Aguilar v. Flores

• Decision Date: 22 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1472,76-1472
• Parties: Francisco AGUILAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Santiago FLORES and Elgin Venenga, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1161

549 F.2d 1161

Francisco AGUILAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Santiago FLORES and Elgin Venenga, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 76-1472.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1977.

Decided Feb. 22, 1977.

James W. Crawford, and Tom Riley, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellant.

Bruce L. Walker, Iowa City, Iowa for appellee; William M. Tucker, Iowa City, Iowa, on brief.

Before LAY, ROSS and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

This diversity action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on a county road near Grundy Center, Iowa. At the trial the federal district court instructed the jury under counts of ordinary negligence and res ipsa loquitur and refused to apply the Iowa guest statute, Iowa Code § 321.494 (1973). ¹ The plaintiff, Francisco Aguilar, was awarded damages for personal injuries against the defendants Elgin Venenga, the owner of the automobile, and Santiago Flores, the driver at the time of the accident. The defendants have appealed.

On May 16, 1973, Flores offered Aguilar a gratuitous ride from Grundy Center, Iowa, to Waterloo, Iowa, so Aguilar could look for employment in Waterloo. The evidence showed the defendant Flores had been drinking excessively. During the return trip he drove the automobile into a ditch. Aguilar got out of the car, allegedly to push it or to direct Flores out of the ditch. The automobile was subsequently backed into Aguilar and he suffered personal injuries.

The major issue on appeal is whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable so that the defendant may assert the defense of assumption of risk. All parties concede that Iowa law controls.

In an early Iowa case, the Supreme Court of Iowa announced that it would apply a strict construction to the Iowa guest statute. Under this construction the application of the guest statute depended on whether the plaintiff was actually "riding in" ² the vehicle at the time of the accident. See Puckett v. Pailthorpe, 207 Iowa 613, 223 N.W. 254 (1929).

In 1962 the court disavowed the application of a strict construction of the statute followed in Puckett and indicated that the rule of liberal construction was now well-established. In Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 118 N.W.2d 41 (1962), the Supreme Court of Iowa applied the guest statute to a plaintiff who was standing by the door of an automobile attempting to enter when the car moved backward. The court stated:

Although our guest statute is in derogation of the common law it is to be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in securing justice (citations omitted).

118 N.W.2d at 44.

In applying the guest statute in Rainsbarger the court quoted with approval from Tallios v. Tallios, 350 Ill.App. 299, 112 N.E.2d 723 (1953):

The beginning and end of that relation is not unlike the beginning and end of the relation of carrier and passenger for hire in a public conveyance. In the latter case the relation begins with the attempt of the passenger to enter the conveyance and ends when he has alighted in safety on completion of the journey. . . . So, the relation of host and guest between automobile owner or driver and a passenger riding without payment of compensation begins when the guest attempts to enter the automobile, and ends only when he has safely alighted at the end of the ride.

112 N.E.2d at 725.

The Rainsbarger opinion similarly relies on Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 N.W.2d 733 (1950). There the Supreme Court of Michigan applied the guest statute to a situation where the passenger was not physically "riding in" the car at the time.

The federal district court here determined that Rainsbarger is the Supreme Court of Iowa's most recent pronouncement regarding who is a guest and that it indicates that the court would apply a liberal construction to the guest statute. The court determined however, that in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974), a case challenging the statute's constitutionality, "it appears that seven of the nine justices currently view the guest statute as unwise or unconstitutional." The district court therefore concluded that "in light of Keasling, supra, the Iowa Supreme Court would presently follow the series of cases which predated Rainsbarger, and would thus not apply the guest statute to bar plaintiff's claims on the facts of the instant case." ³

Although "great weight" is to be accorded to the district court's determination of local law, this court is not bound by that determination. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings, 501 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974); Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856, 94 S.Ct. 158, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973). In reviewing the district court's determination we note that "the responsibility of the federal courts, in matters of local law, is not to formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to ascertain and apply it." Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941). The United States Supreme Court gives the following direction regarding the importance of a decision by a state's highest court:

(T)he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law unless it has later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or restricted (citation omitted).

West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940) (emphasis added).

Here the district court apparently determined that the Keasling opinion was "clear and persuasive" indication that the Supreme Court of Iowa would no longer apply the Rainsbarger "liberal" construction view of the guest statute. We cannot agree.

The Keasling case was an attack on the constitutionality of the Iowa guest statute under equal protection and due process challenges. There was no question of, and no determination made as to, whether a "strict" or "liberal" construction should be applied in determining who is a guest. Although four dissenting justices indicated that they felt the statute was unconstitutional, and three concurring justices suggested it was unwise, there is no "clear and persuasive" indication that the court would overrule its Rainsbarger decision. To the contrary, we cannot conclude from Keasling that the Iowa court would apply the statute any differently than before.

The...