Aguilar-Medina v. Shinn

• Decision Date: 05 March 2021
• Docket Number: CV-20-08068-PCT-MTL (JZB)
• Parties: Marco Antonio Aguilar-Medina, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Marco Antonio Aguilar-Medina, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.

No. CV-20-08068-PCT-MTL (JZB)

United States District Court, D. Arizona

March 5, 2021

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

ORDER

Honorable John Z. Boyle, United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner Marco Antonio Aguilar-Medina has filed a pro se First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his petition. The Court finds that Petitioner's claims fail on the merits. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

II. Background.

A. Facts and Procedural Background.

The presentence report contains the following summary:

On July 9, 2016, at approximately 8:27 p.m., Arizona Department of Public Safety troopers responded to 911 calls regarding a single vehicle collision on Interstate 17. The driver, eventually identified as [Aguilar-Medina] was traveling southbound crossing the northbound traffic lanes, and landing on the right [side] of the vehicle on the northbound dirt shoulder.

During the collision, three underage passengers were unrestrained and ejected. [Aguilar-Medina] was trapped inside and had to be extricated from the driver's seat. His [17-year-old] daughter, the front passenger, was partially ejected and determined to be deceased. A … boy and [another] girl, [Aguilar-Medina's] children and passengers, were found in the median. The boy was medevacked to Phoenix Children's Hospital, and the … girl was transported by ambulance to Flagstaff Medical Center. [Aguilar-Medina] was also transported to Flagstaff Medical Center. He smelled of alcoholic beverages. Two cans of beer were later found near the vehicle.

[Aguilar-Medina] was intubated and unconscious when detectives arrived at the hospital. They obtained documentation of blood draws done on [Aguilar-Medina]. A draw done at 10:51 p.m. provided an ethanol reading of 0.177% B.A.C.

[Aguilar-Medina's] daughter had surgery for a broken femur. [Aguilar-Medina's 17-year-old] daughter died as a result of multiple blunt force injuries. A family of witnesses to the collision saw [Aguila-Medina's] vehicle pass them prior to the accident. They did not believe he was speeding, nor did they observe anything that alerted them to the vehicle.

During the continued investigation, … the mother of the children[] told detectives that her children had been in Utah to stay with their father until the end of July, and she expected to return to pick them up. She said she knew his truck was not in good condition, but did not know of any mechanical problems. She was asked about his drinking, and she told detectives that she believed he had a problem, and had advised that he had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous recently. Her children told her that her deceased daughter had driven at one point, because their father had been drinking and was sleepy.

The two younger children were interviewed at the Child Help Center, and [stated that their] father [had been] drinking beer. The young boy advised, “We said stop drinking and he didn't listen.” The girl recounted her sister screaming at her father in Spanish and then her father “turned really hard” and she felt the car “going in circles.” She, too, recounted [Aguilar-Medina's] alcohol purchases. Both children stated that there were no seatbelts in the backseat, but believed [that the front seats] had seatbelts.

(Doc. 8-1, Ex. B, at 12-13.)

On July 21, 2016, a Coconino County grand jury indicted Aguilar-Medina for one count of manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated DUI. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, at 4.) On November 21, 2017, Petitioner pleaded no contest to all charges. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. C, at 20.) On January 23, 2018, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to presumptive, consecutive sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 3. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. D, at 26-28.) The court imposed one-year sentences on Counts 4 and 5, to run concurrently with Counts 1, 2, and 3. (Id. at 29-30.)

B. Post-Conviction Review Proceedings.

On February 16, 2018, Petitioner filed a timely notice of PCR review. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 56.) On June 29, 2018, Petitioner's counsel filed a notice stating that no issues could be raised under Arizona Rule 32 of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. K, at 66.) On October 4, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition that raised five claims. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. L, at 74.) On January 24, 2019, the trial court summarily dismissed Aguilar-Medina's PCR petition finding that he had not raised a colorable claim. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. P, at 143.)

On February 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. Q, at 145.) On December 10, 2019, the Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. U, at 98.)

C. Petitioner's Federal Habeas Petition.

On March 23, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court summarized Petitioner's claims:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he was subjected to “[f]undamental manifested injustice” because he is “actual[ly] innocent” and there was “no factual basis to support the conviction[s] and sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.” In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated because the “evidence that he used a pick-up truck as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument” was “constitutionally insufficient.” In Ground Three, Petitioner claims he was subjected to “double jeopardy: and a “multilicious [sic] indictment.” In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that his Sixth and Fourteen Amendment rights were violated because he received ineffective assistance of his defense and Rule 32 counsel.

(Doc. 3 at 1-2.)

On June 16, 2020, Respondents filed their Response to the Petition. (Doc. 8). On September 10, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply. (Doc. 16.)

III. Standard of Review.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule on the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state's “highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,' the prisoner must ‘fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”).

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Id. at 33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present' a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged violations of a state prisoner's federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner's claims. See Id. at 731-32. Under these principles, a habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court's procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate' basis for the court's decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989).

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, “if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,' or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732). See also Boyd...