Aguire v. Aguire

• Decision Date: 27 July 1976
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Anthony AGUIRE, Jr. v. Lorraine R. AGUIRE.

Page 948

370 A.2d 948

171 Conn. 312

Anthony AGUIRE, Jr. v. Lorraine R. AGUIRE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 27, 1976.

David S. Maclay, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Donald W. Bicknell, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Richard Fuchs, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Frank J. Hennessy, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff, Anthony Aguire, Jr., for the dissolution of his marriage to the defendant, Lorraine R. Aguire, on the ground that it had broken down irretrievably. In her cross complaint, the defendant also requested that the marriage be dissolved on that ground and claimed alimony, counsel fees, and such further relief as the court deemed proper. By judgment rendered October 23, 1974, the marriage was dissolved and the plaintiff was ordered to convey to the defendant his one-half interest in the marital domicile, to assign to the defendant a loan representing a debt owed the plaintiff, and to pay periodic alimony to the defendant in the amount of $20 per week. The plaintiff appealed to this court from that judgment, and the issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding periodic alimony to the defendant.

The award of alimony by the court was made pursuant to General Statutes § 46-52, which provides, in part, that '(i)n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46-51.'

The well established judicial standards of review of awards of alimony which were developed under General Statutes § 46-21 apply to review of those awards made under § 46-52. See Chambliss v. Chambliss, 171 Conn. 278, 279, 370 A.2d 924; Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 584, 362 A.2d 835. '(T)rial courts have a distinct advantage over an appellate court in dealing with domestic relations, where all of the surrounding circumstances and the appearance and attitude of the parties are so significant.' LaBella v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 318, 57 A.2d 627, 629. The trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in determining the type, duration, and amount of alimony which is proper in each case. Krieble v. Krieble, 168 Conn. 7, 357 A.2d 475; Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 488,452 A.2d 277. As we stated in DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298, 303 A.2d 709, 712, cited in Pasquariello v. Pasquarielli, supra: "The action of the trial court is not to be disturbed unless it abused its legal discretion, and '(i)n determining this the unquestioned rule is that 'great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.' Dudas v. Ward Baking Co., 104 Conn. 516, 518, 133 A. 591 . . ..' Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352.' Camp v. Booth, 160 Conn. 10, 13, 273 A.2d 714, 716. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. Surabian, 146 Conn. 608, 611, 153 A.2d 463.'

The plaintiff attaches great significance to the fact that the marital relationship was of only six months duration, and cites several ...