Afscme Council 25 Local 1690 v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth.

• Docket Number: 360818
• Decision Date: 29 June 2023
• Parties: AFSCME COUNCIL 25 LOCAL 1690, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

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AFSCME COUNCIL 25 LOCAL 1690, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 360818

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 29, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 21-010642-CL

Before: Riordan, P.J., and Borrello and Boonstra, JJ.

Per Curiam

Plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted^[1] the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss in lieu of answer under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by collateral estoppel) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) and denying plaintiff's cross-motion for summary disposition in this arbitration action. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The initial appeal in this case arose from a May 2019 arbitration decision in favor of defendant. Context and background for this dispute is summarized in this Court's opinion in AFSCME Council 25 Local 1690 v. Wayne Co Airport Auth, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 11, 2021 (Docket No. 352500):

Plaintiff is a union that represents certain employees of defendant. One class of employees that plaintiff represents are those classified as Department Manager IV (DMIV) employees. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governs the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Whenever a dispute arises over the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the CBA and the parties cannot resolve the dispute on their own, the CBA requires that the dispute be submitted to an arbitrator to resolve.

In this case, two provisions of the CBA are at issue. One provision addresses the general authority of the arbitrator. Specifically, Article 10.04, Step 4(E) states:

The arbitrator shall have no authority to amend, alter or modify this Agreement. Further, the arbitrator shall limit the decision strictly to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of this Agreement and shall be without authority to make any decision contrary to, or inconsistent with, or modifying or varying, in any way, the terms of this Agreement; or granting any wage increases or decreases.

The other provision states that a wage increase must be provided under certain conditions. Article 34.07 states:

Should a newly-hired employee be placed in the pay grade at a higher rate than other bargaining unit members in the same classification, the pay rate of those bargaining unit member(s) will be increased to that of the newly-hired employee.

The dispute over these provisions arose after defendant hired Samuel Kaufman as a DMIV-Technology Services System Engineer. Defendant hired Kaufman at a salary of $85,000 per year-a pay rate higher than that of any other DMIV employee.

Shortly after defendant hired Kaufman, plaintiff filed a grievance, alleging that Article 34.07 required defendant to raise the pay rates of the other DMIV employees so that they all received $85,000 per year.

Plaintiff demanded that defendant raise the annual wage of all DMIV employees to $85,000 and provide back pay for the eight weeks that Kaufman was paid at a higher rate. The arbitrator denied plaintiff's request and granted an award in favor of defendant. Although plaintiff's and defendant's arguments concerned only the interpretation of Article 34.07, the arbitrator considered only Article 10.04, Step 4(E) of the CBA, which, he reasoned, prohibited him from granting a wage increase as a remedy:

Here the nature of the grievance filed is requesting an increase in wages for certain employees in the bargaining unit. Article 10.04, Step 4(E) clearly and unmistakably shows us that a grievance remedy that grants any wage increase is a remedy inconsistent with the article. The Arbitrator must consider and apply Art. 10.04, Step 4(E) as governing his authority to decide this case.

Since there is no other request for remedy other than the increase in wages for certain bargaining unit members, there is nothing within my jurisdiction to operate on. This case must be closed with that result, and without an award.

Notably, the arbitrator did not discuss whether Article 10.04, Step 4(E)'s prohibition of granting wage increases could be reconciled with Article 34.07's mandate of providing pay rate increases.

After the arbitrator's award in favor of defendant plaintiff filed a complaint with the trial court seeking to vacate the arbitration award and remand to another arbitrator. Plaintiff argued the arbitration award was invalid because the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his authority. Plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator's application of Article 10.04, Step 4(E) essentially nullified Article 34.07. And because the CBA prohibits an arbitrator from "amend[ing], alter[ing] or modifying" the terms the CBA, plaintiff reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his contractual power.

In lieu of filing an answer, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant argued that because the arbitrator applied a valid provision of the CBA in deciding to dismiss the grievance, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority. Further, because the arbitrator acted within the scope of his contractual authority, the trial court could not vacate the award. Plaintiff then filed a cross-motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) for the same reasons detailed in its complaint.

Finding that the arbitrator had a rational basis for his decision, the trial court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals that decision, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. [AFSCME Council 25 Local 1690, unpub op at 1-3.]

On appeal, this Court held that because the arbitrator completely disregarded Article 34.07, he exceeded the scope of his authority. Id. at 4-5. Further, because the arbitrator only considered Article 10.04, Step 4(E), and not Article 34.07, in his decision, "the arbitrator failed to tether his award to his interpretation and application of the CBA." Id. at 5. Based on this failure, this Court reversed the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, and remanded the case "for further arbitration." Id.

After this Court's remand, the arbitrator sent a letter to the parties, stating that because the parties did not challenge the facts found in his original decision or allege that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant finding additional facts, there was no need for a hearing or further fact-finding. The arbitrator invited the parties to inform him of any disagreements, and concluded with a request for briefs from the parties. The next day, the arbitrator sent a second letter to the parties, stating that he would not accept any additional evidence because the parties did not challenge the adequacy of the record, there was a fair hearing, briefing of the issues, and a reasoned award, and this Court remanded for a specific reason. The arbitrator issued his supplemental arbitration opinion and award, concluding, based on the parties' arguments and the record, that although defendant violated Article 34.07, because the language of Article 10.04, Step 4(E) placed a specific limitation on the arbitrator's authority to grant wage increases, this language trumped that of Article 34.07. As such, the arbitrator could not grant the wage increase remedy under Article 34.07, and denied plaintiff's grievance.

Plaintiff filed its complaint to set aside the supplemental arbitration decision, claiming that the arbitrator denied plaintiff the opportunity to submit relevant and material evidence, and exceeded the scope of his authority by nullifying Article 34.07 of the CBA. Plaintiff argued that because the parties did not base their initial arguments on Article 10.04, Step 4(E), there was no evidence on the record related to Article 10.04, Step 4(E) and, thus, the record was incomplete. But, plaintiff argued, the arbitrator denied plaintiff the opportunity to submit additional evidence related to Article 10.04, Step 4(E). Because this Court expressly remanded this case for "further arbitration," plaintiff averred that the arbitrator erred in denying it the opportunity to submit additional evidence, and exceeded the scope of his authority by reading Article 10.04, Step 4(E) to nullify Article 34.07.

In lieu of answering plaintiff's complaint, defendant moved to dismiss under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). According to defendant, this Court remanded the case solely for the arbitrator to address and interpret Article 34.07. Defendant claimed that the parties had an opportunity to submit to further fact-finding or additional hearings before the arbitrator issued his supplemental opinion, but agreed it was not necessary. Because no new facts or issues were submitted to the arbitrator, defendant asserted that plaintiff could not claim the arbitrator made his decision in error. As such, based on the parties' supplemental briefs, the arbitrator validly exercised his authority to determine that Article 10.04, Step 4(E) trumped Article 34.07, and precluded him from granting a wage increase under Article 34.07. Because the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority when issuing his final judgment, defendant requested that the trial court dismiss plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary disposition, arguing that it should have been permitted to present the affidavit of AFSCME advocate, Richard Johnson, which provided insight on the history of the CBA and how to construe Articles 10.04, Step 4(E) and 34.07 together. Because this relevant, material evidence would have aided the arbitrator in his interpretation of the CBA, plaintiff claimed that the arbitrator erred in denying plaintiff the opportunity to present it. Plaintiff also argued that although the arbitrator found defendant violated the terms of ...