AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dep't of Correction

• Decision Date: 09 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18187.,18187.
• Citation: 298 Conn. 824,6 A.3d 1142
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 1565 v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION et al.

6 A.3d 1142

298 Conn. 824

AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 1565

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION et al.

No. 18187.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 23, 2010.

Decided Nov. 9, 2010.

Todd D. Fernow, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Anthony D. Collins and Nancy E. Martin, Wethersfield, filed a brief for the American Immigration Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Edward J. Gavin, Bridgeport, Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, and Elisa L. Villa, Bristol, filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, PALMER, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

KATZ, J.

The plaintiff, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment denying the plaintiff's application to vacate an arbitration award holding that the named defendant, the department of correction,¹ had just cause to discharge its employee, Eunice Smith. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 321, 322, 945 A.2d 494 (2008). The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly rejected its claims that, by relying on Smith's admission into a pretrial program for accelerated rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56e ² as evidence of her alleged misconduct, the arbitrator had issued an award that: (1) exceeded the arbitrator's authority in violation of General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4); ³ and (2) violated the

[6 A.3d 1145, 298 Conn. 828]

clear public policy underlying accelerated rehabilitation. We conclude that the arbitrator's award violated a clear and significant public policy, which is that acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation is not evidence of guilt, that it cannot be used as evidence of guilt, and that, indeed, acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation has no probative value on the issue of guilt or innocence of the charged offense. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following facts and procedural history, based on the "[s]tatement of the [c]ase" recited in the arbitrator's award. "On January 17, 2003, as the result of a police investigation into a complaint that Smith, a correction officer, had threatened to shoot a coworker for refusing to answer questions about a union related posting, Smith was arrested and charged with making threats, breach of the peace and inciting injury to a person. On January 19, 2003, the police conducted a search of Smith's residence in order to confiscate a weapon registered to her. Due to the officers' discovery of a partially smoked marijuana cigarette and a pill bottle under Smith's bed, Smith was charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

"On May 19, 2003, Smith told the captain conducting the defendant's [administrative] investigation that she had accepted accelerated rehabilitation for the charges against her. On August 27 and September 17, 2003, the defendant held predisciplinary hearings on the matter. Through its investigation, the defendant found that Smith had been arrested and charged with threatening, inciting injury to persons, breach of the peace and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On November 6, 2003, Smith was dismissed from state service for on and off duty misconduct which violatedadministrative directive 2.17 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement [agreement].⁴

"The plaintiff timely filed a grievance on behalf of Smith. After its grievance was denied, the plaintiff proceeded to arbitration. The plaintiff and the defendant were, at all relevant times, parties to [the agreement] that provided for final and binding arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement. Attorney Susan E. Halperin of the state board of mediation and arbitration was appointed as the arbitrator. At the arbitration hearings, which were held on October 28, 2004, and January 28, 2005, the plaintiff submitted that Smith's dismissal was unjustified becausethe defendant had failed to substantiate the violence related claims of the complaining officer. The parties stipulated to the following ... submission: 'Was the dismissal of [Smith] for just cause? If not, what shall the remedy be, consistent with the [parties' contractual just cause standard]?' " Id., at 322-24, 945 A.2d 494.

Following the "[s]tatement of the [c]ase" and a synopsis of the positions taken by both sides, the arbitrator's award provided the following "[d]iscussion and [a]nalysis," in which she identified the factors that she had considered and the facts that she had found. "The [a]rbitrator reviewed and analyzed the record evidence in light of the contractual just cause standard to determine if the evidence supported the dismissal.

"The [a]rbitrator utilized, as guidance in her deliberations, those certain elements of just cause that can be restated as follows:

"1. Was the employee forewarned of the consequences of [her] misconduct?

"2. Was the [e]mployer's rule or order reasonably related to safe and efficient operations?

"3. Did the [e]mployer, before administering the discipline, investigate to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order?

"4. Was the [e]mployer's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?

"5. Did the investigation produce substantial evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged?

"6. Has the [e]mployer applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination?

"7. Was the degree of discipline reasonably related to the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and the employee's past record? ...

"The [a]rbitrator discussed her application of these guidelines with the [p]arties at the outset of the hearing in order that the [p]arties as part of the proceeding could address any issues with regard to their application.

"The [defendant] has the burden in disciplinary matters to prove that [Smith] was guilty of the wrongdoing for which [s]he was charged.

"In the instant matter, [Smith] was terminated for her alleged behavior as it related to both [her] employee conduct and for alleged off-duty criminal charges.

"I find that the alleged threats against the other officer did not necessarily occur as described by the officers' allegations. The [defendant] also concluded that it was not able to fully substantiate the claims. The truth is somewhere between [Smith's] explanation and that of the [other officers].

"I find that the evidence is clear that ... something occurred between the two officers over the issue of the distribution of the [u]nion material concerning [Smith]. The fact remains that the telephone contact by [Smith] with the other officer resulted in a series of events that led to [Smith's] subsequent arrest and dismissal.

"Nonetheless, [Smith] was aware of the consequences related to her conduct and had full notice of the [defendant's] rules regarding such conduct. There is no question that the rules are related to the efficient operation of the [defendant] especially in light of its mandates and mission.

" Although [Smith] claims that she accepted [accelerated rehabilitation] on [the] advice of her attorney, the fact that she asked the court for and was granted [a]ccelerated [r]ehabilitation indicates that she accepted responsibility for the charges and assumes culpability. I find that fact to be substantial evidence of her violations before this arbitration.

"Based on the foregoing, I find that [Smith] was terminated for just cause, and the [defendant] met its burden of proof." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Accordingly, the arbitrator denied the grievance.

The record reveals the following additional procedural history. The plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award on the following grounds: "The [arbitrator] exceeded [her] powers or so imperfectly executed them such that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.... The [arbitrator is] guilty of misconduct by which the rights of the [plaintiff] have been prejudiced.... The award is against public policy." In support of these claims, the plaintiff contended that the arbitrator was limited to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the defendant had had just cause to discharge Smith but, instead, improperly had reliedon Smith's acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff's application to vacate the award. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that the scope of its review was limited because the submission was unrestricted. In light of this fact, the court stated: "This court cannot find that [the arbitrator's award] was an egregious misperformance of duty in violation of ... § 52-418(a)(3) or (4). The court cannot correct errors of fact or law, substituting its judgment for the arbitrator's where the submission was unrestricted."

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's decision denying its application to vacate the award to the Appellate Court, contending that the award violated the public policy underlying the accelerated rehabilitation statute, § 54-56e, and exceeded the arbitrator's authority in violation of § 52-418(a)(4). AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 107 Conn.App. at 322, 945 A.2d 494. The Appellate Court concluded that there was no clear public policy prohibiting an arbitrator, in rendering an arbitration award, from taking into account or drawing an inference from a party's acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation. Id., at 332, 945 A.2d 494. Additionally, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the award manifested an egregious or patently irrational application of the...