Aga v. Harbach

• Decision Date: 22 September 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 669,140 Iowa 606
• Parties: AGA v. HARBACH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

140 Iowa 606

117 N.W. 669

AGA

v.HARBACH.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 22, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; A. H. McVey, Judge.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff, by whom the original action was brought, and for whom on his death his administratrix has been substituted; such injuries being alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, in whose employ he was at the time of receiving such injuries. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and, from the judgment rendered thereon, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Ryan, Ryan & Ryan, for appellant.

Kelleher & O'Connor and Carr, Hewitt, Parker & Wright, for appellee.

McCLAIN, J.

The facts as to the employment of the plaintiff by the defendant are quite fully stated in the opinion of this court on a former appeal in which a judgment on a directed verdict for defendant was reversed. See 127 Iowa, 144, 102 N. W. 833, 109 Am. St. Rep. 377. The numerous questions presented for determination on this appeal by defendant from judgment on a verdict against him may be conveniently disposed of by considering the case with reference to the following questions: Was plaintiff an employé of the defendant in such sense that defendant owed him the duty of furnishing a safe place to work, and warning him of dangers not obvious? Was defendant's negligence in the discharge of these duties the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? And did plaintiff assume the risks of defects in the electric appliances, if any, by reason of which he received his injuries?

1. As to the employment of plaintiff by defendant, the evidence is substantially the same as on the former trial, and little need be added to what was said in the opinion on the former appeal. As pointed out in that opinion, plaintiff was secured by one Boehler, the engineer in charge of the machinery in the engine room of one of defendant's buildings, to act as his substitute in view of a proposed temporary absence, and this employment was under the authority and with the knowledge of defendant's superintendent having supervision of the general operations of the factory. The defendant was therefore charged with knowledge that plaintiff was entering into his employment to perform duties in the engine room, and defendant owed to him the same duty as he owed to any employé engaged for that purpose. Wilson v. Sioux Consol. Mining Co., 16 Utah, 392, 52 Pac. 626;White v. San Antonio Waterworks Co., 9 Tex. Civ. App. 465, 29 S. W. 252. This duty involved furnishing to plaintiff a safe place to work and warning him of any dangers incident to the employment not obvious to the employé. That plaintiff was not charged with knowledge of dangers which were in fact known to Boehler, for whom he was substituted, and that duty to warn did not rest upon Boehler, but upon the defendant acting through his superintendent, was practically settled by what was said in the former opinion. Aga v. Harbach, 127 Iowa, 144 102 N. W. 833, 109 Am. St. Rep. 377.

2. There can be no serious controversy as to the negligence of defendant in failing to provide a safe place to work. In performing his duties about the machinery in his charge, plaintiff was required to use an electric light at each of two places in the room in which he was employed. At each of these places was a socket connected by wires with the incandescent lighting system of the building. But only one bulb was provided, and it was necessary for plaintiff, as it had been the custom of his predecessor, Boehler, to detach this bulb from one socket, and attach it to the other from time to time as he required light at these different places. The brass portion of this bulb was not insulated, and the insulation was also worn off from the wires so that, when plaintiff took hold of the bulb to detach it from one socket to remove it to another, he was likely to receive a slight electric shock from the lightingcurrent. So long as the current was that usual for supplying light by means of incandescent bulbs, there was no serious danger of injury, but the evidence tends to show that, when on one occasion plaintiff attempted to remove the bulb from the socket to which it was attached, a strong charge of electricity passed through his body, which so burned his flesh that he was most severely and permanently injured. As the evidence tends to show want of insulation on the brass part of the bulb and the wires, and, indeed, tends to show that the whole wiring of the room in which plaintiff was employed was defective and out of repair, and not provided with rosettes or small fuses, there can be no question of the sufficiency of the evidence of defendant's negligence to take the case to the jury if defendant was charged with knowledge that the defective condition of these appliances was likely to cause injury. It may be conceded that, so long as the lighting wires were charged with the usual voltage of not to exceed 110 volts, there was no danger of serious injury resulting from defects in insulation; but defendant was charged with knowledge that such electric lighting wires drawing electricity from a supply wire carrying an extremely dangerous current of 1,000 volts, as in this case, may through defects in the transformer, or in other ways become charged with a much larger voltage than that which it was intended to carry, and reasonable care for the safety of employés made it the duty of defendant to protect the employés by proper insulation against such hazard. The duty to adopt every practicable precaution against the dangers incident to the use of electricity is too well settled by decisions of the court to require an extended citation of authorities; but see, as particularly in point, Moran v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 21 R. I. 386, 43 Atl. 874, 45 L. R. A. 267;Voyer v. Dispatch Printing Co., 62 Minn. 393, 64 N. W. 1138;Economy Light & Power Co. v. Hiller, 203 Ill. 518, 68 N. E. 72;Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telegraph Co., 215 Pa. 241, 64 Atl. 515, 114 Am. St. Rep. 958. It is shown by the evidence that defendant's superintendent had knowledge that the electric lighting appliances in the room where plaintiff was employed were defective, and that persons frequently received shocks while transferring the electric light bulb from...