a rehearing. After oral argument thereon, we reserved decision on the petitions and remanded the matter to the Chancery Division for testimony with respect to the identity, interest and volume of business of the persons affected by the 'grandfather clause' and with respect to the identity, interest and volume of business of the holders of Class A licenses (N.J.S.A. 33:1--10) as of the date of the passage of Chapter 58. We also continued the stay until further order. On the return of this testimony to us, we directed further argument as if the petitions for rehearing had been granted. We grant the petitions and proceed to consider the points raised thereby in the light of the additional evidence.
The plaintiff now urges us to reverse our earlier holding regarding the constitutionality of the tied-house prohibition of the first amendatory paragraph of Chapter 58. Alternatively, it argues that the 'grandfather clause' is unconstitutional but that we erred in finding it severable from the remainder of the statute. Defendants, the Attorney General and the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, ask us to reexamine the constitutionality of the 'grandfather clause' only and to reverse our earlier opinion that that clause was invalid. Intervenors take the position that the 'grandfather clause' is constitutional but that if it is held to be invalid, it is not severable and the entire provision must fall. In other words, they contend the provision must stand or fall in its entirety. Finally, amicus curiae, representing 'certain wholesalers,' asserts that the original decision was correct in all respects or, alternatively, that we should reverse only that part thereof which held the 'grandfather clause' unconstitutional.
After a full review of all the evidence presented on remand, we are satisfied that our original decision that the 'grandfather clause' was unconstitutional should not be disturbed. However, the evidence has raised a substantial question regarding the severability of the 'grandfather clause' from the remainder of the statute. When this case was originally argued before us, we were led to believe that only a 'handful of manufacturers' having a relatively small share of the market would be affected by our decision. Evidence on remand has shown this to be incorrect. It now appears that about one-third of those holding wholesale licenses representing at least 15% Of the sales of spirits and at least 25% Of the sales of wine would be protected by the 'grandfather clause' if it were valid.
Severability is a question of legislative intent. That intent must be determined on the basis of whether the objectionable feature of the statute can be exercised without substantial impairment of the principal object of the statute. 56 N.J. at...
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