Aga v. United States
Citation | 312 F.2d 637 |
Decision Date | 01 February 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 17145.,17145. |
Parties | James Richard AGA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
James Richard Aga, pro se.
Miles W. Lord, U. S. Atty., and Patrick J. Foley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., filed typewritten brief, for appellee.
Before VOGEL, BLACKMUN and RIDGE, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court denying appellant's Rule 35 motion (18 U.S.C.A.) to correct commencement of the term of a sentence imposed for "escape" (§ 751, T. 18 U.S. C.A.) as recorded in the written judgment, signed by his sentencing Judge and under which appellant was first committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for service thereof.
The pertinent facts are these: Appellant and two companions were jointly indicted in the first count of a four-count indictment for conspiracy (18 U.S.C.A. § 371) to effect their escape from the Federal Correctional Institution at Sandstone, Minnesota. Each of them was separately charged in another count of that indictment with the substantive offense of escape (18 U.S.C.A. § 751). When first arraigned thereon, after advising with counsel, they each entered pleas of "guilty" to the substantive offense and "not guilty" as to the conspiracy charge. Sentence on the guilty pleas was deferred pending trial for the latter-mentioned offense.
On May 2, 1960, appellant (as did his co-defendants) filed a separate motion in the District Court "to change his plea of guilty" for escape "to not guilty." Such motions were granted. A trial date on the indictment as a whole was then set for May 24, 1960. On that date appellant, in the presence of individually-appointed counsel, duly entered a plea of guilty to the two charges made against him, ante. His co-defendants did likewise. Thereupon, sentence was first pronounced on one of appellant's co-defendants and then on appellant, as follows:
The record judgment of sentence and commitment as entered and signed by the District Court on the same date (May 24, 1960) was in form as provided by Form #25, "Appendix of Forms" (F.R. Cr.P. 18 U.S.C.A.). In that "Judgment" and "Commitment" it was recited, among other things, that appellant was thereby "committed to the custody of the Attorney General * * * for a period of three (3) years on count three" of the indictment charging the substantive offense "to be served consecutively, and not concurrently, with the term, or terms, of imprisonment being served at the time the offense herein was committed"; and, that probation be granted on count one (1) thereof, "for the period of three (3) years from termination of sentence on count three."1
On the next day, May 25, 1960, appellant and his co-defendants were returned to court, in the presence of their respective counsel, when their sentencing Judge said to them:
It is appellant's contention here that the aforestated facts establish his "judgment of commitment" as signed by his sentencing Court is "invalid" in that the commencement of the term of his sentence as therein stated is different from that as orally pronounced on May 24, 1960, and that his sentencing Court committed error in not sustaining his Rule 35 motion "to correct the sentence imposed on May 25, 1960" to make the same "to run concurrently as the original sentence was pronounced on May 24, 1960" with the sentence he was then serving, i. e. the sentence from which he escaped.
Appellant's sentencing Court, by memorandum opinion (unpublished)2 denied appellant's Rule 35 motion, on the ground that the only "lawful sentence" imposed on appellant was that set forth in its written "judgment as entered on May 24, 1960." In that memorandum Judge Donovan stated:
The whole gist of appellant's contention as here made may best be exemplified by what is said in Payne v. Madigan, 274 F. 2d 702, 704 (9 Cir., 1960):
To further pinpoint appellant's contention it should be noted that the District Court, at the time of oral pronouncement of sentence in the case at bar on May 24, 1960, did not make any statement of its "intention" as to the time of commencement or the sequence of service of the sentence imposed on appellant in relation to the sentence he was then serving. However, it is manifest in the pronouncement then made that it was the intention of that Court that appellant be "committed to the custody of the Attorney General * * * for imprisonment for a period of three years" for the substantive offense of "escape" and on the same date of its oral pronouncement of sentence it first gave expression of its "intention" regarding the service of that sentence in the written judgment and commitment signed by it. It is only because his sentencing Court, through oversight and inadvertence, failed to make known its "intention" to appellant and his co-defendants when they were first before it for sentencing and because it had them brought back into open court the next day and emphatically, in their presence, orally made its intention clear, that appellant asserts a premise for his instant Rule 35 motion.
In any consideration of appellant's contention, we think it should be called to mind that the common law practice of oral pronouncement of sentence and recordation thereof by the clerk in his minutes has been changed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Miller v. Sanford, 161 F.2d 291 (5 Cir., 1947). Further, that the "determination of guilt" in federal criminal procedure now is that the "judgment of conviction" and sentence as provided in Rule 32(b) thereof, "must be signed by the judge" before it becomes legally effective. (Cf.) Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1563, 6 L.Ed.2d 940 (1960). Hence, after the oral pronouncement of a sentence it is still up to Court to render a "judgment of conviction" which must "set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence" and must be "signed by the judge and entered by the clerk" before commitment for a federal offense can take place. Rule 32(b), F.R.Cr.P. 18 U.S.C.A.
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