Agbara v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. TJS-20-0306 |
| Parties | EMMANUEL AGBARA, Plaintiff, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
The following motions are pending before the Court: the motion for "Leave to File Redacted Versions of a Complaint and Divorce Transcript Attachments" (ECF No. 4) filed by Plaintiff Emmanuel Agbara ("Mr. Agbara"); the "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Redacted Complaint" (ECF No. 9) filed by Defendants Board of Education of Prince George's County, et al.1 (collectively, the "Board Defendants"); the "Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff's Redacted Complaint, and for Sanctions" (ECF No. 16) filed by Defendant Evelyn O. Okoji ("Ms. Okoji"); the "Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, and for Sanctions" (ECF No. 18) filed by Ms. Okoji; the "Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Response in Opposition as an Improper Sur-Reply" (ECF No. 29) filed by the Board Defendants; the "Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Surresponse" (ECF No. 30) filed by Ms. Okoji; and the "Motion for Leave to File a Surreply; and Motion in Opposition to Defendant Okoji's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Surreply" (ECF No. 31) filed by Mr. Agbara.2 Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 4, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, and 32), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6.
This case is about a dispute over the interpretation of a child custody order issued by a Maryland state court. Mr. Agbara claims that the Board Defendants conspired with Ms. Okoji, his ex-wife and the mother of his son, to interpret the child custody order in a way that barred him from picking his child up from school before 5:00 p.m. on Monday, January 6, 2020, and on an unspecified date in October 2019. In Mr. Agbara's shotgun-style, 56-page complaint (complete with unnumbered paragraphs and 500 pages of exhibits), he attempts to cobble together several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the supposed violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. All of this for having been deprived of the ability to pick up his child from school approximately 90 minutes early on two occasions. The defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Agbara's claims and the motions are now ripe for consideration. As explained below, the Court will dismiss all of Mr. Agbara's claims.
Rather than filing a complaint with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Mr. Agbara filed a sprawling history of his marriage to Ms. Okoji, the dissolution of that marriage, and a narrative of his frequent child-custody disputes with Ms. Okoji. Most of the allegations in the Redacted Complaint3 are immaterial to Mr. Agbara's claims. Rather than summarize the entire complaint, the Court will direct its attention to the allegations that are material to Mr. Agbara's claims.
Mr. Agbara and Ms. Okoji were married in 2013. ECF No. 3 at 18. The marriage was not a happy one. Id. Mr. Agbara and Ms. Okoji have one child, a son, who was born in January 2015. Mr. Agbara and Ms. Okoji separated and then divorced. Id. at 25. The divorce was finalized on May 31, 2018. Id. at 25. Under the terms of the Judgment of Absolute Divorce ("Custody Order"), both parents were ordered to share physical and joint legal custody of their son, and Ms. Okoji was granted "primary, residential custody." ECF No. 1-5 at 1-2. The Custody Order directed Mr. Agbara and Ms. Okoji to confer about "all important matters" relating to their son, but it gave "final decision-making" authority for "all educational matters" to Ms. Okoji, and "final decision-making authority for all medical decisions" to Mr. Agbara. Id. at 2. The Custody Order directed Ms. Okoji to enroll the child in a licensed child care center and allowed Mr. Agbara the right to enroll the child in after-school programs once the child reached five years of age. Id. at 3. Mr. Agbara was permitted visitation with his son every other weekend (beginning on Fridays at 5:00 p.m. and lasting until Mondays at 9:00 a.m.) and weekday visitation with his child "every otherMonday at 5:00 p.m. until Tuesday at 9:00 am." Id. at 2. The Custody Order did not state whether Mr. Agbara's right to enroll the child in after-school programs also granted him the ability to pick up his child from school before the normal 5:00 p.m. pickup time on his visitation days, or whether it granted Mr. Agbara the right to pick up his child from school on non-visitation days.
Mr. Agbara's child was enrolled at KECDC. Starting in February 2019, Mr. Agbara began to pick his child up from KECDC at 3:30 p.m. on his visitation days. This is an earlier time than allowed for in the Custody Order, but it was apparently permitted by KECDC. ECF No. 3 at 28. Mr. Agbara suggests that the staff at KECDC may have allowed him to pick up his son at 3:30 p.m. instead of 5:00 p.m. because they confused him "with a fellow who had been picking up the minor child from the school." Id. After the summer vacation in 2019, Mr. Agbara was no longer permitted to pick up his child from school before 5:00 p.m. Id. at 33. School employees explained to Mr. Agbara that their interpretation of the Custody Order (which provides that Mr. Agbara may pick up his child from school at 5:00 p.m. on visitation days) did not allow him to pick his child up from school before 5:00 p.m. Id. Mr. Agbara objected to what he viewed as an overly technical interpretation of the Custody Order and asked what had prompted the school to make this change. Id.
Principal Ezell-Lawson explained that "it was what Ms. Okoji wanted." Id. Because Ms. Okoji was the primary custodian of the child, and because she was the "parent and guardian of the minor child on file at the school," KECDC was "bound to follow her instruction." Id. Apparently, because Ms. Okoji was the person to register the child for the school, and because she did not choose to add Mr. Agbara as a contact in the school's "Blue Book" for the child, the school was obligated to comply with Ms. Okoji's decisions regarding the child, and her decisions alone. Ms. Lamar suggested that Mr. Agbara obtain a modified Custody Order that would allow him to addhimself to the school's "Blue Book" for his son. Id. at 34. Principal Ezell-Lawson suggested that Mr. Agbara attempt to convince Ms. Okoji to add his name to the emergency contact list and the school's other official registration forms so that he would have the ability to pick up his son from the school as he chose. Id.
At some point before January 2020, Mr. Agbara informed Principal Ezell-Lawson that he intended to enroll his child in after-school programs and that he would pick his son up from school "at the end of classes," which appears to be at 3:30 p.m. Id. at 35. Ms. Lamar and Principal Ezell-Lawson told Mr. Agbara that he could not do so because of Ms. Okoji's instructions. Id. at 35. They suggested that Mr. Agbara obtain a separate court order if he wished to pick up his child from school as he requested. Id. On January 2, 2020, Mr. Agbara emailed Principal Ezell-Lawson to remind her of his son's upcoming fifth birthday and to announce his continued intention to pick him up from school at the end of classes for an after-school program. Id.
On January 6, 2020, Mr. Agbara went to KECDC to pick up his son from school. Id. Principal Ezell-Lawson refused to release Mr. Agbara's son to him. Id. at 35-36. She explained that the Custody Order did not give Mr. Agbara access to his son at the time. Id. Later the same day, Principal Ezell-Lawson emailed Mr. Agbara to state that she "just heard back from the General Counsel for Prince George's County Public Schools and per our telephone conversation this afternoon at 2:30, I am responding to you via email." Id. at 36. Principal Ezell-Lawson conveyed that Id.
Mr. Agbara alleges that the defendants' refusal to allow him to pick up his child from school on the afternoon of January 6, 2020, and on some unspecified date in October 2019, violatedhis rights to due process and equal protection, which are secured to him under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it is unclear, Mr. Agbara may have also raised claims against the defendants under Maryland state law.
The Board Defendants and Ms. Okoji have both filed motions to dismiss the Redacted Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). ECF Nos. 9 & 16. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges a court's authority to hear the matter brought by a complaint. Richardson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. RDB-13-1924, 2014 WL 60211, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 7, 2014). Generally, "questions of subject matter jurisdiction must be decided 'first, because they concern the court's very power to hear the case.'" Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 442 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.30[1] (3d ed. 1998)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly exists in the federal court. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court "may consider evidence outside the pleadings" to help determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case before it. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
There are two ways to present a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). "A def...
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