Aggarwal v. Ponce School of Medicine

• Decision Date: 03 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1798,85-1798
• Citation: 837 F.2d 17
• Parties: 43 Ed. Law Rep. 1320, 3 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 307, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 823 Deep AGGARWAL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PONCE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 17

837 F.2d 17

43 Ed. Law Rep. 1320, 3 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 307,

24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 823

Deep AGGARWAL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PONCE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 85-1798.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard June 3, 1987.

Decided Jan. 19, 1988.

Fernando L. Gallardo-Aramburu with whom Woods & Woods, Hato Rey, P.R., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Hector R. Cuprill, Ponce, P.R., with whom Jorge P. Sala, San Juan, P.R., was on brief, for defendant, appellee.

Before BREYER and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges, and RE, ^* Judge.

RE, Chief Judge:

In this diversity action, Dr. Deep Aggarwal sued his former employer, the Ponce School of Medicine (PSM), for breach of contract in not having given timely notice that his one-year employment contract would not be renewed. The jury found for the school, and Dr. Aggarwal appeals the judgment entered against him by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

Specifically, Dr. Aggarwal contends that the district court committed error in having denied his motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. He also contends that the trial judge's remarks, gestures, and adverse rulings manifested an attitude of bias which was prejudicial to his case.

Two questions are presented on this appeal: first, whether the evidence supporting plaintiff was so overwhelming that the district court should have directed a jury verdict, or entered judgment in his favor notwithstanding the verdict; and second, whether the manner in which the trial judge conducted the trial deprived the plaintiff of the right to a fair trial by an impartial judge.

Since the court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment on the jury verdict, and that there is no rational basis for any of the charges of bias, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

THE FACTS

Dr. Deep Aggarwal entered into an employment contract with the Ponce School of Medicine in September 1980. The PSM was formerly the medical school of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico (CUPR). The written contract provided for a one-year term as a nontenured associate professor, and stated that it contained "the complete agreement between the parties." Dr. Aggarwal, however, claims that the PSM administration entered into a special arrangement which permitted outside research during the academic year.

The contract also provided that the rules and regulations of the PSM, pertaining to faculty members, would opportunely be provided. Although PSM did not promulgate a set of regulations until 1985, Dr. Aggarwal asserts that during the 1979-1980 academic year, while employed at the CUPR School of Medicine, he was told that the rules and regulations contained in the CUPR Faculty Manual would be used as guidelines until PSM adopted its own regulations. Hence, Dr. Aggarwal asserts that the reference in the contract pertained to the existing rules of CUPR.

On May 5, 1981, Dr. Aggarwal was notified that his contract of employment with PSM would not be renewed for the following academic year. In this action against PSM, Dr. Aggarwal alleged that PSM breached the contract by failing to notify him before March 1 of its intention not to renew his contract, as required by the Faculty Manual of CUPR. He also alleged that, as a result of the untimely notice, he was unable to find employment for the following year, and remained unemployed at the date this action was commenced.

PSM contended that it was not bound by the renewal provisions of the CUPR Faculty Manual, and that the terms of the written contract constituted the totality of the Voluminous conflicting testimony was offered at the 8-day trial as to these issues, as well as to the performance of both parties under the contract. Although the complaint alleged additional wrongdoing by PSM and requested extensive damages, these claims for relief were either found to be unsubstantiated or barred by the Puerto Rican Civil Code. After plaintiff's motion for directed verdict was denied by the court, the jury found that PSM was not liable to Dr. Aggarwal for breach of contract. The district court also denied the motion made for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment for the defendant, PSM.

school's obligation to Dr. Aggarwal. The contract contained no provision pertaining to notice, and expired on July 31, 1981.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Dr. Aggarwal asserts that, based on the evidence presented at the trial, the only reasonable conclusion the jury could have reached was to find PSM liable for breach of contract. The standard used to evaluate a motion for a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. is the same in both the trial court and the court of appeals, and poses a heavy burden on the moving party. This is especially true when, as in this case, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Musa, 785 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.1986). As the court stated in the Musa case, "we are especially reluctant to require a directed verdict or the entry of judgment n.o.v. in favor of a party with the burden of persuasion." Id.; see Service Auto Supply Co. v. Harte & Co., 533 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir.1976); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2535, at 590-91 (1971).

To determine whether sufficient evidence was offered at trial to support the jury's factual findings, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences that may be drawn. See Rios v. Empresas Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 575 F.2d 986, 989 (1st Cir.1978); Dumas v. MacLean, 404 F.2d 1062, 1064 (1st Cir.1968).

When considering the evidence presented at the trial, "the court may neither weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, [n]or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir.1986). Again, as stated in the Musa case, "it is for jurors, not judges, to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses." 785 F.2d at 372.

On appellate review it is clear that the verdict must be upheld if the evidence fairly would support different conclusions, and "fair minded men may draw different inferences and reasonably disagree as to what the verdict should be...." Dumas, 404 F.2d at 1064; see M.C. Carlisle & Co. v. Cross, 386 F.2d 672, 674-75 (1st Cir.1967); Hobart v. O'Brien, 243 F.2d 735, 741 (1st Cir.) (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Drexler, 220 F.2d 930, 932-33 (5th Cir.1955)), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 830, 78 S.Ct. 42, 2 L.Ed.2d 42 (1957). Hence, the moving party will prevail only when the court finds that the evidence points "so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have arrived at [the] conclusion" actually reached. Chedd-Angier Production Co. v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 934 (1st Cir.1985); see deMars v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 610 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir.1979).

Despite this burden of proof, Dr. Aggarwal contends that the evidence does not sustain the jury's verdict. According to Dr. Aggarwal, the evidence, which consisted of documents and extensive testimony, supports his contention that PSM breached the employment contract by failing timely to notify him of its intention not to renew the contract. Dr. Aggarwal maintains that his employment contract with PSM was governed by the rules and regulations of the CUPR Faculty Manual until the PSM adopted its own. Hence, he contends that PSM breached the contract by failing to notify him by March 1 of the nonrenewal of his contract.

The written contract between the parties provided that Dr. Aggarwal would "dedicate the weekly hours required of the faculty properly, as well as to office work in diverse functions such as tutoring, academic orientation and assistance in administrative tasks of the Faculty...." In addition, the fifth clause of the contract states that "[t]his contract contains the complete agreement between the parties and ... leave[s] without effect any other existing agreement. The parties express that they have not made representations to each other of any class in relation to the contract which does not appear in this document."

Although the contract stated that "[t]he School opportunely will furnish ... the Faculty Manual," it did not mention the CUPR Faculty Manual. Furthermore, the contract did not contain any requirements for notice in the case of nonrenewal, and specifically stated that it was in force from August 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981.

At the trial, Dr. Aggarwal testified that he was told by Dr. Jose Correa, a Dean of CUPR School of Medicine, who subsequently became a Dean at PSM, that PSM would follow the former school's manual. Hence, Dr. Aggarwal asserts that the CUPR rules are the rules referred to in the employment contract. This testimony, however, directly contradicts that of other members of the PSM faculty. Dean Correa testified that he informed the faculty of the CUPR School of Medicine that he believed that PSM would use the CUPR rules and regulations as a guideline, but he denied that he had stated that they would be adopted or incorporated by PSM. Dr. Felix Cortes, chairman of the Medicine Department at CUPR School of Medicine and at PSM, testified that, as one of the faculty members involved in drafting the PSM regulations, he planned to use the CUPR regulations along with those from other medical schools, as models.

The language of the written contract, and testimony of PSM administrators, provide a sufficient basis for the finding of the jury that the CUPR regulations were not applicable, and were not incorporated into the agreement. In view of the conflicting evidence, and the different conclusions that could have been drawn, it was reasonable for the jury to have found that...