Agnew v. Cox
| Decision Date | 22 April 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 15869.,15869. |
| Citation | 254 F.2d 263 |
| Parties | Don AGNEW, Appellant, v. Annabelle COX, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Paul C. Sprinkle, Kansas City, Mo. (Sprinkle, Knowles & Carter, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
Sam Mandell, Kansas City, Mo. (S. David Trusty and Popham, Thompson, Popham, Mandell & Trusty, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and JOHNSEN and VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judges.
This was an action brought by appellee as plaintiff to recover damages on account of personal injuries. We shall refer to the parties as they were designated in the trial court.
It was alleged in plaintiff's complaint that while she was a passenger in an automobile being driven by her husband the automobile was negligently and violently struck from the rear by an automobile being operated by defendant Agnew, that defendant carelessly and negligently operated his automobile at a high and dangerous rate of speed, carelessly and negligently failed to keep a proper lookout ahead, carelessly and negligently failed to stop or slow his automobile but negligently permitted his automobile to collide with the rear of the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, carelessly and negligently failed to turn his automobile aside and avoid striking the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, and carelessly and negligently failed to use ordinary care in the operation of his automobile so as to avoid striking and colliding with the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger; that as a result of the negligence on behalf of defendant she suffered serious injuries to her head, neck, back, spine, body and limbs as a result of which she had undergone and will undergo in the future medical care and treatment and will continue to endure physical pain and suffering. She also alleged that because of her injuries she had been caused to be hospitalized at great expense. She specified and enumerated the character of her injuries and sought damages in the amount of $50,000.
Defendant Agnew by answer put in issue all the material allegations as to his negligence and pleaded that the injuries suffered by plaintiff were due to the negligence of plaintiff in that:
"* * * the driver of the car in which she was seated brought same to a sudden, violent, unusual, unexpected and unnecessary stop without giving a signal when by the exercise of ordinary care on her part she could have warned the driver in time so that the driver could have avoided stopping in the manner aforesaid and the collision would not have occurred."
The action was tried to the court and a jury and at the close of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict which was denied. This motion was renewed at the close of all the testimony and again denied by the court and the case was submitted to the jury on instructions to which no exceptions are here urged. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $20,000. Thereupon the court entered judgment pursuant to the jury's verdict. Defendant then moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive and other enumerated grounds. This motion was denied.
From the judgment so entered defendant prosecutes this appeal and seeks reversal on the sole ground that the verdict was excessive, the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, and the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion for new trial because of that fact.
No error is urged as to the ruling of the court in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, no error is urged as to any of the rulings of the court on the question of the admissibility of evidence, and neither is any error urged as to the instructions given the jury. In this condition of the record we must assume that no prejudicial errors occurred during the course of the trial and our examination of the evidence, if that is necessary, will be limited to the question of the extent of plaintiff's injuries. In considering this question we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the prevailing party and assume that all conflicts in the evidence have been resolved in her favor. As so viewed the jury might from the evidence have found that plaintiff at the time of trial was thirty-eight years of age, a housewife and the mother of four children aged fourteen, twelve, nine and six years of age respectively; that in 1940 her appendix was removed with satisfactory results and she was in good health thereafter until the time of the accident involved in this action; that at the time of the accident plaintiff's body was thrown forward violently but her neck and head went backward and that shortly after the collision she just seemed to go to pieces, her teeth began to chatter, she began to cry and she could not move her neck normally. When examined by her doctor shortly following the accident plaintiff could not get her head off the pillow; that her neck and whole back were hurting and paining and she was nauseated; that about two days after the accident a bulging appeared at the site of her appendicitis operation scar; that later she was ordered into the hospital where she was X-rayed for various injuries; that she was there treated for a week and given treatment particularly for her physical pain and suffering; that she started menstruating at the hospital and had severe pain all through her abdomen and through her organs; that she had never had any difficulty with her menstrual periods before; that while in the hospital she was fitted with a brace which came down over her shoulders; that it had two cups to hold up her chin and the back of her head; that she wore the brace four to six weeks when her physician removed it because of the pain it caused her right shoulder and arm, which would first be painful and then become numb; that another brace was fitted which she wore for about three weeks; that...
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...common law as it existed in 1791 upon the Amendment's adoption, Myra Foundation v. United States, 8 Cir., 267 F.2d 612, 614; Agnew v. Cox, 8 Cir., 254 F.2d 263, 267, and to earlier English and federal cases, St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ferguson, supra, at page 955 of 182 F.2d. Instanc......
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Jordan v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company, No. W2007-00436-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 1/15/2009)
...will not make their own appraisals." Id. (citing Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 1961); Agnew v. Cox, 254 F.2d 263, 268 (8th Cir. 1958); Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co. v. Sorenson, 220 F.2d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 1955); Sebring Trucking v. White, 187 F.2d 48......
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...trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, Stofer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 8 Cir., 249 F.2d 285, 288; Agnew v. Cox, 8 Cir., 254 F.2d 263, 267-268; Hobart v. O'Brien, 1 Cir., 243 F.2d 735, 744, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 830, 78 S.Ct. 42, 2 L.Ed.2d 42, rehearing denied 35......
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