Aguilar v. Mgmt. & Training Corp.
Decision Date | 24 October 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 16-00050 WJ/GJF |
Parties | MARISELA AGUILAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION d/b/a MTC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Opposed Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability, filed July 21, 2017 (Doc. 160). Having reviewed the parties' pleadings and the applicable and controlling law, the Court finds that Defendant's summary judgment motion is well-taken and, therefore, is granted with respect to Plaintiffs' claims asserted under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 ("FLSA") and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M.S.A. §§ 50-4-1 to 50-4-33 ("NMMWA").
This is a collective/class action lawsuit filed by current or former employees of Defendant Management and Training Corporation ("Defendant" or "MTC") who claim they were not paid for some of their hours worked on assignment for MTC at the Otero County Prison Facility near Chaparral, New Mexico. The lawsuit asserts claims for unpaid wages and overtime, as well as other statutory damages and the recovery of attorneys' fees, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 ("FLSA") and/or the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M.S.A. §§ 50-4-1 to 50-4-33 ("NMMWA"). Plaintiffs contend they should be compensated for various pre- and post-shift activities which they argue are compensable, namely (a) waiting at the prison, (b) clearing security, (c) taking and returning equipment, and (d) meeting and reporting to other detention officers. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20 - 22.) In addition, Plaintiffs accuse MTC of unlawful "rounding" practices with respect to their compensation.
The issues must be considered in the context of the challenged activities performed by the detention officers to and from work. Plaintiffs claim that they should be paid for the following activities to and from their posts:
The FLSA does not specifically define "work," so courts must determine on a case-by-case basis whether an employee's activities are compensable under the FLSA. See Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir.2006) (citations omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 785.6. The Department of Labor has adopted the "continuous workday" rule, which means that the "workday" is generally defined as "the period between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee's principal activity or activities." § 790.6(b). IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28 (2005) ("Alvarez"). The term "principal activity or activities" embraces all activities which are "an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities." Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 21 ("Alvarez"). An activity is integral and indispensable if it is an "intrinsic element" of the employee's principal activities, and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he or she is to perform his or her principal activities. See Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 513, 514 (2014), cited in Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs.,L.L.C., No. CIV 16-621 JB/LF, 2017 WL 1709695, at *24 ); Baker v. Barnard Const. Co., 146 F.3d 1214, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998) ( ).
The FLSA was amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act to exclude normal home to work travel from the scope of paid time under the FLSA, as well for any activities that are merely "preliminary to or postliminary" to their principal activities at work. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a); 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. The Portal-to-Portal Act's amendment, however, did not change earlier descriptions of the term "work." In Alvarez, the Supreme Court clarified that time spent after the beginning of the first principal activity, including time spent walking, is not affected by §4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §254(a), and is therefore compensable. 546 U.S. at 28 (2005). In Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956), the Supreme Court found that Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act still intending for an employee's activities to fall within the protection of the FLSA "if they are an integral part of and are essential to the principal activities of the employees."
Thus, activities performed either before or after the regular work shift are still compensable "if those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed." Id. at 256. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further clarified this rule in Alvarez, explaining that any activity that is "integral and indispensable" to a "principal activity" is itself a "principal activity" and is thus compensable under the FLSA. Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. at 525. Further, where an employee's activity "takes all ofa few seconds and requires little or no concentration," then the activity is "properly considered not work at all." See, e.g., Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV 16-621 JB/LF, 2017 WL 1709695, at *23 (citing Smith V Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2006)).1
Under the FLSA, then, a "workday" begins after the beginning of the first principal activity, and activities after that point are compensable and not affected by §4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. In other words, any pre or post shift "principal activity" triggers coverage under the FLSA for other activities that occur after that point. This is why the determination of which (if any) of the activities at issue are considered "principal activities" under the FLSA is so critical. Any activity, even time spent walking, is excluded from the scope of the Portal-to-Portal Act and is compensable as long as the activity occurs after the beginning of the employee's first principal activity and before the end of the employee's last principal activity. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005). Thus, if any of the below activities are found to be compensable, that activity would trigger the "continuous workday." See, e.g., Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV 16-621 JB/LF, 2017 WL 1709695, at *23 ( )(citing Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiffs also claim that they have lost time for which they should be compensated due to Defendant's "rounding" policy, which Plaintiffs claim is unlawful. "Rounding" is addressed in29 CFR §785.48 as a lawful method for averaging start and stop work times where time clocks are used. The practice of "computing working time" by "rounding" is accepted and lawful "provided that the practice "averages out so that the employees are fully compensated for all the time they actually work" and so that "it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked." §785.48(b).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Once that burden is met, the nonmoving party must put forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material...
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