Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-57138.,03-57138.
• Citation: 461 F.3d 1114
• Parties: Mara AGUIRRE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; Victoria McKendal, in her official capacity as Coordinator of the Los Angeles Unified School District Due Process Unit, e/s/a Victoria McKendall, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

461 F.3d 1114

Mara AGUIRRE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; Victoria McKendal, in her official capacity as Coordinator of the Los Angeles Unified School District Due Process Unit, e/s/a Victoria McKendall, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 03-57138.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 20, 2005.

Filed August 29, 2006.

Barrett K. Green, Steven A. Groode, Littler Mendelson, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellants.

Paul M. Roberts and Michael E. Jewell, Roberts, Adams & Jewell, Huntington Beach, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-09753-CAS.

Before PREGERSON, CLIFTON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge.

The question before us is one we have not previously addressed: Does the "degree of success" standard announced in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), apply to attorney's fees awards under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. See id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). We hold that it does, and we vacate the judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

In the IDEA, Congress found that it was "in the national interest that the Federal Government have a supporting role in assisting State and local efforts to educate children with disabilities" and "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6), (d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp.2005). See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-84, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (discussing the predecessor to the IDEA, the Education of the Handicapped Act). States who elect to receive federal financial assistance must demonstrate that they have in effect "policies and procedures" to provide disabled children with a "free appropriate public education" through the creation of a tailored program known as an "individualized education program" or "IEP." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a), (a)(1), (a)(4); see Cal. Educ.Code § 56341 (2003 & Supp.2005). The IEP is created by a team that includes the child's parents, teacher, a special education teacher, a school representative and others. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The IDEA broadly requires participating states to provide a parent or guardian who is dissatisfied with either the IEP or the school system's implementation of the IEP with an opportunity to present complaints "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). A parent or guardian who believes that the public school system has denied her child the appropriate education may pursue mediation, an "impartial due process hearing," and an appeal to the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), (f), (g). Ultimately, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made by the state or local education agency may bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), (3); see Cal. Educ.Code § 56505(k). Subject to certain restrictions not relevant here, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under [the IDEA], the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).

B. Facts and Proceedings

Mara Aguirre challenged the Los Angeles Unified School District's ("LAUSD") implementation of a "free and appropriate public education" for her son, Carlos Castro, for the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years. In a hearing before a California special education hearing officer ("SEHO"), Aguirre raised twenty-seven issues—contending, for example, that the school denied her son a "free and appropriate public education" because it failed to prepare daily reports on Carlos's work and behavior, did not provide him with a one-on-one aide, and failed to provide him with occupational therapy. She sought to recover tuition and other expenses incurred when she took Carlos out of public school and enrolled him in a private school, and to secure his continued placement there. Aguirre ultimately prevailed on four of the twenty-seven issues. The SEHO ruled that LAUSD failed to provide Carlos with a "free and appropriate education" as required by IDEA insofar as it failed to conduct a timely assessment for assistive technology and failed to provide the technology. As a result, the SEHO denied Aguirre's request for tuition and other expenses, and awarded Carlos the use of assistive technology for a period not to exceed eight months. The court observed that even without the use of assistive technology—which consisted of a desktop computer, printer, and learning software— Carlos was making excellent progress and so he did not require compensatory counseling or a supplemental writing program. Though she sought reimbursement for a year of private tuition and fees, Aguirre obtained only a few months' use of educational equipment. The hearing officer concluded that "[t]he District prevailed on all issues heard and decided, except to the extent that it denied a [`free and appropriate public education'] in the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school year[s] when it failed to conduct the assistive technology assessment and provide devices in a timely manner." Neither LAUSD nor Aguirre sought further review.

After the hearing, Aguirre sent the district a bill for her attorney's fees and costs, totaling $42,104.92. LAUSD requested a detailed billing statement, indicating which fees had accrued for work done towards the successful claims. Aguirre failed to provide the statement and, after LAUSD refused to pay the fees, she filed a complaint in the district court. She argued that as the prevailing party she was entitled to recover all her fees, while the district claimed that, because she prevailed on only part of her claims, she should receive a reduced award or no award at all. The district court granted Aguirre $21,104.24, reasoning that the petitioner prevailed on a "significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit," but only raised the assistive technology issue partway through the litigation. The sum awarded was calculated based on "reasonable" attorneys' fees and costs incurred on and after the issue was raised. In calculating the amount of the fee award, the district court did not appear to consider the degree of success Aguirre attained. LAUSD appeals.¹

II. ANALYSIS

The IDEA provides that "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In order for a court to award attorney's fees, the parent must (1) be a "prevailing party" and (2) seek "reasonable attorneys' fees."

The district properly found, and the parties do not disagree, that Aguirre was a prevailing party under the IDEA. See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The parties, however, disagree on the standard used to determine a reasonable fee. Aguirre asserts that she is entitled to recover all her fees because she prevailed on a "significant issue." See Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that "[a] prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees is a party which `succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit'" (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933)). She claims that once the California SEHO found fault in Carlos's IEP, the court must award full fees because he was denied a "free and appropriate public education." The LAUSD argues that the "significant issue" test is only the first step in a fee award analysis. It argues that passing the "significant issue" test merely makes Aguirre eligible for a fee award as a prevailing party; it does not mandate recovery of all fees. Accordingly, the school district argues, the court abused its discretion in failing to apply the "degree of success" standard announced by the Supreme Court in Hensley, a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.²

We thus turn to the question whether Hensley applies to attorney's fee awards under the IDEA. We first observe that the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), is nearly identical to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) ("the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability") with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....").

In Hensley, the Supreme Court considered "whether a partially prevailing plaintiff may recover an attorney's fee [under § 1988] for legal services on unsuccessful claims." 461 U.S. at 426, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Court held that a partially prevailing plaintiff generally may not recover fees for her unsuccessful claims: "the level of a plaintiff's success is relevant to the amount of fees to be awarded." Id. at 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Court concluded that "Congress has not authorized an award of fees whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill.... [T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained." Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Significantly, the Court declared the standard announced in Hensley to be "generally...