Aguiar v. Whiteley

• Decision Date: 08 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. SA-15-CV-14-DAE (HWB)
• Parties: ROLAND A. AGUIAR, No. 319513, Plaintiff, v. KATHERINE WHITELEY, Physician, DAVID GUARDIOLA, RN, KAYLA A. SMITH, LVN, BEXAR COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER, UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, and ROBERT B. GREEN CLINIC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

ROLAND A. AGUIAR, No. 319513, Plaintiff, v. KATHERINE WHITELEY, Physician, DAVID GUARDIOLA, RN,KAYLA A. SMITH, LVN, BEXAR COUNTY ADULT DETENTIONCENTER,¹ UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, and ROBERT B. GREEN CLINIC, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. SA-15-CV-14-DAE (HWB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

February 8, 2016

SECOND MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Roland A. Aguiar has filed a civil rights action naming as defendants a physician and two nurses employed at the Bexar County Adult Detention Center ("BCADC"), the BCADC, University Hospital, and the Robert B. Green Clinic and demanding five million dollars in monetary damages as well as injunctive relief for alleged inadequate medical care. Defendant Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Hospital (henceforth "Hospital District"), the Robert B. Green Clinic, and Correctional Health Care Services has filed a pair of motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action (ECF nos. 30 & 34). For the reasons set forth below,the Hospital District's motions to dismiss will be granted. Additionally, the Court will sua sponte dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendant BCADC as frivolous and for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Court will also sua sponte dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendants Guardiola and Smith as frivolous.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action on January 8, 2015, alleging (1) on or about January 10, 2013, while plaintiff was an inmate at the BCADC, a nurse named David Guardiola employed at the BCADC (a) erroneously administered the wrong dosage of an unspecified medication to plaintiff, causing plaintiff to suffer over-dose reactions and (b) subsequently injured plaintiff's legs, ribs, and lower spinal area when this defendant turned plaintiff on plaintiff's back; (2) on the same date, another BCADC nurse named Kayla A. Smith was present, observed plaintiff's situation, but failed to take action to prevent injury to plaintiff or to respond to plaintiff's medical situation; (3) BCADC physician Dr. Katherine Whiteley was informed on an unspecified date of the actions of the two nurses but refused to take corrective action or to furnish plaintiff with unspecified medical care for plaintiff's injuries and medical needs; (4) plaintiff was subsequently taken to University Hospital where he received inadequate medical care from January, 2013 through August 20, 2014; (5) at some point, plaintiff was taken to Robert B. Green Clinic where an unidentified nurse negligently inserted a catheter into plaintiff, causing plaintiff unspecified harm; and (6) at all times relevant to the foregoing events, plaintiff was recuperating from a motor vehicle accident which rendered plaintiff a paraplegic who lacked control over his bowels.

Defendant Whiteley filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's claims against her for failure to state a cause of action (ECF no. 11), which this Court granted in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued May 1, 2015 (ECF no. 14).

II. Defendant Bexar County Hospital District's Motions to Dismiss

Defendant Bexar County Hospital District (henceforth "Hospital District") is a hospital district created under state statutory and state constitutional authority which operates several health care facilities in Bexar County, Texas, including the Robert B. Green Clinic, University Hospital, and Correctional Health Care Services. Neither the Robert B. Green Clinic, University Hospital, nor Correctional Health Care Services are separate jural entities capable of suing or being sued independently of the Hospital District. All of the allegedly improper treatment and inadequate medical care about which plaintiff complains in this Section 1983 lawsuit was rendered at facilities operated by the Hospital District.

In its first motion to dismiss, the Hospital District argues plaintiff's lawsuit fails to state a cause of action because (1) the Hospital District may not be held liable in a Section 1983 action based upon respondeat superior or any other theory of vicarious liability and (2) plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that any of the incidents about which plaintiff complains were the products or results of any action or omission taken by final Hospital District policymakers or of any official policy, longstanding custom, or widespread practice attributable to final Hospital District policymakers (ECF no.30). In its second motion to dismiss, the Hospital District argues plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing he ever filed a grievance or took any action to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit against the Hospital District (ECF no. 34).

III. Standard of Review Under Rule 12(b)(6), FED.R.CIV.P.

The pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a)(2), FED.R.CIV.P., (which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief") does not require detailed factual allegations but it does demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund ex rel. Bunte v. Health Special Risk, Inc., 756 F.3d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 2014). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund ex rel. Bunte v. Health Special Risk, Inc., 756 F.3d at 360. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Nor does a complaint suffice if it renders "naked assertions" devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.

IV. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

When Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"), it specifically amended Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i) and added new § 1915A to provide that a complaint filed by a prisoner could be dismissed as frivolous regardless of whether any filing fee or portion thereof had been paid. Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1041 (1999). Therefore, plaintiff's claims herein are subject to review under § 1915(e) and dismissal as frivolous regardless of whether he paid any portion of the filing fee in this cause. See Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding the federal district courts are required to dismiss any action brought by a prisoner that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a cause of action, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief); 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complainant's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). The PLRA moved the relevant statutory provision addressing dismissal for frivolousness from former subsection (d) of § 1915 to new subsection (e) (2) (B) and expanded the scope of that statute to expressly authorize dismissals of lawsuits as frivolous regardless of whether a filing fee or any portion thereof had been paid. Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) (2) (B) (i).

In an action filed in forma pauperis, a court may raise sua sponte the issue of whether an action is malicious or frivolous under § 1915(e). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. at1833; Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding it is appropriate for a district court to sua sponte determine whether a claim was barred by limitations); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d at 1434. Dismissal of a claim as frivolous under § 1915(e) is permissible where the claim lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S. Ct. at 1831; Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d at 156; Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th Cir. 1998); Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d at 580 (holding frivolous complaints by a prisoner in administrative segregation regarding restrictions on his recreation and visitation time, possession of personal property, ability to purchase items from the commissary, denial of desert, required jump suit, handcuffs during all transfers, and...